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INTRODUCTION TO THE PORTFOLIO
This portfolio presents three dossiers that reflect the work completed during the 
Doctorate of Psychology (PsychD) clinical training programme. The Academic 
Dossier will be presented first, followed by the Clinical Dossier and lastly the 
Research Dossier.
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ACADEMIC DOSSIER
The Academic Dossier contains two essays, two problem-based learning accounts 
and two personal and professional discussion group process summaries.
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ADULT MENTAL HEALTH ESSAY - Year 1
My G.P has a 'borderline personality disorder': should this worry me? 
Introduction
If my GP had a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder (BPD), I would not be 
worried. The aim of this essay is to guide the reader through some of my own 
thoughts and feelings in order to depict how I came to this conclusion. I chose to 
take on this title as it raised many interesting questions that challenged me to 
think about the assumptions I was making. After reading the title I found myself 
asking what meaning I placed on my GP having a BPD. I also considered how my 
own identity may influence my thinking in relation to this title. Additionally, I 
experienced a sense of curiosity and wondered how a diagnosis of BPD for my GP 
would impact on our relationship; did I already hold pre conceived ideas on what 
it meant to have a diagnosis of BPD; did I even believe that the diagnosis exists? 
Due to limited space it is important for me to acknowledge that I have only been 
able to present my main arguments in answer to the question; the information 
presented only partly demonstrates the complexity of issues that this subject 
raised for me.
I shall proceed by setting the scene for this essay, firstly by defining who I am, and 
then who my GP is in the context of this essay. I will then go on to define what 
BPD is, its prevalence, and the likely course of symptoms, as well examine the 
potential implications of a GP having a BPD and what effect this would have on 
the GP-patient relationship. Following this I will consider issues of stigma 
surrounding BPD and finally discuss the validity and utility of the BPD diagnosis. 
Throughout the essay I will be reflecting on my own thoughts, feelings and 
assumptions and share how these have shaped my thinking in relation to 
answering the title question.
Who am I in the context of this essay and who is the GP?
When I read the essay title and considered the issues it raised for me, I 
automatically assumed it was my own GP that had a BPD. This was helpful as it 
allowed me to relate better to the essay, and take a more critical stance.
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Following is an explanation of whom I am and who my GP is, so that the reader 
can develop a clearer understanding of my perspective.
I am a 28 year old, British Indian female who has commenced her first year of 
training in clinical psychology. Being raised in an Indian family I was unfamiliar 
with mental health issues and the concept of mental health diagnoses until I 
began to study psychology and work within mental health settings. Having recent 
discussions on mental health issues with both my family and Indian friends I 
realise that this unfamiliarity was also shared by them. In my opinion mental 
health diagnoses is a very Western social construct, and because of my own 
cultural background I sometimes find 'diagnoses' difficult to digest and accept. 
Also, I personally believe it is important to understand the individual and the 
problems they are presented with, and not just understand a person by the 
mental health diagnosis they are given. Consequently, I experienced some 
internal conflict based on some of my professional and personal beliefs when I 
initially read the essay title. On one hand, I felt that a GP with a BPD was 
dangerous as my work experience and conversations with colleagues have 
indicated that someone with a BPD is, for example, 'difficult'. On the other hand I 
believe that one should not be judged by labels they are given, and so I found 
myself questioning exactly what it means for a GP to have a BPD, without the 
presumption that it was something negative.
When I first read the essay title I found myself thinking of the GP in question as 
being a white British middle aged man. I had automatically imagined my GP being 
male as this is the gender I associate most commonly with the role, as well as the 
fact that my current GP is a middle aged male. This is supported by the National 
Health Service (2008) statistics which show that historically more men than 
women have entered into the GP profession. I also assumed the GP was white 
British as I found it difficult to associate BPD with a person from another culture. 
My experience within my own culture is that mental health issues are generally 
not acknowledged or discussed, and thus less easily identifiable, which in turn 
may mean fewer diagnoses of BPD within a minority group. This led me to 
consider how likely it would be to identify a BPD in someone from an Indian 
culture. Research conducted during this essay identified very little information on
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ethnie presentation of BPD. I feel that this would be an interesting avenue for 
future research.
Key features, prevalence and course of borderline personality disorder
To facilitate a clearer understanding of BPD it was helpful for me to define and 
understand its prevalence and course. BPD as defined in the fourth edition text 
revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; 
American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2004), is 'a pervasive pattern of instability 
of interpersonal relationships, self image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that 
begins by early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts'. The 
International Statistical Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders (ICD- 
10, World Health Organisation (WHO), 1992) defines two variants of BPD which 
both share the overall theme of impulsiveness and lack of self control. The first 
variant is the impulsive type where the person diagnosed primarily presents 
characteristics of emotional instability and a lack of impulse control. The ICD-10 
highlights that it is common for the impulsive type to have 'outbursts of violence 
or threatening behaviour, particularly in response to criticism by others'. The 
second type is the borderline type where 'the patient's own self image, aims and 
internal preferences are often unclear or disturbed'. This type 'may [also] be 
associated with excessive efforts to avoid abandonment and a series of suicidal 
threats or acts of self harm'.
It is estimated that 2 per cent of the general population have a diagnosis of BPD, 
and of those diagnosed 75 per cent are predominantly female (APA, 2004). 
Knowing that there is a gender bias in BPD was an interesting consideration given 
that I had identified my GP as being male. I found myself questioning why so 
many more women than men have a diagnosis of BPD and learnt that some of the 
explanations for the development of BPD, for example physical and sexual abuse, 
are more likely to affect women (Zanarini, 2000). BPD has shown an overlap with 
other personality disorders and co-morbidity with Axis I disorders, such as 
depression (Zanarini et al., 1998). This left me wondering whether diagnostic 
features can be attributed solely to BPD or if they can be better explained by 
another mental health disorder. This would have great implications for me when 
considering concerns regarding my GP having a BPD, as I may hold a different set
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of assumptions and beliefs for a different diagnosis. I shall be discussing the 
validity and utility of the BPD diagnosis in more detail.
In answering this title it was also helpful for me to consider a number of 
questions; is BPD a lifelong 'condition'; are the symptoms associated with BPD 
static or on a continuum; are there periods when symptoms are exacerbated?
This was an important factor for me to consider because if my GP had persistent 
and ongoing issues as a result of having a BPD, and this interfered with his ability 
to perform his duties of responsibility, I would be worried.
Through my reading I learnt that symptom improvement of BPD is common. 
Zanarini et al. (2003) found that over an entire follow up period where patients 
were assessed over 2,4 and 6 years, 73.5 per cent met criteria for remission.
Paris (1993a) also suggests that in most cases as impulsivity declines generally by 
the age of 40, BPD 'burns out'. Furthermore, the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2004) 
highlights that the majority of individuals with a BPD gain 'greater stability in their 
relationships and vocational functioning' during their 30's and 40's'. Given that 
BPD may not be a static condition, and that symptoms may 'burn out' over time I 
feel less worried about my GP having a BPD compared to when I first read the 
essay title where a lot of my negative assumptions had been elicited.
The GP-Patient relationship
When thinking of my response to the essay title, an important issue for me to 
consider was the GP-patient relationship - could I encounter difficulties when in a 
medical consultation with my GP who has a BPD? I felt this was important to 
consider given that one of the key features of a BPD is that of having 'a pervasive 
pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships' (APA, 2004). What would this 
mean for the relationship between my GP and me? In this section I will discuss 
some of the issues that may arise. Due to space limitations I will only present the 
main points for my argument, although I am mindful that there are many more 
issues to consider.
So, how can we define the GP-Patient relationship? The GP-patient relationship is 
based on 'openness, trust and good communication' (General Medical Council
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(GMC), 2006). The quality of the level of communication between a GP and 
patient remains key to the effectiveness of patient satisfaction and health 
outcomes (Norfolk et al., 2007). To aid successful communication the GP should 
possess a range of qualities such as politeness, consideration and honesty, 
treating patients with dignity and managing each patient as an individual (GMC, 
2006). Norfolk et al. (2007) highlight an important goal of the doctor-patient 
communication is building rapport and a therapeutic alliance. I recognise I hold 
certain expectations regarding the medical consultation. For example, I expect to 
feel heard and understood and I expect the consultation to be based on my own 
needs. Reflecting on my cultural upbringing, I realise that I have been brought up 
to respect and accept decisions made by the GP However, since my exposure to 
the psychology profession over the last few years I feel that my curious inquisitive 
nature has developed and strengthened, and I am more open to questioning 
medical recommendations, especially where I feel uncertain about the rationale 
for a particular treatment. I wonder how my GP would respond to this. The ICD- 
10 (WHO, 1992) highlight it is common for the 'borderline impulsive type' to have 
'outbursts of violence or threatening behaviour, particularly in response to 
criticism by others'. I found myself asking would my GP see my questioning as a 
criticism. Would I feel uncomfortable asking my GP certain questions 'just in case' 
he might get aggressive? Would this not leave me feeling unsatisfied if I did have 
any concerns regarding my own medical treatment? Interestingly the DSM-TR-IV 
(APA, 2004) highlights that individuals with a BPD frequently express 
inappropriate intense anger and have difficulty controlling anger. However this 
anger is aimed at a care giver or lover when they are seen as neglectful, uncaring 
or abandoning. Is anger therefore something I really need to be concerned about 
in the context of the GP-patient relationship given that this relationship is 
distinctly different from that of a care giver or lover (i.e. the differences in 'power' 
dynamics).
Subsequently, I have considered Linehan's (1993) biosocial theory of BPD in order 
to understand why my GP may potentially experience interpersonal difficulties. 
According to the biosocial theory (Linehan, 1993), BPD is 'a pervasive disorder of 
the emotion regulation system, characterised by disturbances in mood'. 
Individuals with BPD often experience difficulties with identifying what emotions
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they feel and further experience difficulties in identifying what caused the 
emotion. According to this theory individuals with a BPD also lack emotion 
regulation strategies, such as shifting attention away from cues associated with 
negative emotion, which can potentially lead to difficult interpersonal 
interactions. Linehan's theory postulates that emotional dysregulation is 
developed and maintained by biological and environmental factors. The theory 
suggests that biologically, individuals experience difficulties regulating emotions 
due to differences in the central nervous system (e.g. due to early life trauma). 
Linehan suggests that problems may arise when a 'biologically vulnerable 
individual' is in an invalidating environment - an example of an invalidating 
environment related to a BPD can be childhood sexual abuse. Invalidating 
environments communicate that the individual's emotional responses to an event 
or situation are not appropriate and thus can be met by inappropriate, extreme or 
erratic responses from a care giver. Consequently the environment can seen to 
have become invalidated when communication is not validated by the care giver 
but instead is trivialised or punished. According to Linehan's theory, BPD 
criterion behaviours (e.g. suicidal behaviour), as defined in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2004) and ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) are functional behaviours that help to regulate 
emotions. Wolff et al. (2007) found that individuals with a BPD had greater 
difficulty in identifying their own emotions and reported higher levels of aversive 
inner tension. Findings support the biosocial theory and highlight that difficulty in 
identifying emotions is an important factor for the dysfunction of the emotional 
system in BPD.
Given that the theory shows that individuals with a BPD have difficulty regulating 
emotions, I needed to examine how this transposes to the GP-patient 
relationship. What would happen if my GP was experiencing stress at work or 
within his personal life; how would this impact on his emotions and his ability to 
provide a service of care? Are there other characteristics of a BPD that I need to 
be mindful of as a patient - for example, impulsivity? Interestingly, Linehan's 
(1993) theory was not originally developed with a BPD in mind, but in relation to 
working with women who self harmed. So how reliable is this theory when 
considering my GP who has a BPD? Given that my GP may experience difficulty 
regulating his own emotions, I also wondered how effective my GP would be at
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sensing my needs through the presentation of my emotions (i.e. my facial and 
vocal expressions). I feel this would be an important factor in establishing rapport 
within our relationship. Levine et al. (1997) looked at emotion recognition in BPD 
and found that outpatients with BPD showed significantly less accurate facial 
emotion recognition, and suggested that individuals with BPD may have 
impaired/altered facial emotion recognition. However, this study was carried out 
with a fairly small sample of 30 patients, and very few other studies look at 
emotion recognition, so generalising these findings is questionable. As a result, 
the findings of this study may have no real implication on whether my GP can 
respond to my emotional distress appropriately. Another issue I contemplated 
was my G P's ability to help me deal with any medical concerns, for example, best 
treatment options. Linehan (1993) suggests that pervasive emotion dysregulation 
interferes with problem solving and can create further complications. McMurran 
et al. (2007) examined the relationship between social problem-solving ability and 
BPD, and found that BPD was associated with an impulsive/careless problem 
solving style. However, I am unsure how this would interfere with my G P's ability 
to problem solve in his professional capacity. Furthermore, generally GP-patient 
consultations are short in duration (e.g. 5-10 minutes), so to what extent would 
the symptoms associated with a BPD actually impact on my GP-patient 
relationship within this timeframe?
Stigma and borderline personality disorder
When I initially read the title of this essay I was automatically associating negative 
labels to my GP having a BPD. For example, 'this GP is going to be difficult and 
hard work to get along with'. Taking a step back I began to think where these 
negative labels have come from. How would my GP internalise being labelled, 
and would this in turn worry me? In this section I shall be exploring these 
thoughts in more detail.
When thinking about the stigma associated with BPD it was helpful for me to 
consider the labelling theory (Becker, 1963; cited in Schulze et al., 2003); which is 
concerned with the negative terms and labels that may be used to describe or 
classify a person and/or a group of people as being deviant. There has been 
comparatively more research on negative labels and stigma associated with
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mental health issues, such as schizophrenia, than stigma associated with BPD.
The few studies that have been conducted on stigma associated with BPD (e.g. 
Fraser & Gallop, 1993) have generally been with mental health professionals, and 
these studies have shown that mental health professionals tend to label people 
with a BPD in a very negative way. For example, people with a BPD have been 
referred to as 'manipulative' and 'difficult' (Lewis & Appleby, 1988). Interestingly, 
Link and Cullen (1986; cited in Markham 2003) found that given the social setting, 
personal contact with mental illness can reduce the levels of social rejection. I 
wonder what social settings this includes as I found this difficult to believe when I 
consider some of the interactions I have seen between professionals and patients 
with a BPD in mental health settings. This was further supported by research 
evidence I came across. Fraser and Gallop (1993) found staff less empathetic to 
those with BPD compared to people with other diagnoses, and people with BPD 
less likely to be viewed as ill. Gallop et al. (1989) also suggest that the behaviour 
of a patient with BPD is interpreted as 'manipulative' and not 'mad'. Thus, it can 
be suggested that personality disorder (PD) carries great stigma, more than other 
mental health diagnoses (Nehls, 2001).
I found it very interesting to read these studies as it made me think back to where 
some of my negative labelling of a BPD diagnosis had originated. I thought of my 
previous work experience as a health care assistant in adult mental health, where 
I first learnt of BPD and recall some of my nurse colleagues referring to a patient 
with a BPD as being 'disruptive' and 'unmanageable'. I realise I had then 
automatically begun to associate some negative labels with BPD. As I reflect on 
my experiences of working with people with a BPD I wonder how some of the less 
understanding and empathie attitudes projected by myself and other 
professionals may have been unhelpful in trying to really understand the 
individual and their difficulties. I also recall how in some situations these 
individuals would react in a way that was perceived as being 'aggressive and 
impulsive'. Having experienced this 'impulsivity and aggression' and reflecting on 
my initial reactions when reading the essay title I realise I had also attached the 
label of 'dangerous' to the thought of my GP having a BPD. Link et al. (1987) 
conducted a study to measure social rejection and stigma associated with mental 
health issues and concluded that labels were important as they evoked people's
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stereotypical beliefs. This study also found that where participants perceived 
people with mental health issues as dangerous, social rejection was more 
apparent. When I consider the essay title I realise how I had begun to translate 
my own stereotypical beliefs of a BPD diagnosis, and had automatically labelled 
my GP and rejected him from his role. After giving thought to the label I attached 
to a person with a BPD, I question the origin and validity of these labels and the 
associated assumptions. Having gone through this process my initial assumptions 
of my GP being 'incompetent and dangerous' have been fragmented, and I am left 
wondering what having a BPD actually means.
Horn et al. (2007) discuss how consequences of having a mental illness label not 
only impacts on the individual socially (e.g. social isolation, reduced employment 
opportunities), but also how it effects the internalised views of the self (e.g. 
thinking and behaving in a disempowered way). Costillo (2000) argues that 'there 
is a need for a reframing and renaming of the concept of personality disorder', 
and goes on to argue that the label of BPD 'is so very stigmatising that it can itself 
compound the effects of trauma...' As mentioned previously I became curious as 
to how my GP may internalise having a label of a BPD and how this may 
potentially impact on his subsequent behaviours. Considering existing evidence 
on mental health professionals' attitudes toward BPD (e.g. Fraser & Gallop, 1993) 
would my GP be compelled to seek help when needed, or given that individuals 
with a BPD are sensitive to rejection would he withdraw from treatment and 
continue with his professional responsibilities regardless? The modified labeling 
theory of mental illness (Link et al., 1989) postulates that once a person is given a 
mental health 'label', the way in which this mental illness is culturally viewed (e.g. 
dangerous) becomes relevant to that individual on a personal level and has the 
potential to damage the way in which that person views themselves. The theory 
also postulates that given the negative labels that are associated with mental 
health, an individual may feel that they will be socially rejected and thus may 
conceal information regarding any treatment they are in and become withdrawn.
Having read a report on 'Mental Health and III Health in Doctors' (Department of 
Health (DOH), 2008) it was interesting to learn that doctors have higher rates of 
mental disorder than the general population. This report also highlighted that
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doctors often have very high expectations of themselves and mental illness is 
regarded as a sign of weakness (Sritharan, 2005; cited in DOH, 2008), and that 
there is a perceived threat to career and livelihood should a mental health issue 
be disclosed. Reflecting on how my GP may internalise having a BPD I began to 
consider the likeliness of my GP disclosing any concerns in relation to his mental 
health to his professional regulatory body (General Medical Council; GMC), and 
how this would impact on him accessing treatment. The GMC (2006) state that if 
a GP is aware that their judgement or performance is affected by a condition or 
treatment, it is essential that they consult a suitably qualified colleague and 
further must consider changes to practice. One of my concerns was whether my 
GP felt he could disclose his mental health issue given the stigma associated with 
BPD. Currently a G P's medical practice is not assessed at regular intervals. They 
may have no formal assessment of their knowledge, competence, clinical skills or 
performance until they retire (DOH, 2006). However the GMC aims to assure 
patients that G P's are up to date with the latest key changes in medical practice 
and are also themselves physically and mentally well to practice with a new 5 year 
process of 'revalidation' (DOH, 2008). Thinking of my GP with a BPD I am not sure 
how reassured I feel with the fact that the revalidation process happens every 5 
years. However, this uncertainty is partially based on the view that my GP could 
potentially be 'dangerous', which has now become a lot less alarming as I begin to 
examine the meaning of my GP actually being dangerous. I also wonder if the BPD 
diagnosis exists, and I shall be discussing this in the following section.
Does borderline personality disorder exist?
As I started to deconstruct the title of this essay I began to consider the actual 
validity and utility of a BPD as a diagnosis. The BPD diagnosis has attracted a lot 
of debate and controversy over the years, primarily within an academic context 
(Horn et al., 2007). Derksen (1995) suggests that 'BPD is clinically factual, 
empirically fictional and theoretically chaotic'. Reading this led me to question 
whether BPD actually exists as a mental health diagnosis. Is the diagnosis simply a 
social construct, that is, how our understanding of BPD is shaped, which then 
impacts on our assumptions about the disorder. It was interesting to see how my 
thought processes developed and expanded furthermore as I learnt about the 
development of the BPD diagnosis and how this knowledge began to influence my
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thinking about the meaning I placed on my GP having BPD. Following, I will be 
discussing some of the issues that developed my uncertainties when considering 
the validity and utility of BPD as a diagnosis.
Whilst considering the validity of BPD as a diagnosis it was interesting to learn 
that the inclusion of BPD in DSM-III (APA, 1980) was partially based on empirical 
data (Spitzer et al., 1979) and also Kernberg's (1967) theory of personality 
structure (Higgitt & Fonagy, 1993). The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2004) has since refined 
its diagnostic criterion. It can be suggested that the refinements made in 
successive versions of DSM have been made on the basis of the DSM-III (APA, 
1980) and thus already biased in its origins in psychoanalytical theory. Higgitt and 
Fonagy (1993) suggest that Kernberg's (1967) theory may have been over- 
inclusive in terms of diagnostic definitions of BPD, so I feel sceptical about the 
validity of BPD diagnostic criteria as defined in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2004). It can 
be argued that nothing is really known about the assumptions that may be central 
in this disorder (Arntz et al., 1999), and this in itself leads me to be even more 
critical of the diagnosis. For example, if we are not aware of what is central to this 
disorder, how could we possibly effectively treat someone who has BPD? Has my 
GP even been correctly diagnosed?
I was further intrigued to learn that 'from the service user perspective, research 
has identified that people's experiences of BPD differ markedly from clinical 
descriptions' (Horn et al., 2007). For example, it has been found that 86 per cent 
of service users with a personality disorder (PD) diagnosis described their 
difficulties in terms of depression, anxiety and often both (Castillo, 2000). This 
again leads me to consider the actual utility of the diagnosis of BPD. Pilgrim 
(2001) views PD as a largely unreliable diagnosis and viewed it as a 'dustbin 
category of problematic 'behaviour' as judged by significant others or staff. 
Manning (2000) described the BPD diagnosis a way of conceptualising a 
'heterogeneous group of patients that did not fit elsewhere'. Taking all this into 
account I almost feel that BPD could be a label given to a person who exhibits 
problematic characteristics that cannot be accounted for by any other mental 
health diagnosis.
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When I considered the varying level of agreement between the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2004) and ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) classification system for the diagnosis of BPD I 
began to question how psychiatrists decide on what classification system to use. 
Moreover, I began to wonder how psychiatrists themselves interpret and define 
the criterion within each classification system. It is interesting to consider that 
any combination of five or more of the nine criteria from the DSM-TR-IV (APA, 
2004) is required for a BPD diagnosis. This potentially means there are 256 
possible combinations of a BPD (Critchfield et a i, 2008).
Mental health professionals may have a different understanding and 
interpretation of diagnostic criteria. In their Scandinavian study, Bergman and 
Eckerdal (2000) interviewed professionals within a multidisciplinary team (MDT) 
and found that they had a very different perspective on the understanding and 
treatment of BPD. In addition, Pilgrim (2001) postulates that the process through 
which a professional diagnoses people with PD is highly subjective. According to 
social constructionist views, such as Brown (1995), BPD is not 'real' from an 
objective viewpoint. It is formed by the action of 'social labellers and problem 
finders'. The issues discussed leave me to wonder how valid and useful the 
diagnosis of BPD is when thinking of the distinction between what is viewed as a 
'normal' and an 'abnormal' personality and further what this means for my GP 
who has a BPD diagnosis. Pilgrim (2001) suggests that the basic criterion of any 
valid diagnosis is that it must indicate abnormality, and further highlights that this 
has been difficult to demonstrate in PD. Consequently, having considered these 
issues I am now uncertain of the implications of my GP having a BPD.
Conclusion
This essay has critically evaluated some of the meanings and assumptions I had 
placed on my GP having a BPD and if this in turn worried me. One of my first 
considerations was how people with BPD experience interpersonal difficulties and 
how would this play out in the GP-patient relationship? Having considered many 
issues, such as expression of impulsivity and anger in BPD, I found the evidence 
had very little significant meaning for my relationship with my GP. I feel the GP- 
patient relationship has a different dynamic to that of someone with BPD and 
their care giver. It would be interesting to learn more about how people with a
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BPD manage relationships in their 'work life' and this could be an area for further 
research. I also considered the negative labels I had associated with my GP having 
a BPD and questioned how I had developed these associations which in turn 
reduced my anxieties on my GP having a BPD. It was also interesting to consider 
how my GP may internalise having a BPD, given the stigma associated with having 
mental health issues and I realised that this may impact on his outlook to access 
treatment. Finally, I examined the validity and utility of the BPD diagnosis and 
have developed strong views that the BPD diagnosis is fraught with complications 
empirically and theoretically. Therefore, when considering my GP who has a BPD 
diagnosis I found myself questioning my understanding of his diagnosis and the 
reality of it. Consequently, if my GP had a diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder (BPD), I would not be worried.
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PROFESSIONAL ISSUES ESSAY - Year 2
Emancipation versus empowerment (Stickley, 2006)? Is the involvement of 
service users and carers in the development and planning of mental health 
services perpetuating existing power imbalances?
Introduction
The title of this essay appealed to me because it was on the subject of service user 
and carer involvement and this is something that I feel very passionate about.
This passion developed from my work experience as an assistant psychologist 
within the substance misuse field. I was privileged to witness some successful and 
meaningful changes that were made within the service I worked in resulting from 
service user involvement (SUI). For example, the service developed a new care 
pathway model based on meetings with service users where it was highlighted 
what services were most beneficial for service users to achieve a drug free 
lifestyle. It was from this point forward that I really began to value the 
involvement of service users in the planning and development of mental health 
services.
In stating my position in answer to this essay title I do not believe that the 
involvement of service users and carers in the development and planning of 
mental health services perpetuates existing power imbalances. In my view service 
users are in a position to take action, and make genuine and meaningful changes 
within mental health services, which demonstrates the power they have. I will be 
using this essay to present evidence to support my position. I realise that there 
are arguments in opposition to the position I have taken in answering this essay 
title and will explore some of these arguments within the text.
This essay has been written from my own perspective of an Asian female trainee 
clinical psychologist who is in her late twenties. This has allowed me to reflect on 
my own experience of SUI and some of my own thoughts as I wrote the essay. I 
appreciate that a different perspective would offer a different approach to this 
essay and so acknowledge that my approach is one framework of answering this 
title, and that alternative approaches can be offered.
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In writing this essay I made the decision to focus solely on SUI and to put aside 
carer involvement. In my view, although the two groups work towards a common 
goal (i.e. better service provision for those that require health services), the two 
'groups' are conceptually distinct. By referring to service users and carers 
collectively I felt I would be doing an injustice as in my view the two groups raise 
different issues when considering the title. However, I acknowledge that both 
parties are equally important.
When discussing SUI I have used the term 'service user' in line with Beresford's 
(2005) definition - 'people who receive, have received or are eligible for health 
and social care services, particularly on a longer term basis' (p.471). Beresford 
highlights that the term 'service user' is problematic as its holds many 
assumptions. For example, it assumes a group of people who have something in 
common and does not take into account individual identities. I appreciate that 
this term is not one that is well received by all that access mental health services, 
and acknowledge that the term has been used for the ease of writing and reading 
this essay.
When reading the title of this essay, the concept of emancipation versus 
empowerment stood out for me the most, so I chose to begin my essay with an 
introduction and exploration of these concepts and how these relate to SUI. 
Following this, I decided to explore the development of SUI as a concept within 
mental health services, as well as some of the frameworks in which this 
involvement takes place. In my view, understanding the concepts of 
emancipation and empowerment, the development of SUI as a concept and some 
of the SUI models, is significant in assessing the power relationship when involving 
service users to develop mental health services. Based on the exploration of 
these concepts I have concluded this essay with my own position on how I felt the 
involvement of service users in the development and planning of mental health 
services does not maintain a power imbalance.
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Exploring the concept of emancipation versus empowerment
The existence of an imbalance of power within mental health services has been 
widely acknowledged in the literature. For example, Rush (2004) reviews the way 
in which the medical model and the role of psychiatry have historically oppressed 
those receiving mental health services. Read (2001) agrees with the concept of an 
existing power imbalance stating that there has been a longstanding struggle for 
power between service users and health professionals within mental health 
services. Read also suggests that by involving service users in the development 
and planning of services, this power struggle continues to remain an issue. I do 
not agree with this view and my reasons are explored further within this section.
Stickley (2006) introduces an interesting view on SUI and the relationship of 
power that is held between service users and mental health professionals.
Stickley suggests that SUI in its current form is within a model of empowerment. 
Within this model of empowerment mental health professionals are giving power 
to service users, enabling service users to have a channel through which they can 
be involved in the development and planning of services. Stickley suggests that as 
this power is being given from professionals to service users, the existing 
imbalance in power remains. Consequently, Stickley suggests that power 
imbalances are being maintained by the very act of involving service users in the 
development and planning of services. Stickley discussed that in order for there 
to be a move away from this imbalance of power, and for service users to make 
genuine change in the development and planning of services, service users would 
have to take an 'emancipatory approach'. By this, Stickley meant that service 
users would need to take action independent of professionals, such as, taking a 
stand in their own right as opposed to being invited by professionals.
I found Stickley's (2006) concepts of empowerment and emancipation in relation 
to SUI intriguing. However, in my view these concepts are not straightforward 
and breaking down the meaning of these terms can lead you to think of the 
concept of power in a very different way. For example, Rodwell (1996) defines 
the concept of empowerment as being the 'process of enabling or imparting 
power transfer from one individual or group to another' (p.306). Using this 
definition in the context of the empowerment model of SUI indicates that power
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is being transferred between service users and health professionals. It is 
interesting though to think of the direction in which this power is being 
transferred. Stickley (2006) suggests that the power transfer is from professional 
to service user, which would be more suggestive of a perpetuation of power 
imbalance that historically exists between service users and professionals. 
However, some suggest that empowerment can work in a multi dimensional way 
and can also be a bottom up process (Rowlands, 1995). This notion would 
challenge Stickley's suggestion that professionals are giving power to service users 
by involving them in the development and planning of services. Rowland's 
definition of empowerment may suggest that service users are actually 
empowering professionals. It is also interesting to consider that service users are 
potentially choosing to be involved in the development and planning of mental 
health services, thus holding power and control in making the decision to be 
involved in the first place. This is supported by Blakemore's (2003) definition of 
empowerment where empowerment is seen as 'a process of change in which 
oppressed groups discover their ability to challenge those who oppress them' 
(p.261). Thus the very act of service users choosing to be involved in the 
development and planning of services in the first place may influence the 
relationship of power that is held between professionals and service users, and 
challenge the ides of SUI perpetuating power imbalances.
Stickley (2006) drew on the concept of an emancipatory approach to SUI as a 
means in which service users can overcome existing power imbalances that exist 
within mental health services. Emancipation is 'a term used to describe various 
efforts to obtain political rights or equality, often for a specifically disenfranchised 
group, or more generally in discussion of such matters' (Wikipedia). Based on the 
definition of emancipation above, Stickley's empancipatory approach would 
perceive service users as 'the disenfranchised group', who are making an effort to 
gain equal rights to discuss issues that service users felt were pertinent. It would 
be interesting to consider from whose perspective service users would be seen as 
a 'disenfranchised group'. Some of the discussions that I have had with service 
users who have been involved in the development and planning of services 
perceive themselves within positions of power, where they see themselves in 
positions to make radical changes within mental health services. Also, thinking
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back to some of my own experience of SUI, I feel that some of the ways in which I 
have seen service users being involved in the development and planning of 
services has actually already been emancipatory. For example, I recall sitting in a 
lecture during my first year as a trainee clinical psychologist and being fascinated 
by a service user who had discussed his involvement in the development of 
mental health services. He spoke of his own views of SUI and how he felt that 
service users held very powerful positions within the process of developing 
services. This service user had felt liberated to put forward ideas that he felt were 
important in developing and planning services. Consequently, where some may 
perceive service users as a disenfranchised group who need to be emancipated, 
others may disagree.
In my view, the concepts of emancipation and empowerment, and the way they 
relate to SUI are not as straightforward as Stickley depicts. As you begin to unpick 
the concept of SUI, its evolution and framework, the concept of service users 
being in a state of emancipation or empowerment begins to blur. The following 
section begins to present some of this through the exploration of the 
development of SUI and how this development may relate to the concepts of 
emancipation and empowerment.
Service user involvement -  how it all began
The origins of service user involvement can be traced back to the 1970's where 
groups of service users came together to think about the mental health care 
services that were being provided. Forming alternative approaches to service 
provision were discussed within these groups (Peck et al., 2002), and this 
developed into a growing social movement (Everett, 1994). Service users were 
motivated by ideas from the civil rights movement in the United States and others 
were motivated by the anti-psychiatry movement in the 1960's (Peck et al., 2002). 
Service user movements became highly influential in forming user groups such as 
the United Kingdom Advocacy Network, which influenced how national 
healthcare policies took shape.
In the past few decades a change in government national healthcare policies has 
put an emphasis on users of National Health Services (NHS) to be involved in the
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development and planning of mental health services (Mental Health Task Force 
User Group, 1995; Department of Health, 1999o, 19996, 2001; National Health 
Service Executive, 1996, 2000). It is anticipated that through involving service 
users in the development and planning of health care provision, a feedback loop 
can be generated. For example, the outcome of SUI can be fed back into policy 
making so that policies are more effective in meeting the needs of those that 
access services (Beresford, 2001).
Changes that were noted within healthcare policies were also reflective of the 
political and social climate of the 1980's and 1990's, where an emphasis was put 
on service users being seen as customers or consumers of healthcare services 
(Rush, 2004). This climate permitted service users to have more of a voice in how 
services were provided (Croft & Beresford, 1992). Thus the NHS moved away 
from the concept of service users being passive recipients of a service, and more 
towards a framework of involving service users in how services are planned and 
developed (Taylor et al., 2004).
Reflecting on the way in which SUI has developed, I believe that service users are 
in a state of emancipation, although at first glance it may seem like 
empowerment. The very fact that service user movements became influential in 
shaping policy indicates that service users hold powerful positions. I believe that 
by making SUI part of national healthcare policy an attempt has been made by 
health professionals to re assert the power positions that have historically existed 
because it is the professionals who are providing a framework in which service 
users can be involved in the development and planning of services. This view is 
supported by Rutter et al. (2000) who suggest that government healthcare 
policies outline the way in which service users participate in healthcare planning 
and provision, but this outline of involvement may not be the way in which service 
users want to be involved. As a result of policies being driven by the government, 
power may have been taken away from service users to makes changes that they 
genuinely desire. Further, it is suggested that the government drive to involve 
service users in service planning and delivery has been a method through which 
service providers have legitimised their own decision making processes (Forbes & 
Sashisdharan, 1997). This would fit more within a model of empowerment where
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service users are being empowered by health professionals. In my viewpoint this 
does raise some ethical considerations. For example, in whose best interest is SUI 
actually being promoted? Is SUI in the interest of service users or healthcare 
professionals? And is SUI something that is being done simply at a tokenistic 
level? Some would agree it is (e.g. Shackley & Ryan, 1994). However, 'policy 
guidance has offered little clarification of the meaning of involvement' (Rutter et 
al., 2004, p. 1974). As a result I would strongly argue that although professionals 
may provide an outline of how service users are involved in the planning and 
development of services, a lack of understanding of the concept means that 
service users have the autonomy to involve themselves in the development and 
planning of services in a way which they would, themselves, feel emancipated and 
in a position of power.
At this point it is essential to define the concept of SUI. Firstly, this would enable 
a framework in which the concept could be understood. Secondly, this 
framework would then develop the capacity to think how the concept of SUI 
affects power imbalances in mental health services.
Developing a framework for understanding service user involvement
Writing this essay, I realised that my own thoughts of the way in which service 
users are involved in the development and planning of services was very 
simplistic. My definition of SUI prior to writing this essay was as follows; someone 
who has or is receiving mental health services sharing their views and opinions on 
what they think works and does not work in service provision. I had never really 
taken a step back to think about the multiple ways in which this is achieved or to 
consider the relationship of power that exists between professionals and service 
users within the concept of SUI. I recognise that this is the face value at which I 
had interpreted and assumed what SUI meant, and that to develop clarity on the 
issue raised within the title I would need to explore the concept in a more critical 
and questioning manner. In this section I have discussed some of the frameworks 
in which SUI can be understood. As I explore these frameworks I have also 
explored the relationship of power that exists between service users and 
professionals when involving service users in the development and planning of 
mental health services.
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Arnstein, an urban redevelopment specialist, introduced a document in the late 
1960's titled 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation'. This document highlights a model 
where steps are taken by citizens to move from 'nobodies to become somebodies 
with enough power to make the target institutions responsive to their views, 
aspirations and needs' (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). In my understanding Arnstein's 
model has been influential in the development of models of SUI because it 
highlights the ways in which a group of individuals who are perceived to have little 
power in decision making processes can work toward a position where they have 
power in these processes. Interestingly Arnstein's model depicts a framework in 
which a citizen's ultimate goal is to gain total power in decision making processes. 
Arnstein argues for a redistribution of power between 'citizens' and those that 
work within the political and economic process. Translated in the context of this 
essay, this would mean SU arguing for a redistribution of power with service 
providers.
The first stages of Arnstein's model (see Figure 1) are the stages of 'manipulation' 
and 'therapy'. At these stages it is suggested that citizens have no participation in 
decision making processes. In the case of the SUI, this would infer that service 
users hold no power in making decisions about their treatment, that is, they are 
passive recipients of therapy. The model then moves on to stages of informing, 
consultation and placation, which Arnstein proposes involves citizen participation, 
but only at a tokenistic level. For me, when thinking about SUI this infers some 
power, but this power may still predominantly reside with service providers as 
'participation' may not be in the genuine interest of service users. The final stages 
of Arnstein's model highlight citizens being at a stage of partnership, delegated 
power and citizen control. It is at this stage that Arnstein proposes that citizens 
would have total power in decision making processes. In the context of SUI this 
means that the imbalance of power is likely to be overcome in the final stages, 
where service users have more of a say in how the services are delivered.
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8 Citizen control
7 Delegated power Degrees of citizen power
6 Partnership
5 Placation
4 Consultation Degrees of tokenism
3 Informing
2 Therapy
Manipulation
1 Manipulation
Figure 1 Ladder of citizen engagement (Arnstein, 1969)
Despite the fact that this model was introduced in a context of housing and urban 
redevelopment, it remains influential in how current models of SUI are framed, 
and how models theoretically continue to take shape and form (Tritter & 
McCallum, 2006). What is interesting about some of the current models of SUI is 
that they are not explicit in stating a position of power between service users and 
service providers as Arnstein has done. Also, current models do not conceptualise 
SUI in a graded manner (e.g. therapy, moving to informing). Some of the models 
discussed below present SUI as a concept which can take place in many different 
ways and on many different levels. Consequently, I suggest that the way in which 
the relationship of power exists as shown in Arnstein's model, is not clear cut.
Barnes et al. (2000) tracked the progress of SUI identifying its origins from a 
'consumerist model' towards a model of 'empowerment', a concept which has 
been discussed previously within this essay. It is suggested that SUI in its more 
current form is under a 'stakeholder model'. This model asserts that there are 
different views from different groups of individuals that are interested in the way 
in which health care services are delivered, and that each of these views need to 
be taken into consideration when planning and developing services. It is 
suggested that within a 'stakeholder model' different stakeholders possess 
different degrees of power in influencing how services are developed, thus there 
is a power imbalance. It is also suggested that this power inequality is something 
which is accepted, as opposed to being challenged. It could be suggested that
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service users are the group of stakeholders that have least power as it has been 
suggested that in the past the medical model has been in the position where their 
views and opinions have been more valued, and service users have had limited 
control in their own healthcare (Rush, 2004). However, this view is challenged by 
other models of SUI. Beresford (2003) proposes a democratic model of SUI. 
Within this model Beresford acknowledges that power imbalances do exist 
between service users and professionals, yet this model suggests that service 
users are in positions where they are influential in developing and planning 
services and thus have power and control. In my opinion, Beresford's democratic 
model suggests that existing power imbalances are not maintained as service 
users are in a position to take action and that their voices can be heard.
Having previously worked within the substance misuse field I was interested to 
learn how SUI is understood within this area. The London Drug and Alcohol 
Network (LOAN, 2004) depicts SUI within two models; passive and active 
involvement. The passive involvement model points to service users being 
involved in consultation, monitoring and evaluation of health services. Active 
involvement indicates service users being involved in research, participation, 
partnership and service delivery (in a paid or unpaid capacity). In my view passive 
or active involvement imply a different power relationship being held between 
service users and service providers in the development and planning of services. 
For example, the very concept of 'passive involvement' is suggestive of service 
users being in a position of inactivity and service users being submissive. Thus in 
this model of understanding SUI, I would suggest that SUI in consultation, 
monitoring and evaluation of mental health services would be more indicative of 
a perpetuation of power imbalance where power resides with service providers. 
On the other hand 'active involvement' in my viewpoint implies more of an 
equality of power because the very word 'active' implies service users in a 
dynamic and interactive stance. This paints a complex picture when thinking 
about the maintenance of a power imbalance when involving service users in the 
development of services. However, in my viewpoint the fact that service users 
are involved in an 'active' way would provide evidence to suggest that a balance 
for power between service users and professionals is being achieved.
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Peck et al's. (2002) conceptualisation of SUI was also influential in developing my 
thoughts when considering the perpetuation of power imbalances when involving 
service users in developing services. Peck et al. propose three distinct 
conceptions of SUI; service users as recipients of communication; subjects of 
consultation and agents in control. It is also proposed that SUI operates at four 
distinct levels that include self help, one-to-one interaction between service users 
and professional, in the development and management of local services and 
finally in the planning of overall services. A graphical representation of this model 
can be seen in Figure 2).
Conceptions of user involvement
Levels of interaction Recipient of 
communication
Subject of 
consultation
Agent in control
Interaction between 
service users
Newsletter
Periodicals
Advocacy schemas
Hearing voices
Newsletters
Periodicals
Interaction between 
users and professionals
Receiving care 
plans
Agreeing care plans Direct Payments
Management of local 
services
Receiving
information
services
Patients Councils 
User surveys 
User-focused 
monitoring
Mental health
User run crisis 
houses 
Social firms
Planning of overall 
services
Community care 
plans
taskforce
membership
Stakeholder
conferences
Figure 2 Matrix of service user involvement (Peck et al., 2002)
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The conceptualisations of SUI discussed so far can be seen to have some 
similarities. For example, Arnstein (1969) refers to citizens having 'no 
participation' in decision making processes in the stages of manipulation and 
therapy. The LOAN (2004) identify 'passive involvement', and Peck et al. (2002) 
offer similar concepts in which service users are 'recipients of communication'. In 
my view each of these conceptualisations would offer a view that there is a 
perpetuation of power imbalances between service users and service providers in 
the development and planning of mental health services because at this level 
each model portrays service users as passive recipients of a service. However, the 
concept that there is maintenance of power imbalance between service users and 
service providers in service planning and development is challenged through the 
other concepts which are presented by the LOAN (2004) and Peck et al. (2002).
For example, the LOAN discuss 'active involvement' which as discussed previously 
indicates more dynamic involvement in my viewpoint. Similarly, Peck et al. (2000) 
discuss the concept of service users being agents in control and highlight 
campaigns such as the Hearing Voices group. In my view, at these levels a 
balance of power between health professionals and service users is also achieved.
Peck et al. (2002) present a much more complex picture when considering the 
concept of SUI. The model presents the different levels of interaction in which SUI 
can take place, for example, between service users, between service users and 
professionals (see Figure 2). In my view, the level at which this interaction takes 
place may influence how the maintenance of a power imbalance between service 
users and professionals is perceived. For example, at the level of interaction 
between just service users, service users have equal power. The power 
relationship becomes more complex when at the level of interaction between 
service users and professionals, yet as discussed does not necessarily indicate a 
perpetuation of power imbalance.
The conceptualisation of how SUI has developed, and the definition and models of 
SUI discussed have highlighted the complexity of the nature of SUI. Thus the 
question of whether the involvement of service users and carers in the 
development and planning of mental health services perpetuating existing power 
imbalances is indeed a complex one. Something which further stood out for me
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was the many concepts that have been used to depict the varying types of SUI. 
Some refer to 'consultation' (e.g. Peck et ai, 2002; LOAN, 2004) and some refer to 
'partnership' (e.g. Arnstein, 1969; LOAN, 2004). I found these concepts 
themselves intriguing when thinking about the relationship of power held 
between service users and professionals. What did the concepts of 'involvement' 
'consultation' 'partnership' actually mean? Following I have chosen to explore 
these concepts in more detail.
Different concepts of service user involvement -  a further exploration
The concept of 'involvement' is interesting in itself. Read (2001) suggests that the 
act of 'involvement' is always in the interest of someone else's agenda. It is often 
the case that service users and service providers prioritise different issues. This 
was an issue that was reflected in my experience of SUI. I remember attending a 
service user meeting as an assistant psychologist where service users had raised 
issues such as improving the condition of the building and the clinical team had 
raised issues such as how to best implement new care standards. Read (2001) 
suggests that SUI is in fact a disempowering process for service users, especially 
when SUI has been instigated badly. Campbell (2002) supports this view, and 
states that the act of 'involvement' means that service users work toward 
agendas that are defined by service providers, and that service users may well 
have their own initiatives to take forward. Campbell suggests that control of 
agenda in the past has been with those that are the more powerful, and thus the 
type of SUI has been in the control of service providers. This could mean that the 
voices of service users are therefore only heard to the extent that service 
providers want to hear them. These are interesting points to consider. However, 
in my view, as you begin to break down the ways in which service users are 
'involved' in the development of services, and the way in which the power 
relationship between service users and professionals is viewed, changes.
As discussed previously, SUI has been referred to within a 'consultation' capacity 
and others refer to a 'partnership' approach. When deconstructed, these terms 
of consultation and partnership may provide a very different outlook when 
considering the relationship of power between the service user and the 
professional, and whether there is an imbalance. Chadderton (1995) proposes
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that the process of 'consultation' in SUI is within the professionals' control. It is 
the professional that instigates the involvement, thus the outcome of this 
involvement would also lie with the professional. In a nutshell 'consultation' 
would mean the professional making a decision about whom to consult and what 
to ask (Rutter, 2004). Thus it can be inferred that the power would remain with 
the professional, because it is the professional who takes responsibility to make 
decisions in the first instance. 'Partnership' on the other hand would be 
suggestive of an equal status, where the setting of the agenda and outcomes from 
this would be in control of the professional and service user, and so there is a 
sharing of power (Chadderton, 1995). However, it has been found that these 
terms have often been used interchangeably (Barnes & Wistow, 1994).
Therefore, when thinking about the concepts that are used to define SUI and the 
way in which it is implemented, it is important to ask how reflective these 
concepts are of what is really happening when involving service users in the 
development and planning of services. For example, a concept of consultation 
may be used, yet service users could be actually working in partnership.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Stickley's (2006) discussion of the concepts of emancipation and 
empowerment has enabled me to develop my understanding of the position of 
power that is held by service users when involved in the development and 
planning of mental health services. Stickley proposed that SUI is currently within 
a model of empowerment, and suggested that this model perpetuates the power 
imbalance that exists between mental health professionals and service users. 
Stickley advocated for an emancipatory approach to be taken by service users to 
achieve an equality of power. Having explored the evolution, diverse frameworks, 
and the meaning of some of the concepts of SUI, the question of a perpetuation 
of power imbalance becomes complex and not as clear cut as Stickley portrays.
As argued and demonstrated within this essay, I believe that service users hold a 
position of power in their own right. Consequently, I propose that the existing 
power imbalances between service users and health professionals have not been 
maintained.
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PROBLEM BASED LEARNING REFLECTIVE ACCOUNT - Year 1
The relationship to change
When considering how to write a reflective account of my experience of being 
part of a problem based learning (PBL) exercise, I thought that I would best 
portray my thoughts and feelings through a continuous narrative account to 
capture my uninterrupted flow of thought. In this account I shall be reflecting on 
the PBL group process and presentation whilst presenting how this has made me 
think of my clinical practice and my personal and professional development.
The PBL exercise was structured around 'the relationship to change'. We were 
introduced to this ambiguous title and given some information on what PBL is by 
the group facilitator. The PBL group was made up of 8 trainees, including myself. 
We were given instructions that we had 6 weeks in which to discuss and prepare a 
presentation based on 'the relationship to change' which we would then present 
to the rest of the cohort.
This exercise was introduced to our group at the end of what felt like a very long 
first day of being on the training course. I was feeling emotionally overwhelmed 
as it had now sunk in that I was actually on the course; something that I had been 
working towards for the past 4 years. As a group, we attempted to make sense of 
the PBL exercise, and I slowly started to feel anxious as I was having difficulty 
keeping track of the group conversation whilst simultaneously trying to get my 
head around what we were being asked to do. At that time it had appeared that 
the other group members had grasped the concept of what was being asked of us, 
yet I felt I needed more clarity. I later learned that the other members of the 
group had similar feelings.
In this first group session my clouded state of confusion led me to get more and 
more frustrated. Had I missed something? Thoughts such as 'was I good enough 
to be here on the course if I couldn't understand this' started to flow through my 
mind as I started to doubt my abilities. I started to feel alienated in the group, 
and slowly became aware of differences between the group members and me.
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Were these differences a reason for my lack of understanding? I became mindful 
of my ethnicity and the other group members being white British. This 
heightened awareness of difference further impacted on my ability to feel 
comfortable in the group and I felt myself retreat when I had wanted to ask 
questions. Had I allowed this difference to impact on my ability to contribute and 
feel comfortable in the group? Could it be that I was thinking that because I am 
from an ethnic minority background I lack certain resources as a person? I realise 
at the time some of my thoughts also included 'Do I sound stupid?' I was 
concerned as to how I came across. Everyone else seemed to be happy and 
getting on with it, why couldn't I?
In retrospect I realise now that at this first meeting I was tired, and that as my 
anxiety levels increased my focus became more internalised. Although I was 
motivated to engage in this task, this was not helpful in me being able to digest 
information and participate fully. Tuckman (1965) proposed a model of group 
development in which the first stage is that of forming. Tuckman proposed that 
at this stage members of a group act in a very motivated and independent way, 
but may be self focused and vary in how they respond to pressure.
Learning from this early experience in group, I think it is important for me to 
recognise situations where I may be doubtful or uncertain of my own abilities so 
that I can step back and view it from other perspectives. This is important when 
thinking of my current clinical practice, especially as I am in my first year of clinical 
training and therefore may feel more anxious about my 'performance' as a 
therapist. Also, thinking about the ambiguity of the first PBL session made me 
think how in clinical practice this is probably similar to how a client may feel if 
they are not given clear information when they first attend therapy. They may 
feel frustrated at not being able to understand what is 'required' of them to be 
successful and achieve a good outcome. I also feel that this experience has 
highlighted how important it is to be aware of issues of diversity within clinical 
practice i.e. for both the client and therapist, and thinking how this may inform 
your clinical practice when thinking of assessment and formulation.
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During the first group meeting, group member roles were discussed. We were 
instructed that as part of the PBL exercise, we needed a scribe and chair person. I 
felt obliged to speak out at this point so opted to be the scribe. I felt that being 
the chair would have been too challenging for me; I was unsure how I felt about 
'managing' personalities that I was not familiar with. For the duration of the PBL 
sessions I found taking on the role of the scribe to be helpful as it allowed me to 
get clarity by summarising key points and developments within the group. It also 
allowed me to stop and check with group members for further clarification when 
comments and suggestions seemed ambiguous. Similarly, now practicing 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) in my clinical placement, I have found that 
summarising has been a useful way of keeping the focus within client sessions.
On the other hand, I realise that taking on the role of the scribe further added to 
my frustration in the first few PBL group sessions as I attempted to familiarise 
myself to this role and other members in the group, and contribute to the task 
itself.
After the first PBL session I was dreading meeting up with the group again as I was 
worried I would once again feel like an outsider. Looking back to how we 
developed as a group when working towards this task I feel that some group 
members' ideas were listened to more than others, and at the time I remember 
feeling very deflated by this. I found it hard to vocalise my ideas in the group, and 
because I did not want to cause any conflict I decided to sit on some of my ideas.
In retrospect I may have felt this way because I had a dual role in the group; that 
of a scribe and a group member. Furthermore, as a group we were very task 
focused, and more concerned with the end result rather than the group process. 
Tuckman (1965) highlights that the second stage of group development is 
storming; this is when different ideas for the task at hand are brought to the table 
for discussion and consideration. This stage is important for the team to grow and 
develop, and in some cases can result in conflict whilst in others this stage can be 
resolved quickly. Knowing this I began to wonder how this stage translated for 
our group. Looking back I almost feel that we went through this stage very quickly 
within the first two sessions. I also began to wonder what would have happened 
if I had been more outspoken about my ideas and less worried about causing
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conflict. Would our group have benefitted from having a longer stage of 
storming? Where we being too polite to each other?
By the third PBL session I felt the atmosphere in the group become a lot more 
relaxed as the group came to a decision about the content of the presentation. 
Looking back I feel that our group worked well to try and incorporate the main 
themes that had emerged from our discussions to actually form our final 
presentation. Tuckman (1965) would refer to this stage as norming; when the 
team starts to work in a way that flows naturally. I started to feel a sense of relief 
as we made progress, and I found that my own feelings were echoed by the 
group. Now 6 months into the training, having learnt about transference and 
countertransference issues, I am curious as to how this may have impacted on our 
group dynamic. Were my initial feelings of anxiety being picked up by other group 
members, was I reacting to other group members' anxieties? I am fascinated by 
this, and am eager to learn more about psychodynamic approaches especially as 
the current model I am predominantly working with is CBT.
Our group reached what Tuckman (1965) would refer to as being the final stage of 
performing during the fourth PBL session. By this stage, group members were 
working interdependently; each member knew what was required of them so that 
the PBL task could be executed successfully. As a group we felt that we had 
developed a sense of autonomy, and now felt very different to how we initially 
did when first having been introduced to the PBL exercise. For example, I 
remember feeling a need for more guidance and support from our group 
facilitator during the first few PBL sessions, especially when I was hearing the 
varying levels of input that other PBL groups were getting. I now felt that our 
group was headed in a good direction, and that guidance and supervision no 
longer seemed important for the purpose of this exercise. In hindsight I actually 
feel better for having gone through this PBL exercise with little guidance as I feel 
that the counter-dependency helped to create a supportive bond within our 
group.
Discussions within our group had led us to believe that the availability and 
accessibility of adult mental health treatment has changed over a number of
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years, and that these changes had been influenced by a number of factors (e.g. 
social and political factors). This is what we had decided would be the basis of our 
presentation. To illustrate this point we had decided to have a narrative account 
of someone's real experience of accessing treatment in the 1980's ('Anne') and to 
role play an account of someone accessing mental health treatment now ('Sally'). 
To help illustrate our point further we used the Transtheoretical Model of Change 
(Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983) to present how Sally had moved through the 
stages of precontemplation, contemplation, action and maintenance (as outlined 
in the model of change) when accessing mental health treatment.
On the day of the presentation, we were told that we were the second group to 
present. After seeing the first presentation I started to get worried that our 
presentation was very technical and maybe a little too on the serious side. Would 
our presentation be understood? Had our presentation become too complex so 
that we could incorporate the main themes of the group's ideas? I was also 
aware that we had not included any reflections of our experience of doing the PBL 
exercise within our presentation. This was picked up by a staff member during 
the question and answer part of our presentation. After we presented I felt 
annoyed with the group members because I distinctly remembered speaking to 
the group about having a reflective space for our presentation, but was informed 
by another member that this was probably not required as we would be writing a 
reflective account later. I now realise that I was actually annoyed at myself for 
not feeling confident enough to challenge things in the group, especially when I 
felt I had a valid point to make. I realise now that I do have a tendency to shy 
away from things when I feel the majority do not agree for the fear of looking or 
sounding stupid. However, having had this experience I feel it is okay and healthy 
to challenge and question dominant views, and I hope to develop confidence to 
do so during the course of my training. This thought itself excites me as I think of 
myself as an agent of change within clinical psychology.
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PROBLEM BASED LEARNING REFLECTIVE ACCOUNT - Year 2
How do we know if IAPT is working? 
introduction
This piece of work is a reflective account of my experience of being part of a 
problem based learning (PBL) exercise in my second year of training as a clinical 
psychologist. PBL aims to promote shared working and reflective practice through 
working within a group setting.
My account begins with an introduction to the 'problem' exercise we were 
presented with. I then go on to describe my group members and think about the 
group development and presentation. I end this account with some thoughts of 
what my specific learning needs are for the future.
The 'problem' exercise
Within our groups we were asked to prepare a consultancy report that addressed 
the following question: 'How do we know if Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPT) is working?
IAPT is a large scale initiative that was introduced by the UK government on World 
Mental Health Day in October 2007. The project aims to improve access to 
psychological therapies within the National Health Service (NHS) for individuals 
that experience depression and anxiety. A substantial investment of £173 million 
per annum, above existing expenditure, has been invested in IAPT. It is 
envisioned that 3600 new psychological therapists will be trained and employed 
to work in services that offer psychological therapies recommended by the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE); namely cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) (Clark et al., 2009).
Being introduced to our PBL topic left me with some mixed feelings. On one hand 
I felt some relief. Compared to our previous PBL exercise, which was titled 'The 
Relationship to Change', this was something that was tangible and familiar. I had 
found the last PBL exercise very abstract and vague, and this had left me confused
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and uncomfortable at an early position in the training programme. Consequently,
I was repeatedly evaluating myself within the PBL group and this had impacted on 
my level of confidence when contributing to the group discussions. Being 
introduced to this current task, I felt more comfortable as I had knowledge on the 
topic in hand. My yearlong adult mental health placement was in a service that 
was delivering psychological therapies within the IAPT framework, thus I had read 
literature on IAPT and had knowledge of how the initiative was working at a 
service level. For me this provided a knowledge base from which I felt I could 
contribute to the group.
Having some familiarity to the PBL exercise was also a bonus for me as this 
enabled me to connect with the task at a time where I had felt overwhelmed with 
many competing demands, both personally and professionally. I was in the midst 
of buying a property, and as other second year trainees I was competing with 
many other deadlines. It was all systems go, which on the flipside had also left me 
feeling annoyed with being given this exercise. I was feeling overwhelmed and 
questioning whether this PBL exercise was necessary? My thoughts were that the 
task was tedious and time consuming at a time where I would have preferred to 
focus on the others tasks at hand.
Having been introduced to the task, our group convened to meet for the first 
time. Following, I have described my PBL group and considered factors that may 
have impacted on its development. I have also made specific reflections on my 
own role and position within the group.
The PBL group and its development
Each PBL group was made up of clinical psychology trainees that are in their 
second and third year. The group I was allocated was made up of three third year 
trainees and five second year trainees. I was surprised to learn that the PBL 
groups were made up from across years. This was different to my previous 
experience of being part of a PBL group in my first year of training, where groups 
where made up of trainees in the same year. Some of the previous PBL meetings 
had also been facilitated by a member of the academic team. We were informed 
that these meetings had no 'official' facilitation.
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Looking back to our first group meeting I had assumed that as we had no group 
facilitator, and that we were working with third year trainees, they would take the 
lead in group discussions. I viewed them as having more expertise than us being a 
year ahead in their training, and viewed them in a position of power. I often find 
myself feeling a similar way when in other group settings, where there is a 
difference in the positions of power, for example, in multi disciplinary team 
meetings in my clinical work, where I have looked to 'more experienced others' to 
the take lead. Thinking about this, I realise that I have often fallen into a passive 
role in these group settings. It is suggested that people may comply with those 
that are perceived to hold more power because there is dependence on these 
power holders for their level of expertise (Ellermer et al., 1998).
In our first meeting I recall there being a particular individual in the group who 
was more vocal than others. This individual appeared to have very firm views on 
the topic of conversation, and appeared to be taking the lead in the discussion.
As the discussions progressed in this first meeting, I started to get frustrated with 
myself realising that I had many valuable contributions to make on the topic in 
hand. So why had I chosen to be so passive in my manner? Part of me 
understood that this was because I was feeling so overwhelmed with other tasks 
at hand. I also became aware of the assumptions that I had made regarding the 
power dynamic of the group. Believing I had valuable contributions to make I 
made the decision to change my position in the group from taking a back seat to 
being more assertive and active. As I began to share some of my views and 
opinions in the group my annoyance at having to do the task soon dissipated, and 
I started to engage and enjoy the discussions more; seeing it as a less tedious 
exercise.
Thinking about the development of our group, a key strength was our ability to 
build upon group members existing knowledge base of the IAPT initiative, and to 
use this as a catalyst from which to approach the task. For example, a group 
member had written an essay on this very subject matter so could introduce 
material that she was familiar with. I had worked in an IAPT service, and 
therefore could share my experience of being involved with the IAPT initiative. 
Other members of the group had experience of working in other psychological
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therapies, such as psychoanalytic psychotherapy, which is only briefly 
acknowledged in the NICE guidelines for anxiety and depression. Therefore these 
group members were able to offer a critique of CBT - the therapy of choice in 
IAPT. Overall, this enabled me to start thinking beyond my own understanding of 
IAPT, which has developed my appreciation of different areas of expertise and 
levels of knowledge. Diversity of expertise is something that has been researched, 
and has been found to promote positive outcomes within group interactions. For 
example, Simons et al. (1999) found that different levels of expertise enable team 
members to engage in debate and dialogue. I feel that this was very true for our 
group, and being engaged in this level of dialogue, sharing my knowledge with 
others, and learning from their expertise, has made me appreciate the importance 
of collaboration versus competition in my learning experiences, both in a clinical 
and academic context.
Due to the limited time we had to meet, I also found that as a group we used 
different mediums to communicate ideas, for example, using email to share 
information. I think that this was a positive experience for me as it enabled me to 
take more active responsibility for my own learning needs and objectives. 
Consequently, I found myself working in a more independent and self directed 
manner, alongside group members. Thinking back to this position of learning, I 
feel that this task created an opportunity for group members to work with greater 
autonomy and flexibility. This skill is something that I think is very important for 
my future work as a clinical psychologist, where there will be multiple demands 
based on the different roles.
The presentation
Our presentation was titled 'A Time for Questions', and was based on the BBC 
programme - Question Time; a political discussion show, where there is a host, 
panel members and an audience. The aim of our presentation was to put forward 
the perspectives of different stakeholders involved with the implementation of 
IAPT. These included government officials, service users and carers, researchers, 
and tax payers, whose perspectives we presented as either panel members or the 
audience. As a group, to help divide up the tasks for our presentation, we had 
each gone away and researched these different stakeholder positions
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independently. My role was of an IAPT worker and I was a member of the 
audience.
In my view, using this framework of presentation helped to portray the strengths 
and weaknesses of the IAPT initiative. Through the process of developing this 
presentation with my group members, I personally had been made aware of some 
of the wider context issues that surround the IAPT initiative. For example, some 
of the ethical and practical issues such as limiting the choice of therapy that is 
available to service users, and the inconsistent evaluation of the initiative.
One of the downfalls of our group presentation was that there was an imbalance 
of roles, some members taking on greater roles than others. This had meant that 
there was also a different amount of work done to prepare for these roles.
Closing thoughts
Reflecting on some of what I have written in this account has made me think that I 
tend to adopt a position of 'safe certainty' i.e. a position of knowing (Mason, 
1993), when in group contexts. The topic of IAPT was one that I was familiar with, 
therefore I felt confident to contribute in this group exercise. This position of 
knowing was also reflected in the IAPT worker role I took on within the group. 
Developing an awareness of this, an area of for my personal and professional 
growth would be to move into a position of 'safe uncertainty' i.e. a position of 
curiosity (Mason, 1993). This would enable me to start thinking in less fixed ways, 
being in a state of flow, to explore issues without worrying about the familiarity of 
the topic. I feel that I have achieved moving into a position of safe uncertainty in 
my therapeutic work with clients. However, I would now like to extend this 
position in other areas, such as within my multi disciplinary work with other 
health professionals. Being in this position would allow me to develop my existing 
knowledge base, and work even more collaboratively with others.
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Being part of this PBL exercise has raised my awareness of wider issues that need 
to be addressed when critically appraising the effectiveness of new initiatives such 
as IAPT. I realise that my contribution to the group exercise had mainly been at a 
service level, such as thinking about the sustainability of the IAPT workforce. In 
my view, this reflected the stage of my professional development at the time of 
being introduced to the task, having moved from a stage of thinking about my 
clinical work to now considering issues at a service level. Therefore, another 
learning point for the future would be for me to develop a greater awareness of 
wider context issues. For example, the perspectives of different stakeholders, 
policy and its impact on clinical practice, and research agendas.
Taking a position of curiosity, and understanding the broader context would 
continue my journey of personal and professional development. For me, this is an 
important stage in my development as I progress into the third year of training.
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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DISCUSSION GROUP ACCOUNT - Year 1
Summary
This account reflects my experience of participating in a personal and professional 
discussion group (PPDG) during my first year as a trainee clinical psychologist. The 
account begins by providing the reader with a description of the PPDG members, 
and how our group chose to operate. The account is then broken down into the 
following sections: a) the factors that I regard as being the most influential in our 
group development, b) some reflections of myself within the group, and the 
discussions that took place and, c) an example of my own and group member's 
personal and professional development as a consequence of being part of this 
group.
Writing this account was a difficult, yet insightful process as I found my thoughts 
branching into different directions. Consequently, the enormity of my learning 
within this group, and how I have translated this within my clinical work, has 
become apparent. Pearce et al. (1987) suggest that successful work groups 
require open communication, a flexible approach in co-ordination and a 
commitment to group goals. Thinking back to my experience of our group over 
the past year, I do think that our group has been successful, and I have really 
come to appreciate the fortnightly meetings as a forum where I can vent my 
frustrations, be supported, support others, and expand my learning. My hope is 
that as group members we continue to take responsibility to use this forum to 
expand and develop our personal and professional development.
Page 53 of 245
PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DISCUSSION GROUP ACCOUNT - Year 2
Summary
This account has been written as a reflection of my experience of being part of a 
personal and professional discussion group (PPDG) in my second year of training 
as a clinical psychologist, and focuses on two major themes: change; and 
leadership. These themes were chosen as they represent the common threads 
that weaved through my experience of being a member of this PPDG, as well as 
my experience of being a trainee attending lectures at university, and as a trainee 
working in the NHS. Throughout this account I have self-reflected and reflected 
on the PPDG process, and how this has impacted on my personal and professional 
learning. Where relevant I have also made reference to theory and practice.
Having written this account I wonder how I move on from this point, and how I 
can support and be supported by others in my PPDG for the coming year. Having 
progressed through the second year and moving to another transition point, I 
have now moved into a position of embracing change versus fearing change, as I 
have realised that through taking this position I will expand as an individual and as 
a clinical psychologist. I also hope to expand my position through acquiring skills 
and opportunities that will allow me to begin developing as a leader in clinical 
psychology.
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CLINICAL DOSSIER
The Clinical Dossier contains an overview of clinical experience gained through 
five placements, and case report summaries of clinical work undertaken.
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AN OVERVIEW OF CLINICAL EXPERIENCE GAINED THROUGH PLACEMENTS
Adult Mental Health
Dates: October 2008 - September 2009
Setting: Psychological Therapies in Primary Care service, and an Adult Community 
Mental Health Team
Summary o f experience: I worked across two adult mental health services, with 
service users aged between 20-64 years from diverse backgrounds. Service user 
presentations included panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, vomit 
phobia, depression, low self-esteem, psychoses, and memory difficulties.
Working with two of the service users involved risk assessments of self harm and 
substance misuse, and Care Programme Approach (CPA) work was also 
completed. All assessments were based on interviews and use of standardised 
measures (e.g. BDI-II, BAI), and interventions were based on Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) and Mindfulness principles. This experience involved working in a 
community outpatient setting, an inpatient mental health ward, and within 
service users homes. I worked as part of a multi-disciplinary team (MOT) with 
nursing staff in an inpatient setting, and also did some joint work with a clinical 
psychologist. A service evaluation was conducted to examine the effectiveness of 
a Stress Management Course.
Child and Adolescent Mental Health 
Dates: October 2009 - March 2010
Setting: Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service, and a Children and Young 
Peoples Development Service
Summary o f experience: I worked with service users aged between 3-19 years of 
age. Service user presentations included queried Autism and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder, and challenging behaviours related to a Learning Disability 
(LD), and Autism. This placement entailed working within a specialist 
developmental service, an outpatient community child mental health setting, 
within service user's homes, and within a school where observations were 
conducted. Assessments were carried out with service users and families. 
Assessments and interventions were based on integrative (CBT, Behavioural, 
Systemic) and Neurodevelopmental models, with formal and informal assessment
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measures to gather information (e.g. WISC-IV, BADS DEX-C, functional 
assessments, scaling questions). Modes of work included joint work with a clinical 
psychologist and other members of the MDT. I also provided training on basic 
therapeutic skills as part of a Tier 2 service to a local 'buddy' scheme within the 
borough.
Learning Disabilities
Dates: April 2010 - September 2010
Setting: Psychological and Challenging Needs Service
Summary o f experience: I worked with service users aged between 21-66 years of 
age. Service user presentations included queried LD, Asperger's and Dementia; 
depression and low self-esteem; anxiety, bereavement issues; and challenging 
behaviour related to LD. This included direct work with service users, and indirect 
work with carers and residential staff teams. I also delivered a Keep Safe group 
for service users. Work settings varied between outpatient, residential, service 
users' home, and specialist Asperger's Service. Assessments and interventions 
were based on integrative models (CBT, Behavioural, Systemic, Psychodynamic). 
Psychometric tests were used in diagnostic assessments (e.g. WAIS-III, ABS-RC:2, 
DRS-2), and other standardised measures such as BAI, BDI, LD-CORE were also 
used. Functional assessments and systematic interviewing procedures were used 
with residential staff teams (e.g. DLD, HALO). This placement involved working 
within a MDT and a community LD team. In this placement I was involved in 
consultation work with residential staff teams. I presented information on a 
clinical case to the MDT, as well as information on psychometric testing, its 
application and utility.
Older Adults Mental Health
Dates: November 2010 - September 2011
Setting: Community Mental Health Team -  Older Peoples Services 
Summary o f experience: I worked with service users aged between 58-94 years of 
age. Service user presentations included queried Dementia, mild to moderate 
dementia, depression, anxiety, and life-stage adjustment difficulties. This 
placement included work with service users and carers. I delivered a Cognitive 
Stimulation Therapy group (CST) for people diagnosed with dementia. My work
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was primarily based in an outpatient setting, and some work took place in an 
inpatient ward, and residential setting. Assessments and interventions were 
based on integrative (CBT, Behavioural, Systemic, Psychodynamic) and life-stage 
models. Psychometric tests such as WTAR, WAIS-III, WMS-III, Rey Complex, Trail 
Making, Hayling and Brixton were used in diagnostic assessments for dementia. 
Other standardised measures, namely MMSE, GDS, QoL, CSDD, ZARIT, were also 
used. Functional assessments were conducted with a residential, and an inpatient 
staff team. This placement involved working within a MDT and attending regular 
team meetings. In this placement I was involved in service development, setting 
up departmental psychology meetings, organising psychometric test materials, 
and setting up a system to evaluate CST group work. I presented information on 
Pseudo-Dementia and Dementia in Parkinson's Disease within the psychology 
department, and also presented information on CST to the multi-disciplinary 
team.
Specialist Neurorehabilitation
Dates: November 2010 -  September 2011
Setting: Neurorehabilitation Centre
Summary o f experience: I worked with service users aged between 21-63 years 
of age. Service user presentations included queried cognitive decline, cognitive 
and psychological difficulties following an acquired brain injury (e.g. problems 
with memory, attention, concentration, adjustment, anxiety, low-mood, anger 
issues). I was involved in both inpatient and outpatient work. The outpatient 
work was primarily focused on Vocational Rehabilitation; enabling service users to 
get back to work. Models of assessment were Neuropsychological and integrative 
(CBT, Behavioural, Systemic). A range of Neuropsychological tests were used in 
the assessment process, such as the WAS I, TOMM, WAIS-III, WMS-III, WTAR, 
NART, Graded Naming, Verbal Fluency, Stroop, WCST, Zoo Map, Rey Complex 
Copy. Standardised measures included HADS, PAI, O-Log. Risk assessments were 
also conducted in both inpatient and outpatient work. Consultation work was 
offered to inpatient staff. I presented my doctoral research to the 
neuropsychology department.
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ADULT MENTAL HEALTH CASE REPORT ONE - SUMMARY
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for panic disorder associated with vomit phobia 
in a woman in her late twenties 
Year 1
This case report describes the application of cognitive behavioural therapy {CBT) 
for panic disorder associated with vomit phobia. Sandra, a woman in her late 
twenties, was referred by her G.P to a primary care team, as she had also lost a 
significant amount of weight (BMI=16.6). At assessment she presented with a 
fear of feeling sick and vomiting which had made it difficult for her to eat or enjoy 
a full meal and take part in social activities. Her difficulties precipitated after an 
incident where she experienced a panic attack.
An initial formulation based on Clark's (1986) model of panic was used as the 
basis for intervention, which was later elaborated on in therapy using Boschen's 
(2007) cognitive-behavioural model of emetophobia (fear of vomiting). Sandra 
was offered 16 intervention sessions in total. The methods of intervention 
included cognitive restructuring (e.g. socratic method), behavioural experiments, 
and working with imagery to facilitate change in Sandra's catastrophic thinking 
style and avoidant behaviours.
On reviewing outcome mid therapy, Sandra self reported some change and 
showed improvement in outcome measures (GAD-7, PHQ-9, CORE 10). However, 
she still experienced some level of difficulty which is to be addressed in remaining 
therapy sessions. Strength of the work carried out included the flexible and 
adaptable nature in which interventions were utilised. A longer period of 
assessment would have allowed for a deeper understanding of how some 
predisposing factors may have contributed to the maintenance of Sandra's 
problems. This will be taken into consideration for future clinical practice.
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ADULT MENTAL HEALTH CASE REPORT TWO - SUMMARY
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for depression and low self esteem with a 
woman in her mid forties 
Year 1
This report describes the case of Amy, a woman in her mid forties, who was 
referred for cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), for depression and low self 
esteem within an adult community mental health team (CMHT). Amy expressed a 
low selfesteem, feeling low and anxious on a daily basis and complained of 
depressive symptoms e.g. low motivation.
Amy's difficulties were conceptualised using Fennell's (1997) cognitive 
behavioural model of low self esteem; capturing her co-occurrence of anxiety and 
depression, and the probable origins of low self esteem. She attended a total of 
15 therapy sessions, and at the time of writing this report had a final session 
remaining. Interventions applied include behavioural experiments, and building 
new adaptive beliefs. A relapse prevention plan will be developed in the final 
intervention session.
Amy completed the BDI-II at assessment and then again mid-way though therapy. 
Her overall scores showed a reduction from 46 (severely depressed) to 27 
(moderately depressed). Low self esteem has been shown to be a poor predictor 
in indicating the treatment of depression (Sherrington et a i, 2001), and to predict 
relapse following treatment (Brown et a i, 1990). It is unfortunate that this case 
study presents information only on the main episode of treatment without 
information on symptoms after a follow up period. Therefore the level of success 
measured can only be indicative of the short term, and not give a clear indication 
about the long term effectiveness of CBT, to prevent relapse in low-self esteem 
and depression.
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CHILD AND ADOLESCENT CASE REPORT - SUMMARY
A neurodevelopmental assessment for the query of Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder and Autistic Spectrum Disorder with a 9 year old boy 
Year 2
This report describes the case of Jack, a nine year-old boy, referred by his G.P for 
concerns regarding his tantrums and increasing hyperactivity. A history of the 
presenting concerns was gathered, as was a personal and developmental history. 
It was hypothesised that Jack would have a neuropsychological and behavioural 
profile consistent with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) or Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD).
A number of assessment measures were chosen to explore concerns raised and 
test the hypotheses. These include: the Conner's Rating Scale-Revised short 
forms of the parents (CPRS-R: S) and teacher (CTRS-R: S), the Dysexecutive 
Questionnaire for Children (DEX-C), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children- 
Fourth UK Edition (WISC-IV UK). He was also tested using non-standardised ASD 
measures. Jack's behaviours were observed during the assessments, and at 
school where his ability to interact and communicate with others was observed.
The outcomes on assessment measures, and his presentation provided a very 
complex picture. Given the history of presenting concerns, Jack's personal and 
developmental history and the findings of this assessment, a diagnosis of ADHD 
and ASD was made. It was recommended that Jack be reviewed for a trial of 
medication for his ADHD, and his parents be offered ongoing support to develop 
an understanding of his social communication and interaction difficulties. It was 
also recommended that the results of his assessment should be fed back to Jack's 
school.
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LEARNING DISABILITY ORAL CASE REPORT - SUMMARY
Bereavement work with a female with a learning disability in her early forties 
Year 2
This report describes the case of Seema, a female in her early forties who has a 
moderate to severe learning disability, and is on the Autistic Spectrum. An 
internal team referral was made for Seema to be supported by the psychology 
service because her mother was terminally ill and at Stage 3 Cancer. The referral 
was concerned with how and what Seema should be told about her mother being 
terminally ill, and how the staff team in Seema's residential home could support 
her during this difficult time. The referral was also concerned with what support 
could be offered to Seema when her mother passed away.
A multi-layered assessment was conducted. This involved an assessment of 
Seema's background, her relationship with her family and residential care home 
staff, and her past experiences of bereavement. Further, an assessment of the 
residential teams understanding of bereavement and learning disability was also 
conducted. This included understanding how the staff team felt about Seema 
being informed of her mother's ill health. Due to the sensitive nature of the 
events that were taking place for Seema and her family, a direct meeting could 
not take place with them to assess their views on how and what Seema should be 
told about her mother's ill health, although the residential care manager was able 
to share some of their thoughts with me.
Based on this complex assessment, it was conceptualised that Seema's learning 
disability and her limited communication skills would impact on her ability to 
understand her mother's ill health and the sad fact that her mother would 
eventually pass away. It was also conceptualised that, once bereaved, Seema 
would experience grief, but given her previous experience of grief and her 
reaction, she would not show her grief in obvious ways, for example crying. 
Consequently, this may impact on the staff team's ability to understand if Seema 
was grieving, and when she needed support.
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Based on this formulation it was planned for the intervention to take place in two 
parts. The first part was creating a story book with Seema with the support of a 
member of staff from the Speech and Language Therapy Service, to enable Seema 
to develop an understanding of her mother's deteriorating health. Secondly, the 
plan was to conduct staff training on the topic of bereavement and learning 
disabilities.
The nature of the psychological intervention work that was done with Seema was 
very much dictated by the fast changing pace of events that were taking place for 
Seema's mother. Unfortunately due to Seema's mother passing away just before 
the intervention phase commenced, the planned intervention changed, and a 
therapeutic space was provided for the staff team instead. This was to discuss the 
impact that the bereavement had on both Seema and the staff team. A referral 
was made for the initial planned intervention work to continue with another 
member of the Psychology service.
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OLDER ADULT CASE REPORT - SUMMARY
Cognitive stimulation therapy for dementia with seven adults aged over seventy
years
Year 3
This case report begins with a theoretical understanding of Cognitive Stimulation 
Therapy (CST) for dementia, and a description of the benefits of group therapy. 
Further, the report illustrates the delivery of CST with seven adults aged over 
seventy years, diagnosed with mild, moderate dementia, or mild cognitive 
decline. The CST group was based in an Older Adult Community Mental Health 
Team setting (OA-CMHT).
The assessment process involved individual interviews and completing outcome 
measures with service users and their carers'. These included Mini Mental State 
Examination (MMSE; Folstein et ai, 1975); Geriatric Depression Scale-short form 
(GDS-short form; Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986); The ZARIT Burden Interview (ZBI;
Zarit et a/., 1980); the Cornell Scale for Depression in Dementia (CSDD;
Alexopoulos et ai, 1988); and the Quality of Life-Alzheimer's Disease Scale (QoL- 
AD; Logsdon et ai, 1999).
Clare's (2008) bio-psychosocial model of dementia was used as a framework to 
understand individual presentations of dementia, and to guide the CST group 
intervention process. The group ran for 8 sessions, lasting 90 minutes each. Each 
week a different group activity, based on a manual for group leaders was 
implemented (Spector et ai, 2006).
Outcome measures and interviews were conducted at the end of the group 
programme. Evaluation of the group showed overall improvement in cognition, 
mood and quality of life from the perspective of both members and carers. Issues 
of consent and confidentiality, limitations of the evaluation approach taken, the 
usefulness of outcome measures used, and the social versus cognitive benefits of 
CST are considered.
Page 64 of 245
RESEARCH DOSSIER
The Research Dossier contains a research log check list, the service related 
research project, an abstract of the qualitative research project and the major 
research project.
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RESEARCH LOG CHECK LIST
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and research questions ✓
2 Carrying out a structured literature search using information 
technology and literature search tools
✓
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and evaluating research 
methods
Z
4 Formulating specific research questions Z
5 Writing brief research proposals Z
6 Writing detailed research proposals/protocols Z
7 Considering issues related to ethical practice in research, 
including issues of diversity, and structuring plans accordingly
Z
8 Obtaining approval from a research ethics committee Z
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for research Z
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for research Z
11 Collecting data from research participants Z
12 Choosing appropriate design for research questions Z
13 Writing patient information and consent forms Z
14 Devising and administering questionnaires Z
15 Negotiating access to study participants in applied NHS settings Z
16 Setting up a data file Z
17 Conducting statistical data analysis using SPSS Z
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses Z
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis Z
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data analysis Z
21 Summarising results in figures and tables Z
22 Conducting semi-structured interviews Z
23 Transcribing and analysing interview data using qualitative 
methods
Z
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses Z
25 Interpreting results from quantitative and qualitative data 
analysis
Z
26 Presenting research findings in a variety of contexts Z
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27 Producing a written report on a research project Z
28 Defending own research decisions and analyses Z
29 Submitting research reports for publication in peer-reviewed 
journals or edited book
30 Applying research findings to clinical practice Z
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SERVICE RELATED RESEARCH PROJECT
Evaluating the effectiveness of a Stress Management Course based within a 
Psychological Therapies in Primary Care Service 
Year I
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Abstract
Background: The NICE guidelines for depression (2007) recommend that 
mindfulness-based cognitive behavioural therapy (MBCT) delivered in a group 
format should be considered for people with recurrent depression.
Objective: To examine the effectiveness of a Stress Management Course (SMC) 
based on principles of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and mindfulness.
Setting and Participants: A Stress Management Course (SMC) run in a 
Psychological Therapies in Primary Care service (PTiPC) based in south west 
London was the setting for this evaluation. Data for 21 clients was included in the 
analysis.
Measures: Clients completed outcome measures assessing anxiety, depression 
and general global distress. A form was also developed to capture demographic 
information e.g. age, gender, ethnicity of participants and to investigate clients' 
experience of the SMC.
Results: A group level analysis revealed that the pre therapy mean was 
significantly higher than the post therapy mean (p<0.05) for all measures, except 
for one domain of a measure. An individual analysis looking at clinically significant 
and reliable change for each of the clients, for each of the outcome measures 
showed mixed results which are presented in further detail within this report.
Conclusions: Overall, the results suggest that the SMC is most effective in 
reducing clients' levels of anxiety followed by levels of depression, however not as 
effective in reducing levels of global distress. Results have been discussed further 
and recommendations for the service are made.
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Introduction
In the United Kingdom depression and anxiety are the two most common reasons 
for consultation at a general practice level (NHS Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination, 2002). Through significant government investment individuals 
presenting to their general practitioners with depression and anxiety disorders 
are being offered more talking treatments, in line with the Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme. Consequently, psychology services at 
a primary care level may be faced with additional pressures to provide services.
The NICE guidelines for depression (2007) recommend that mindfulness-based 
cognitive behavioural therapy (MBCT) delivered in a group format should be 
considered for people with recurrent depression. This treatment approach is 
relatively new yet empirically validated and designed to prevent relapse in people 
who have recovered from depression (Segal et al., 2002). MBCT is based partly on 
CBT for depression (Beck et al., 1979) and Kabbat-Zinn and colleagues' 
mindfulness-based stress reduction programme, which has shown to be effective 
in the treatment of generalised anxiety disorder and panic (Kabat-Zinn et al.,
1992).
MBCT teaches clients to become more aware of thoughts and feelings, and to let 
go of ruminative thinking styles. Unlike CBT where clients are encouraged to 
evaluate the validity of their thoughts, MBCT encourages clients to simply remain 
open to what thoughts are present, to experience these fully, without a feeling of 
aversion or attachment. Kuyken et al. (2008) highlight that mindfulness-based 
group CBT has the potential to help a large number of people in primary care at a 
comparatively low cost in comparison with individual therapies.
Currently, one of the problems faced by a Psychological Therapies in Primary Care 
(PTiPC) service based in a service in south west London is an already extensive 
waiting list, and there is the possibility that given the implementation of IAPT 
within the service, this waiting list may increase further. To manage the already 
existing waiting list, and to allow for faster access to psychological therapy clients 
who are triaged and assessed as requiring Step 3 interventions for moderate to 
severe psychological difficulties (in line with the Improving Access to Psychological
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Therapies (IAPT) stepped care approach), are allocated to a 'Stress Management 
Course' (SMC). The SMC is a 7-week course in total, and each session runs for a 
period of 2 % hours. The course is facilitated by a Consultant Clinical Psychologist, 
and has a maximum capacity of 35 clients. The SMC is based on principles of 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and mindfulness.
To date, the course has been effective in managing the waiting list; however it is 
uncertain as to exactly how effective the group is in terms of client change. Thus 
the aim of this evaluation was to examine the effectiveness of the SMC based on 
principles of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and mindfulness. In order to do 
this a mixed method approach was adopted. Quantitative data was gathered 
through using a set of clinical outcome measures that assessed the psychological 
and social wellbeing of clients attending the SMC. Qualitative data was also 
collected to investigate clients' experience of the SMC.
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Method
Setting and Participants
The evaluation was set within a Stress Management Course (SMC) run in a 
Psychological Therapies in Primary Care service (PTiPC) based in South West 
London. Twenty-one clients who had attended the first and last session of the 
seven-week SMC took part in this evaluation. Clients were recruited from two 
different SMCs.
Design
A repeated measures design was used for this evaluation. Clients completed a set 
of outcome measures at the start of the SMC and then completed the same set of 
measures at the end of the SMC. The dependent variables were clients' 
responses to the each of the outcome measures.
A questionnaire consisting of eight open ended questions was also used to 
investigate clients experiences of the SMC (see appendix A for questionnaire 
design).
Measures
As part of the data collection process the following outcome measures were used:
The Generalised Anxiety Disorder scale (GAD-7; Spitzer et al., 2006)
The GAD-7 (see appendix B) was used to screen and assess clients for the severity 
of generalised anxiety disorder. This measure is a 7-item scale where scores of 0,
1, 2 and 3 are respectively assigned to the response categories 'not at all', 'several 
days', 'more than half the days' and 'nearly every day'. The total score for the 
seven items range from 0 -  21. Spitzer et al. (2006) highlight the GAD-7 to be 'a 
useful tool with strong criterion validity for identifying probable causes of GAD'
(p.1095).
The Physical Health Questionnaire Mood Scale (PHQ-9; Kroenke et al., 2001)
The PHQ-9 was used to assess clients' cognitive, emotional and physical aspects of 
depression. The measure is made up of 9 items that reflect the criteria on which 
the diagnosis of DSM-IV depressive disorders is based. Items grade depressive
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symptom severity, since each item can be scored from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly 
every day). The PHQ-9 score can range from 0-27. The PHQ-9 is a reliable and 
valid measure of depression severity and is a useful clinical and research tool (see 
appendix C).
The Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation -  Outcome Measure (CORE OM;
Evans et al., 2000)
The CO RE-0 M was used to measure clients' level of global distress. The measure 
consists of 34 self report items that look at domains of subjective well-being, 
problems and symptoms, life functioning and risk to self and others. The CORE- 
OM also looks at the level of global distress minus risk. The measure is regarded 
as a reliable and valid instrument with good sensitivity to change in psychosocial 
functioning (Evans et al., 2002), and has been recommended to be used before 
and after treatment (see appendix D).
A form was also developed to capture demographic information e.g. age, gender, 
ethnicity of clients (see appendix E), and to investigate clients' experience of the 
SMC (as previously mentioned).
Procedure
Clients attending the first session of the SMC were asked to complete a form 
collecting demographic information. Clients were also asked to complete the 
outcome measures at the start of the course. These measures were again 
administered at the last session of the SMC, and a questionnaire was also 
completed investigating clients' qualitative experience of the SMC.
Clients' pre and post responses for the outcome measures were collated and 
entered into SPSS version 16.0. To allow for a richer analysis of information, 
clients responses for the CORE-OM were broken down further into the CORE-OM 
domains of subjective well-being, problems/symptoms, life functioning, risk, and 
total items minus risk item. These results were also entered into SPSS. The data 
was then analysed using descriptive statistics and dependent t-tests. Further 
analysis was done on the data through hand calculations to assess clinically
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significant and reliable change (see appendix F for the formula used). Finally, the 
information collected regarding clients' experiences was read, and common 
themes were identified using content analysis.
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Results
Analysis of the data was conducted in four parts. Firstly, a descriptive analysis 
was conducted on the group demographics. Secondly, a group analysis was used 
to explore significant difference between the means of outcome measures 
completed prior to starting the SMC compared to at the end of the SMC. Thirdly, 
clinical significant (CSC) and reliable change (RC) analysis was conducted on each 
outcome measure for each client. Final analysis was done using content analysis 
for the qualitative information that was collected at the end of the SMC.
Descriptive analysis
Client ages ranged from nineteen to seventy-six years old with the mean age 
being forty-six years (SD = 15.97). In total there were seven male and fourteen 
female clients, of whom fifteen clients were 'white British', five were 'white other' 
and one client had 'not stated' their ethnicity. Eighteen clients identified English 
as being their first language, and three clients identified another. Two clients 
identified having a hearing impairment.
Table 1 summarises the reason clients believed they had been referred to the 
SMC.
Table 1 Reason for referral to the SMC
Referral reason Number of clients
Depression 7
Anxiety 2
Stress 2
Depression and anxiety 1
Stress and depression 6
Stress, depression and anxiety 1
Not Stated 2
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Group level analysis
Using dependent t-test calculations, group level comparison of means were 
carried out for each of the outcome measures. Table 2 summarises the findings.
Table 2_______ Summary of t-test calculation for outcome measures
Outcome Measure
Pre-therapy Post-therapy T
(df) p value
Mean SD Mean SD = 20
GAD-7 13.90 5.41 8.19 5.68 4.17 .000
PHQ-9 15.48 6.52 9.38 7.47 4.11 .001
CORE-OM 1.96 0.67 1.40 0.92 3.35 .003
CORE-OM minus risk 2.27 0.73 1.61 0.96 3.47 .002
CORE-OM; risk to self and 
other
0.43 0.58 0.42 1.03 .53 .959
CORE-OM; wellbeing 2.5 0.79 1.79 1.10 2.9 .009
CORE-OM; problems and 
symptoms
2.46 0.75 1.80 1.01 3.31 .003
CORE-OM; life functioning 2.04 0.78 1.38 0.94 3.79 .001
Note: SD=standard deviation; pvalue=!evel of significant difference between pre post therapy
Table 2 shows that for all measures, except on the CORE OM risk to self and 
others result, the pre therapy mean was significantly higher than the post therapy 
mean (p<0.05).
Page 78 of 245
Clinically significant (CSC) and reliable change (RC)
Group level analysis enables one to assess the statistical significance of pre-post 
therapy change at the level of the group. However, this masks the fact that 
individuals within the group may have had different outcomes. For example, 
some individuals may have improved, some may have deteriorated and others 
may have made no change at all. Generally clinicians are more concerned with 
assessing individual-level change, thus it was decided that it would be beneficial 
to explore CSC and RC at an individual level for each of the outcomes measures.
CSC is change that has taken an individual from a score typical of a clinical score to 
that of a score typical for the 'normal' population. RC is a way to measure 
whether the change that has occurred is unlikely to be due to simple 
measurement unreliability (Evans et al., 1998). Both CSC and RC have to be met in 
order for a client to be judged to have made CSC. This may mean a positive 
change (i.e. improvement in scores), or negative (i.e. deterioration in scores).
Also when analysing findings it is important to keep in mind that an individual may 
be so symptomatic (e.g. high in anxiety and/or depression) that although they 
make great improvement (i.e. the change made is large enough to be reliable), 
they may not pass the CSC threshold to be a non-clinical case. Thus although the 
individual has not theoretically made CSC, a clinician would still be pleased with 
the level of improvement.
A formula by Jacobson et al. (1991) was used to assess individual level change in 
the context of group-level change. Calculations were done for each of the clients, 
for each of the outcome measures, including the domains of the CORE-OM, the 
results of which can be found in appendix G.
Table 3 outlines how many clients made CSC and RC, how many did not meet CSC 
and RC, how many crossed the threshold to be a non clinical case but the effect 
might be error (i.e. CSC only), and how many made real change but did not move 
to be a non-clinical case (i.e. RC only).
Page 79 of 245
Table 3 Summary of clients CSC and RC outcome for the GAD-7, PHQ-9,
CORE-OM and CORE-OM domains
Outcome
Measure
CSC and RC No CSC or RC CSC but no RC No CSC but RC
GAD-7 11 4 3 3
(52%) (19%) (14%) (14%)
PHQ-9 10 7 3 1
(48%) (33%) (14%) (5%)
CORE-OM 8 8 3 2
(40%) (40%) (14%) (10%)
CORE-OM minus 8 10 1 2
risk (40%) (48%) (5%) (10%)
CORE-OM; risk 0 3 18 0
to self and other (0%) (14%) (86%) (0%)
COREJDM; 7 8 6 0
wellbeing (33%) (40%) (30%) (0%)
CORE-OM; 8 10 2 1
problems and 
symptoms
(40%) (48%) (10%) (5%)
CORE-OM; life 8 10 3 0
functioning (40%) (48%) (14%) (0%)
Note: CSC = Clinically significant change; RC=Reliable change
CSC and RC
Approximately half of the clients made both CSC and RC on the GAD-7 and PHQ-9. 
For the CORE-OM, 40 per cent of the participants showed CSC and RC. The CORE 
OM domains (excluding the domain of 'risk to self and others') closely reflect the 
percentage of CSC and RC of the CORE OM (33% and 40%).
No CSC or RC
For the PHQ-9 and CORE-OM, a similar percentage of clients made no CSC and RC 
(33% and 40%). In comparison, the GAD-7 showed fewer clients as having made 
no CSC and RC (19%). The CORE OM domains of 'CORE OM minus risk', 'problems 
and symptoms' and 'life functioning', showed that approximately half of the 
clients made no CSC and RC (48%). In comparison to these domains, fewer clients
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made no CSC and RC on the domain of 'wellbeing' (40%) and even fewer on the 
domain of 'risk to self and others' (14%).
CSC but no RC
The same percentage of clients made CSC but no RC for each of the outcome 
measures (14%). Interestingly, looking at the CORE OM domains a high 
percentage of clients made CSC but no RC on the domain of risk to self and others 
(86%). The domain of 'wellbeing' also showed that twice as many clients made 
CSC but no RC compared to the overall CORE OM (30%). the domains of 
'problems and symptoms' and 'life functioning' showed similar results to the 
CORE OM outcome (10% and 14% made CSC but no RC). Finally the domain of 
'CORE-OM minus risk' showed a smaller percentage (5%) made CSC but no RC.
No CSC but RC
A smaller percentage of clients made no CSC but RC for the GAD-7, PHQ-9 and 
CORE-OM (14%, 5% and 10% respectively). The CORE-OM domains of 'CORE-OM 
minus risk' and 'problems and symptoms' showed no CSC, but RCfor 10 per cent 
and 5 per cent of clients.
Overall, the percentage of clients that showed CSC and RC across all measures 
relate to the same individuals. This would also be for clients that made no CSC 
and RC, and no CSC but RC. The exception was CSC but no RC.
Content Analysis
Content analysis was used to determine the presence of certain themes within 
the questionnaires investigating clients' experience of the SMC. Table 4 and 5 
conceptualise the positive and negative themes that emerged. Themes were 
quantified in an objective manner by noting the frequency of times individual 
clients had mentioned them.
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Table 4_______Summary of the positive themes that emerged
Themes Frequency
Interaction with other people who had similar problems was 
helpful
12
Not feeling judged 2
Mindfulness was most helpful 13
Thought challenge was helpful 4
Gaining awareness of problem 6
Table 5 Summary of the negative themes that emerged
Themes Frequency
1:1 sessions would have been more helpful 4
Group sessions were too short in duration 2
Group was too long and intense (academic) 3
Everyone had different problems which was unhelpful 7
Smaller groups would be better 5
Too much description of the problem and not enough 
'action'
3
Intimidated to talk in front of others 4
Having better amenities would improve the course e.g. 
desks, comfortable chairs
4
Not all material covered on the course applied to everyone 4
Stretching exercise was unhelpful 4
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Discussion
Summary of results
The aim of this project was to evaluate the effectiveness of a SMC, based on 
principles of MBCT that is run in a PTiPC service. The group level analysis indicates 
that the SMC was effective in reducing clients levels of depression, anxiety and 
global distress, including levels of global distress without risk, clients problems; 
increasing clients wellbeing and life functioning. No significant change in levels of 
risk was identified. This may be because clients showed little risk to start with.
Individual case analysis indicates that approximately 50 per cent of clients 
attending the SMC had reduced levels of anxiety and depression, moving them 
from a clinical to a non clinical population. For some clients the SMC was less 
successful in reducing levels of depression compared to levels of anxiety. The 
analysis also showed that although 14 per cent of clients moved to score within a 
non clinical population this could have been due to error and thus change was 
unreliable. This may have been because clients' pre-test scores for anxiety and 
depression were close to the threshold of being a non clinical case to begin with.
A small percentage of clients reporting anxiety and depression stayed within a 
clinical population; however the change they exhibited was large enough to have 
had some real effect indicating that to some extent the SMC was still effective for 
these individuals.
Individual case analysis on clients' levels of global distress revealed that 40 per 
cent moved to score within a non clinical population and 40 per cent stayed 
within a clinical range. Clients that did not make CSC and RC was slightly higher 
for the CORE-OM domains of'CORE-OM minus risk', 'wellbeing', 'problems and 
symptoms', compared to those that made CSC and RC. A high percentage of 
clients made CSC but no RC on the domain of 'risk to self and others'. Again this 
may have been due to the fact that clients initially showed little risk.
Overall, the individual analysis suggests that the SMC is to some extent most 
effective in reducing clients' levels of anxiety followed by levels of depression, 
however not as effective in reducing levels of global distress. However, these 
findings may be more suggestive about the outcome measures used i.e. it may be
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easier to evidence change for problem-specific measures rather than global 
distress measures.
Content analysis revealed positive and negative experiences of the SMC. For 
example, some clients found that actual 'group' experience to be a helpful 
process allowing them to interact with others who were in a similar position to 
themselves. Conversely, some clients found that the group size was too large and 
that everyone had different problems.
The findings of this evaluation have been helpful although it is questionable as to 
how far the service can generalise as findings were specific to this group of 
individuals. However, some information has been highlighted, on which 
recommendations have been made. This will be fed back to the service on 4th 
September 2009.
Implications and Recommendations
From the findings of this evaluation, it is suggested that the PTiPC service 
continue to implement mindfulness techniques (e.g. breathing exercise) within 
the SMC and review the implementation of techniques that clients found less 
helpful. It is also recommended that the service consider running additional 
SMC's that focus on specific symptoms of problems e.g. anxiety. Firstly, this may 
allow for fewer clients per group enriching their experience (e.g. clients can 
identify more with each other; feel more 'heard' and less intimidated), and 
possibly facilitate CSC. Secondly, this may further reduce the waiting list; however 
team resources would need to be considered and discussed.
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Appendices
Appendix A Qualitative Questionnaire
STRESS MANAGEMENT COURSE EVALUATION FORM
Tills questionnaire invites you to give feedback on the Stress Management Course you 
have just completed, We would be pleased i f  you would answer the following 
questions:
H What have vflu found most lielnful about the course?_________________
2) Wliat liavc you found most unhelpful about the course?
What was helpful about the group experience?
What was unhelpful about the group experience?
5) Which of the practice exercises were most helpful?
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(}) Which of the practice exercises were least helpful?
7) How do you think the course could be improved?
8) Do you have any further comments?
9) It has been agreed with that my name will be put back on the 
waiting list for further help on a 1:1 basis
Yes No (please circle)
Remember it is important to continue practising what you have Icamt i f  you arc to fully 
benefit. I f  you have not been doing the home practices, it is never too late to start,
Thank you for taking the time to fill in this questionnaire
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Appendix B The Generalised Anxiety Disorder scale (GAD-7)
GAD-7
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you 
been bothered by the following problems?
(Use “tS'to indicate your answer)
Not 
at all
Several
days
More than 
half the 
days
Nearly 
every day
1. Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge 0 1 2 3
2, Not being able to stop or control worrying 0 1 2 3
3. Worrying loo much about different things 0 1 2 3
4. Trouble relaxing 0 1 2 3
5. Being so restless that it is hard to sit still 0 1 2 3
a  Becoming easily annoyed afinitable O ' 1 2 3
7. Feeling afraid as if something awful 
might happen
0 1 2 3
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Appendix E Demographic Form
Psychological Therapies in Primary Care
As pan of the stress management course we are collecting some information to help 
make sure that all sectors of the community have an equal access to the service 
provided. Please note that this information will be treated in the strictest confidence 
and used only by the Psychological Thctapies in Primary Care team. Please can you 
complete the following:
1) Reason for referral
2) Age
3) Gender
Male □
Female □
4) Ethnicity
White
British D
Black
Caribbean
D
Irish □ African □
Other White background □ Other Black background □
M ixed
White and Black a
Other ethnic group
Chinese
□
White and Black African □ Other ethnic group □
White and Asian D
Other mixed background □
Asian
Indian D
AW stated □
Pakistani □
Bangladeshi □
Other Asian background □
PlenNV Turn over
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5) First language (if not English)?
6) Disability Informatiim
M obility impairment Yes □  No [ j
Hriarinu impairment Yes □  No □
Visual impairment Yes D  No D
I f  you have answered yes to any o f the above can you please give some more 
information in  the box below:
Thank-you taking time in completing this form I 
Psychological Therapies hi Primary Cart Team
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Appendix F Clinically significant and reliable change formulas
RC1 Formula
R C I- fPrcrTr^atment) -  (Post-Trcaltncnt'l 
(Sdiff)
Where; SdifT- V2 (SE)-
And: SU=SD %'l-rxx
ïn which; SD is the SD of a ‘dysfunctional’ group; and rxx is (internal) reliability of the 
measure (Cronbach’s alpha)
Step 1; work mil SB
Assume dysfunctional group depression scale SD is 24.3 and Cronbach’s alpha is .87
Formula; SE-SD Vl-rxx
SE- 24.1 \ fl-0.S7 ~24.1 ^0.13
$E= S.6S937
Step 2 : Work out SPIFF
Formula; Sdiff- ^2 (SE)1
sdiir^^2(8M9y/y 
= \^ 2 (75.51)
-ifi51.0l0 i
Sdiff- 32.28 
Stage 3: Work out the RC for clients 
Formula: RC = (Pre-Treatment) -  fPost-Trcatrnenrt
(SdifO
Client A; pre-treatment depression = 130
post-treatment depression = 100
Client A: RC=130-100
12.28
Client A: RC~2.44*
+If  RC is >1.96, change is considered reliable at the .05 significance level
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CSC Formula;
SD* ftncanfl ‘i1 SD1 fmean1^
SD1 t  SD-
Î = Functional Group 
2 -  Dysfunctional Group
Depression moaüure:
Functional bkan = 48.9 (SD 25,6) 
Dysfunctions! Mean = 95.2 (SD 24.1)
z i m m z w r n
24.1 t 25.6
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Appendix G Clinically significant change and reliable change results for each of 
the clients for each of the outcome measures
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Clinically significant and reliable change for GAD-7
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 18 12 6 3.19 YES NO
B 19 7 12 6.38 YES YES
C 5 3 2 1.06 NO YES
D 17 6 11 5.85 YES YES
E 12 3 9 4.79 YES YES
F 15 4 11 5.85 YES YES
G 16 0 16 8.51 YES YES
H 21 18 3 1.6 NO NO
1 17 7 10 5.32 YES YES
J 20 5 15 7.98 YES YES
K 10 3 7 3.72 YES YES
L 17 18 -1 -0.53 NO NO
M 14 4 10 5.32 YES YES
N 12 6 6 3.19 YES YES
0 6 14 -8 -4.26 YES NO
P 20 17 3 1.60 NO NO
Q 9 9 0 0.0 NO YES
R 5 11 -6 -3.19 NO NO
S 12 4 8 4.26 YES YES
T 6 4 2 1.06 NO YES
U 21 17 4 2.13 YES NO
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Clinically significant and reliable change for PHQ-9
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 20 17 3 1.05 NO NO
B 21 8 13 4.55 YES YES
C 7 7 0 0.0 NO YES
D 24 10 14 4.9 YES NO
E 14 3 11 3.85 YES YES
F 13 5 8 2.8 YES YES
G 21 3 18 6.29 YES YES
H 20 21 -1 -0.35 NO NO
1 21 7 14 4.9 YES YES
J 11 3 8 2.8 YES YES
K 8 3 5 1.75 NO YES
L 15 6 9 3.15 YES YES
M 18 3 15 5.24 YES YES
N 12 4 8 2.8 YES YES
0 14 9 5 1.75 NO NO
P 27 27 0 0.0 NO NO
Q 8 10 -2 -0.70 NO NO
R 4 11 -7 -2.45 NO NO
S 14 5 9 3.15 YES YES
T 8 8 0 0.0 NO YES
U 25 27 -2 -0.70 NO NO
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Clinically significant and reliable change for CORE-OM
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 2.76 2.74 0.02 0.08 NO NO
B 2.26 1.38 0.88 3.38 YES NO
C 1.21 1.76 -0.55 -2.12 NO NO
D 2.26 1.09 1.17 4.5 YES YES
E 1.26 0.53 0.73 2.81 YES YES
F 1.32 0.15 1.17 4.5 YES YES
G 1.79 0.68 1.11 4.27 YES YES
H 2.94 3.38 -0.44 -1.69 NO NO
1 2.18 1.26 0.92 3.54 YES NO
J 2.32 0.94 1.38 5.31 YES YES
K 2.5 0.6 1.9 7.31 YES YES
L 1.68 1.38 0.30 1.15 NO NO
M 2.26 0.35 1.91 7.35 YES YES
N 1.58 1.21 0.37 1.42 NO YES
0 1.82 1.65 0.17 0.65 NO NO
P 2.94 2.79 0.15 0.58 NO NO
Q 1.06 1.21 -0.15 -0.58 NO YES
R 0.79 1.47 -0.68 -2.62 NO NO
S 1.82 0.82 1.0 3.85 YES YES
T 1.24 0.82 0.42 1.62 NO YES
U 3.09 3.29 -0.2 -0.77 NO NO
Page 100 of 245
Clinically significant and reliable change for CORE-OM minus risk items
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 3.21 3.21 0.0 0.0 NO NO
B 2.61 1.64 0.97 3.46 YES NO
C 1.46 2.14 -0.68 -2.43 NO NO
D 2.68 1.32 1.36 4.86 YES YES
E 1.54 0.64 0.9 3.21 YES YES
F 1.57 0.18 1.39 4.96 YES YES
G 2.18 0.82 1.36 4.86 YES YES
H 3.36 3.36 0.0 0.0 NO NO
1 2.61 1.5 1.11 3.96 YES NO
J 2.82 1.14 1.68 6.00 YES YES
K 2.89 0.75 2.14 7.64 YES YES
L 1.68 1.68 0.0 0.0 NO NO
M 2.61 0.43 2.18 7.79 YES YES
N 1.93 1.46 0.47 1.68 NO NO
0 2.14 1.89 0.25 0.89 NO NO
P 3.14 3.0 0.14 0.50 NO NO
Q 1.25 1.46 -0.21 -0.75 NO NO
R 0.96 1.79 -0.83 -2.96 NO NO
S 2.11 1.0 1.11 3.96 YES YES
T 1.5 1.0 0.5 1.79 NO YES
U 3.36 3.5 -0.14 -0.50 NO NO
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Clinically significant and reliable change for CORE-OM risk items
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 0.67 0.0 0.67 1.4 NO YES
B 0.67 0.17 0.5 1.04 NO YES
C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
D 0.33 0.0 0.33 0.69 NO YES
E 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
F 0.17 0.0 0.17 0.35 NO YES
G 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
H 1.0 4.0 -3.0 -6.25 NO NO
1 0.17 0.0 0.17 0.35 NO YES
J 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
K 0.67 0.0 0.67 1.40 NO YES
L 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
M 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.04 NO YES
N 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
0 0.33 0.5 -0.17 -0.35 NO YES
P 2.0 1.83 0.17 0.35 NO NO
Q 0.17 0.0 0.17 0.35 NO YES
R 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
S 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.04 NO YES
T 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NO YES
U 1.83 2.33 -0.5 -1.04 NO NO
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Clinically significant and reliable change for CORE-OM wellbeing items
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 3.75 3.25 0.5 0.74 NO NO
B 3.0 1.25 1.75 2.57 YES YES
C 1.5 2.75 -1.25 -1.84 NO NO
D 3.25 1.5 1.75 2.57 YES YES
E 1.5 0.75 0.75 1.10 NO YES
F 1.75 0.25 1.5 2.21 YES YES
G 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.47 NO YES
H 3.0 3.75 -0.75 -1.10 NO NO
1 3.0 1.25 1.75 2.57 YES YES
J 3.0 0.75 2.25 3.31 YES YES
K 2.5 1.25 1.25 1.84 NO YES
L 2.75 2.0 0.75 1.10 NO NO
M 3.0 0.0 3.0 4.41 YES YES
N 2.67 2.25 0.42 0.62 NO NO
0 2.75 3.25 -0.5 -0.74 NO NO
P 3.5 3.5 0.0 0.0 NO NO
Q 1.75 1.5 0.25 0.37 NO YES
R 0.5 1.5 -1.0 -1.47 NO YES
S 2.75 1.25 1.5 2.21 YES YES
T 1.75 1.25 0.5 0.74 NO YES
U 2.75 3.25 -0.5 -0.74 NO NO
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Clinically significant and reliable change for CORE-OM problem items
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 3.17 3.48 -0.31 -0.72 NO NO
B 2.92 1.92 1.0 2.33 YES NO
C 1.67 2.25 -0.58 -1.35 NO NO
D 2.58 1.42 1.16 2.7 YES YES
E 1.42 0.75 0.67 1.56 NO YES
F 1.33 0.17 1.16 2.7 YES YES
G 2.42 0.67 1.75 4.07 YES YES
H 3.75 3.42 0.33 0.77 NO NO
1 2.75 1.5 1.25 2.91 YES YES
J 3.08 1.25 1.83 4.26 YES YES
K 3.08 0.92 2.16 5.02 YES YES
L 2.17 1.75 0.42 0.98 NO NO
M 3.17 0.92 2.25 5.23 YES YES
N 2.0 1.83 0.17 0.4 NO NO
0 2.08 1.58 0.5 1.16 NO NO
P 3.33 3.42 -0.09 -0.21 NO NO
a 1.75 1.83 -0.08 -0.19 NO NO
R 1.17 2.33 -1.16 -2.7 NO NO
s 2.25 1.08 1.17 2:72 YES YES
T 2.08 1.42 0.66 1.53 NO YES
U 3.5 3.83 -0.33 -0.77 NO NO
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Clinically significant and reliable change for CORE-OM functioning items
Client Pre Post Change Reliable
Change
Reliable
Change
met
CSC met
A 3.08 3.08 0.0 0.0 NO NO
B 2.17 1.5 0.67 1.56 NO NO
C 1.25 1.83 -0.58 -1.35 NO NO
D 2.58 1.17 1.41 3.28 YES YES
E 1.67 0.5 1.17 2.72 YES YES
F 1.75 0.17 1.58 3.67 YES YES
G 2.0 0.92 1.08 2.51 YES YES
H 3.08 3.11 -0.03 -0.07 NO NO
1 2.33 1.58 0.75 1.74 NO NO
J 2.5 1.17 1.33 3.09 YES YES
K 2.83 0.42 2.41 5.60 YES YES
L 1.67 1.5 0.17 0.4 NO NO
M 1.92 0.08 1.84 4.28 YES YES
N 1.67 0.83 0.84 1.95 NO YES
0 2.0 1.75 0.25 0.58 NO NO
P 2.83 2.42 0.41 0.95 NO NO
Q 0.58 1.08 -0.5 -1.16 NO YES
R 0.91 1.33 -0.42 -0.98 NO NO
S 1.75 0.83 0.92 2.14 YES YES
T 0.83 0.5 0.33 0.77 NO YES
U 3.42 3.25 0.17 0.4 NO NO
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QUALITATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT - ABSTRACT
Turning 30 
Year 2
Whilst some research suggests that the risk of psychological distress has increased 
for people experiencing the "turning 30" transition in current times, others have 
questioned whether the Age Thirty Transition exists at all. This research study 
aimed to find out how people feel about turning thirty, whilst contributing to the 
knowledge base around the age thirty transition, and adding to the research 
literature on ageing.
Purposive sampling was used, and four participants were interviewed - two men 
and two women - all aged twenty-nine. A qualitative approach was adopted with 
a view that the experiences of each participant could be more appropriately 
explored using this method. The researchers were interested in their subjective 
experience, and therefore used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).
Five subordinate themes emerged; 'taking stock', 'reflecting on the past', 'loss', 
'preparing for the future', and 'expectations'.
This study suggests that the prospect of turning thirty is a salient issue for certain 
individuals in terms of being a potential period of transition. However, half of the 
participants indicated that they did not consider this a significant transitional 
period. Therefore, further research is warranted around whether individuals' 
sense of loss, future expectations, and their preparations for the future are 
influential in altering the ways in which they approach their thirties. The 
strengths and weaknesses of this study are considered.
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MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECT
The effectiveness of the Personality Assessment Inventory in detecting 
exaggerated psychological symptoms of traumatic brain Injury 
Year 3
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ABSTRACT
Background: In this study the identification of exaggerated psychological 
symptoms of traumatic brain injury (TBI) is suggested as an additional method in 
strengthening the detection of Malingered Neurocognitive Dysfunction.
Objective: The aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) in detecting exaggerated psychological 
symptoms of TBI.
Method: A three-group simulation quasi-experimental design was used to 
compare outcomes on the eleven Clinical scales of the PAI, and three Validity 
indices: Negative Impression Scale (NIM), Malingering Index (MAL), and Rogers 
Discriminant Function (RDF). The three participant groups included a TBI group 
(n=30), a control group (n=30), and a simulator group (n=30). The ability of the 
Validity indices to detect exaggerators (simulator group), and accurately detect 
non-exaggerators (TBI and healthy group) was examined.
Results: Overall, no evidence of difference was found between the simulator and 
TBI group on the eleven Clinical scales, or on the NIM index. Differences were 
found between the TBI and control group, and the simulator and control group, 
on six of the Clinical scales and the NIM index. No difference was found between 
all three participant groups on the MAL index. The RDF index yielded a significant 
difference between the TBI and simulator group. On the whole, all three of the 
Validity indices, at suggested cut-offs indicating exaggerated psychological 
symptoms, showed limited ability to accurately detect exaggerators (simulator 
group), and undesirable to perfect ability to accurately detect non-exaggerators 
(TBI and control group).
Conclusions: The results showed that the TBI group expressed specific 
psychological difficulties in comparison to the control group, and these difficulties 
were closely replicated by the simulator group. Results also showed limited utility 
of the PAI as a measure of detecting exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of study
This study is on the topic of exaggerated psychological symptoms of traumatic 
brain injury (TBI). Lying and deceit is regarded as part of everyday life and 
deemed to provide useful social purposes (DePaulo et al., 1996), yet dishonest 
behaviour in the form of healthcare fraud is estimated to cost the global economy 
billions of pounds (Gee et al., 2010). Fraudulent behaviour is defined as 
Intentional false representation and failing to disclose accurate information (The 
Fraud Act, 2006). In sustaining a TBI, individuals may suffer in both social and 
occupational activity (Wood, 2001), and as a result, some seek legal 
compensation. However, the issue of compensation with this population is 
controversial, especially for those with milder injuries. Binder and Rohling (1996) 
found that individuals with a TBI who seek compensation perform worse on 
neuropsychological tests and report longer symptom duration than those in a 
similar position, not seeking compensation. This example of discrepancy in 
performance raises a need to examine the validity and reliability of presentations, 
and whether some individuals seeking compensation exaggerate impairments. 
Where exaggeration is found, and intent to mislead for external gain is 
established (e.g. avoiding prosecution; financial gain), this is termed 'malingering' 
(Rogers, 2008).
The introduction to this study provides a definition of TBI, and a summary of 
cognitive and psychological impairments. The concept of malingering, and criteria 
specific to a 'diagnosis' of malingering in TBI, is then presented. Following this, 
the issue of malingering in TBI is explored, highlighting the need for measures of 
exaggeration in the detection process. Subsequently, base rates of malingering of 
cognitive symptoms of TBI are presented, and explanations of strategies that are 
currently used to detect exaggeration are provided. As current strategies focus 
mainly on exaggerated cognitive impairments, the most popular 
neuropsychological tests based on these strategies are discussed in terms of their 
usefulness and limitations. A rationale for measures of psychological symptoms 
to be used alongside neuropsychological tests, in assessing exaggerated 
impairment for a 'diagnosis' of malingering in TBI is put forward, and measures of
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psychopathology that are potentially useful for this are discussed. Finally, the 
need for a new measure to be validated in assessing exaggerated psychological 
symptoms of TBI is suggested, and the aims and objectives of this study are 
presented.
1.2 Traumatic brain injury and related impairment
A traumatic brain injury (TBI) is defined as 'trauma to the brain either through 
blunt force to the skull or by acceleration-deceleration forces' and 'resultant signs 
and symptoms' (Rogers, 2008, p.71). Teasdale and Jennett (1974, as cited in 
Rogers, 2008) designed the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) to classify brain injury 
severity based on an individual's level of consciousness after sustaining injury. A 
GCS equal to or less than 8 indicates severe injury, 9 to 12 indicates a moderate 
injury, and 13 to 15 suggest a minor injury.
Following an injury of any severity, a combination of cognitive, somatic and 
affective symptoms are reported (McAllister & Arciniegas, 2002). Cognitive 
symptoms include difficulties with memory, attention, and concentration.
Somatic symptoms include headaches, fatigue, and insomnia. Affective symptoms 
include irritability, depression and anxiety. Overall, the view has been that mild 
injuries generally lead to good recovery (Alexander, 1998), and those with severe 
TBI are impaired long term (Volbrecht et al., 2000). Neuroimaging may show 
evidence of neurological damage in severe TBI, explaining symptoms post injury. 
However, using the same methods to understand symptoms in mild TBI may not 
work in the same way, as usually there is little or no evidence of neurological 
damage (Bianchini et al., 2003). However, some studies have found structural 
neuronal damage resulting from mild TBI (Blumbergs et al., 1994), and some have 
found that patients have contusions, haemorrhages, subdural or epidural 
hematomas (Williams et al., 1990). As well as evidence of neurological damage, 
research studies have evidenced psychological and cognitive impairments of mild 
TBI. For example, six months post injury, McCullagh et al. (2001) found those with 
mild injuries reported dizziness, headaches, and psychological distress.
Depressive symptoms were identified in this population over one year post injury 
(Jorge et al., 1993), and decreased memory three months after injury (Rimel et al., 
1981). This leads to the view that normal imaging does not necessarily mean an
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absence of impairment (McAllister & Arciniegas, 2002). As a result, 
neuropsychological tests are often used to assess for cognitive impairments, and 
measures of psychological symptoms used to assess for mood disorder so that 
appropriate treatment is offered.
1.3 The concept of malingering
The authors of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Ed., Text 
Revision (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; DSM-IV-TR) define malingering 
as 'the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or 
psychological symptoms motivated by external incentive../ (p.739). Malingering is 
conceptualised as a set of behaviours driven by external gain, and therefore 
distinct from other presentations of symptom exaggeration such as factitious 
disorder, conversion disorder, and other somatoform disorders driven by internal 
goals (Gerson & Fox, 2006). The DSM-IV-TR proposes that if the following criteria 
is met, malingering should be suspected: (a) a medico legal context of 
presentation, (b) marked discrepancy between the person's claimed stress of 
disability and the objective findings, (c) lack of cooperation during the diagnostic 
evaluation and in complying with prescribed treatment, and (d) the presence of 
antisocial personality disorder.
The categorical nature of the DSM-IV-TR definition has been criticised. Used as a 
screening tool, the definition incorrectly identified approximately 80 per cent of 
genuine presentations as malingering psychiatric symptoms (Rogers, 1990a). It is 
suggested that individuals vary in their misrepresentation of behaviour, intention, 
and level of motivation to malinger, and the concept is multi-faceted (Walters et 
al., 2008). This view challenges the dichotomous definition of the DSM-IV-TR, and 
the assumption that an individual is either honest or malingering. The use of the 
definition is potentially flawed, as it was developed with a focus on malingering of 
psychiatric disorders, and therefore its applicability in the detection of feigned 
cognitive and neuropsychological symptoms in the TBI population is questioned 
(Berry & Nelson, 2010).
In some malingering research, the concept of malingering itself has been avoided, 
and has instead been discussed as 'the effects of financial incentive on recovery'
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(Binder & Rohling, 1996, p.7). Some have provided frameworks in which to 
understand the concept. Lipman (1962, as cited in Rogers 2008) defines four 
types of malingering: invention, which indicates that symptoms are entirely 
fabricated; and the remaining three: perseveration; exaggeration; and 
transference, which are manipulations of actual symptoms. Rogers (1990b) 
provides alternative explanatory models that expand on the view of malingering 
presented in the DSM-IV-TR. These models are: (a) the pathogenic model, where 
motivation to malinger comes from an individual's attempt in managing his/her 
presentation of a chronic and progressive mental disorder; (b) the criminologie 
model, where antisocial personalities faced with legal issues will use situations to 
their advantage in circumstances or for material gain; and (c) the adaptational 
model, where the person sees the situation as difficult and views malingering as 
an alternative cost benefit analysis, and the response is based on an appraisal of 
alternatives. Berry and Nelson (2010) suggest that the latter model removes 
some of the ethical issues of viewing someone as 'mad' or bad' as in the DSM-IV- 
TR criteria.
Slick et al. (1999) offer a 'diagnostic' definition specific to malingering of TBI, and 
introduced the term Malingered Neurocognitive Dysfunction (MND). This is 
defined as 'the volitional exaggeration or fabrication of cognitive dysfunction for 
the purpose of obtaining substantial material gain, or avoiding or escaping formal 
duty and responsibility. Material gain includes money, goods or services' (p.552). 
The evaluation of MND is based on four criteria which are presented in Table 1.
Table 1_______ Criteria for MND proposed by Slick et al. (1999)_____________ _
A Presence of substantial external incentive
B Evidence from neuropsychological testing
C Evidence from self-report
D Behaviours meeting criteria from B or C that are not fully accounted for by
psychiatric, neurological, or developmental factors
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The criteria defined allow for three levels for MND to be 'diagnosed'. These 
include: (a) definite, (b) probable, and (c) possible. A diagnosis of definite MND 
can be made from definite cognitive exaggeration on neuropsychological testing 
(criteria B). A diagnosis of probable MND can be made by two types of evidence 
from criteria B (e.g. probable exaggeration on neuropsychological testing, and 
discrepancy between neuropsychological test outcomes and observed behaviour), 
or one type of criteria B evidence (e.g. probable exaggeration on 
neuropsychological testing), and one or more types of criteria C evidence (e.g. 
self-reported symptoms do not match observed behaviours, evidence from 
exaggerated psychological dysfunction). Possible MND is diagnosed when 
probable MND criteria have been met, but there is the presence of criteria D.
As can be seen from the criteria defined, and the diagnosis of MND, a 
comprehensive approach to diagnosis is taken, drawing on multiple sources of 
information. However, most emphasis is put on neuropsychological tests to 
provide evidence of MND. This is especially the case of a definite 'diagnosis' of 
MND. Whilst neuropsychological evaluation is important, it is suggested that 
other criteria, such as self-report evidence of exaggerated psychological 
dysfunction (criteria C), may also be important in 'diagnosing' MND. To heavily 
focus on evidence from neuropsychological testing is likely to lead to incorrect 
identification (Larrabee et al., 2007).
1.4 Malingering in traumatic brain injury
Much of the research in exploring the phenomena of malingering in TBI has been 
focused on exaggeration of cognitive deficits, and little has been done to explore 
the exaggeration of psychological symptoms (Aronoff et al., 2007). Reference to 
the literature and findings of exaggeration of cognitive deficits will be made in 
order to introduce the phenomena of malingering in TBI.
As explained previously, neuroimaging shows evidence of neurological damage in 
severe TBI, yet not necessarily in mild TBI. Within medico-legal contexts the 
presence of complaints post injury in the absence of evidenced neurological 
damage has attracted the attention, and need, for specialised methods to assess 
exaggeration (Vanderploeg et al., 2003). This has been of particular relevance
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where there is an external motivation to exaggerate (Larrabee, 1992). Although 
most presentations questioned in the medico-legal context are those of mild 
injury, exaggeration is not essentially related to the severity of injury, and 
intentional effort to appear impaired has been found in moderate to severe TBI 
(Bianchini et al., 2003). Therefore regardless of the severity of the injury, 
exaggeration in reporting psychological and neuropsychological deficits may be 
present.
Neuropsychologists have taken on roles of evaluating and supporting, or disputing 
compensation claims (Cato et al., 2002). To solely rely on clinical judgment, 
without an objective appraisal of presentations, is insufficient in detecting faked 
cognitive impairment (Faust et al., 1988). Using standard neuropsychological 
assessments to assess exaggerated cognitive impairment of TBI has proved to be 
poor in differentiating between claimants with genuine and feigned deficits 
(Bernard & Fowler, 1990). As a result, it has been important to identify and 
develop neuropsychological tests that specifically detect exaggeration.
The National Academy of Neuropsychology (NAN) Position Statement (Bush et al., 
2005) suggests 'adequate assessment of response validity is essential in order to 
maximise confidence in the results of neurocognitive and personality measures' 
(p.419), and 'when the potential for secondary gain increases the incentive for 
symptom exaggeration or fabrication and/or when neuropsychologists become 
suspicious of insufficient effort or inaccurate or incomplete reporting, 
neuropsychologists can, and must, utilise symptom validity tests and procedures 
to assist in the determination of the validity of the information and test data 
obtained’ (p.425-426). The British Psychological Society (2009) have proposed 
that 'effort tests should be given routinely as part of clinical assessment of 
cognitive function' and highlight the 'little UK research literature on effort testing' 
stating 'there is a need for this to be developed' (p.l). These statements highlight 
the importance of strategies to identify exaggeration both cognitive and 
psychological domains.
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1.5 Base rates of malingering in traumatic brain injury
Base rates are useful in the interpretation of information to be clinically 
meaningful (Gouvier et al., 1988). Binder and Rohling (1996) suggest 23 per cent 
of claimants with a TBI feign cognitive deficits. Base rates of 39 per cent and 9 per 
cent have been identified for malingering cognitive deficits of mild TBI and severe 
to moderate TBI respectively (Mitternberg et al., 2002). In a review of 11 studies 
on mild TBI, Larrabee (2003a) found a base rate of 15 per cent to 64 per cent, with 
an average base rate of 40 per cent, which is similar to the findings of Mitternberg 
et al. (2002).
Although these findings are helpful, base rates have mostly focused on mild TBI, 
despite evidence to suggest that individuals with moderate to severe TBI may also 
exaggerate symptoms (Bianchini et al., 2003). The ability to generalise from these 
base rates is limited due to the sample of the population, different methods, and 
measures used to 'diagnose' malingering (Aronoff et al., 2007; Reynolds, 1998). 
For example, the study by Mitternberg et al. (2002) was based on a survey of 
members of the American Board of Clinical Neuropsychology (ABCN) where 
malingering was identified through a number of different objective and subjective 
methods, such as failing on neuropsychological tests of exaggeration, 
discrepancies in observations, self-report, and medically recorded information. 
This was very different to the study by Larrabee (2003a), where malingerers were 
identified based on studies that used only objective measures to diagnose 
'malingering'. Furthermore, within the 11 studies used to establish base rates, 
the measures used to 'diagnose' malingering varied. Lastly, these base rates focus 
on exaggerated cognitive symptoms, and fail to include base rates of exaggerated 
psychological symptoms of TBI. As highlighted earlier, information regarding 
exaggerated psychological symptoms, as well as cognitive symptoms would 
enable a thorough approach when considering the probable 'diagnoses' of MND. 
However, despite the flaws described, malingerers will not identify themselves, 
and consequently, this has been the best method of being able to identify base 
rates (Reynolds, 1998; Rogers, 2008). Accurate detection of exaggeration through 
systematic exploration of specific cognitive and psychological deficits, as well as 
assessment of other factors, would help understand the phenomenon of
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malingering in TBI, and identifying base rates from which even more clinical 
meaning can be inferred.
1.6 Detecting exaggerated cognitive symptoms of traumatic brain injury
In the same way research on base rates of malingering in TBI have mainly focused 
on exaggerated cognitive impairment, so have current strategies of detection. It 
is important to know what strategies are currently being used to better 
understand research that has been done to date to help contextualise this study, 
and how it can add to understating of malingering in TBI.
Rogers et al. (1993) identified six strategies designed for the detection of 
exaggeration when assessing cognitive deficits. These are: floor effects; symptom 
validity testing; performance curve; magnitude of error; atypical presentation; 
and psychological sequelae. Rogers and Bender (2003) grouped strategies that 
detect 'unexpected patterns', and those that detect 'excessive impairment'. This 
latter group of strategies include: floor effect (FE); and symptom validity testing 
(SVT). Rogers and Bender (2003) also identified forced choice test detection 
strategies within this group (FCT). These three strategies are of particular interest 
in the context of detecting exaggerated cognitive impairments as they 
demonstrate extreme deficits. Feigned performances on neuropsychological 
tests, evaluated using these methods, generally show worse results than in 
genuine presentations of TBI.
FE strategies are based on common logic and the assumption that even people 
with genuine cognitive impairments are able to answer the most basic of 
questions (e.g. 'What is your name?'), and make easy comparisons (e.g. 'What is 
bigger, a horse or a dog?'). Therefore to fail such questions would indicate 
feigning (Rogers et al., 1993). SVT's are based on a two-choice recognition task, 
where there is a statistical expectation that the person being examined could 
obtain 50 per cent of the answers correct just by chance. Scores below 50 per 
cent indicate that the examinee was purposefully choosing the wrong answer.
This strategy tends to be effective in the most excessive forms of feigning (Rogers 
& Bender, 2003). However, Beetar & Williams (1995) found that individuals asked 
to simulate malingering, or suspected of malingering, actually performed above
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50 per cent, so using alternative methods to SVT in detection may be more 
favourable. Lastly, FCT are based on the concept that feigned performance 
outcomes will be lower than the expected performance levels. Cut-off scores 
derived from looking at normative data are used as the means of identifying 
excessive impairments. The terms SVT and FCT are sometimes used 
interchangeably (e.g. Millis & Volinsky, 2001), and this can lead to confusion about 
what methods of detection are actually being used. In some tests more than one 
strategy of detection has been used, which adds to the confusion. Tests based on 
these strategies have mostly been evaluated for the detection of exaggeration 
and are regarded as an important part of neuropsychological assessment in legal 
and clinical contexts (Iverson, 2003).
Neuropsychological tests based on the strategies discussed have either been 
explicitly developed for the purpose of detecting exaggeration (stand-alone tests), 
or identified in existing neuropsychological tests to be useful in the assessment of 
exaggeration (embedded measures). Information on these tests is presented to 
help contextualise the research to date on exaggerated cognitive impairments of 
TBI. Before these tests are introduced, information regarding research designs 
that have aided in the development and validation of these measures are 
described.
1.7 Research designs
Three distinct research designs have been drawn upon in assessing exaggerated 
cognitive impairments in the detection of malingering (Rogers, 2008). The first of 
these is a 'simulation' design where, generally, participants are recruited to a 
control condition, an experimental condition, and from a clinical group so that 
comparisons can be made. In the experimental condition, participants are asked 
to simulate a disorder. The second design used is 'known groups'. In this design 
individuals who are classified as 'malingerers' are compared with individuals who 
are classified as 'genuine'. The last design is 'differential prevalence' where 
assumptions are made that some groups may respond in specific ways, for 
example, those seeking compensation may exaggerate more. Each of these 
designs is not without its flaws. Rogers and Bender (2003) state that 'simulation' 
designs hold good internal validity, but are limited in external validity; 'known
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groups' design holds good external but limited internal validity; 'differential 
prevalence' designs fail to establish internal validity and have limited external 
validity.
1.8 Stand-alone cognitive tests of exaggeration
1.8.1 Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996,1997)
Slick et al. (2004) suggest that one of the most popular stand-alone measures of 
exaggeration is the TOMM. This is a visual recognition task, presented in two 
trials. Pictures of 50 common objects are presented individually, and then 
presented again with an alternative image, and the individual is required to select 
the object previously seen from the pair. This is repeated for the second trial. A 
third trial is administered to assess retention, where only the pairs are shown.
Normative data shows that the TOMM is relatively insensitive to basic 
demographic factors, such as age and education, and also memory impairment 
(Tombaugh, 1997). Rees et al. (1998) used the TOMM to successfully differentiate 
between malingering and non-malingering individuals; showing high sensitivity1 
and specificity2 using different participant groups, and types of experimental 
designs (e.g. simulation design recruiting students, differential prevalence design 
recruiting individual with TBI seeking compensation). Rees et al. (1998) found a 
statistically significant difference between a mild TBI group seeking compensation 
and a TBI group not seeking compensation. From the group seeking 
compensation, only 23 per cent were found to not exaggerate. This shows that 
within a medico-legal context the TOMM is useful as a measure of detecting 
exaggerated cognitive deficits.
1 Sensitivity is the proportion of actual exaggerators accurately identified by the 
instrument as exaggerating(Gordis, 2009)
2 Specificity is the proportion of non-exaggerators correctly identified by the instrument as 
not exaggerating (Gordis, 2009)
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The TOMM is primarily based on the FCT detection strategy, but also incorporates 
SVT methods (Rogers and Bender, 2003). Using FCT strategies, the TOMM shows 
high levels of sensitivity in comparison to using SVT (Rees et al., 1998). The FCT 
strategy employs a cut-off score of 45 (90 per cent correct) on either the second 
trial of the TOMM, or on the third trial to highlight exaggeration. This cut-off was 
established by Tombaugh (1997) who found that only 1 out of 45 individuals 
diagnosed with a TBI had scored less than 45.
1.8.2 The Portland Digit Recognition Test (PORT; Binder & Willis, 1991)
The PORT is another widely used test. The measure is a 72-item digit recognition 
test that involves the presentation of 5-digit numbers, followed by a distracter 
(e.g. counting backwards), after which two sets of 5-digit numbers are presented, 
and the individual is required to recognise and choose the previous presented 
numbers. Binder (1993) used FCT and SVT methods in the validation of the PORT 
with the TBI population. The PORT was used to compare outcomes in three 
groups: a TBI group seeking compensation; another brain dysfunction group 
seeking compensation; a brain dysfunction group not seeking compensation. 
Findings suggested that those seeking compensation were more impaired on the 
PORT in comparison to those not seeking compensation; 17 per cent of the TBI 
group and 3 per cent of the brain dysfunction group scored considerably lower 
than 50 per cent. A third of the TBI group fell below the score of 39 that had been 
established from the group with brain dysfunction not seeking compensation, 
suggesting an exaggeration of symptoms in these individuals. Using a SVT 
detection method within the PORT has shown high specificity, but poor sensitivity 
(Rogers & Bender, 2003), which questions the usefulness of this measure. 
However, Binder (1993) demonstrates that by employing the FCT methods within 
the PORT shows high specificity and high sensitivity.
1.8.3 The Word Memory Test (WMT; Green et al., 1996)
The WMT is another test that has been widely used to detect exaggeration. This 
is a computerised test, where the individual is presented with a list of 20 
semantically linked pairs of common words, which are subsequently followed by 
immediate and delayed recognition trials. Both trials involve selecting original 
words from new pairs. Individuals with severe head injuries have passed these
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trials suggesting that scores on the WMT are relatively insensitive to brain 
damage, thus failure would imply exaggeration (Green et al., 1999). Using a FCT 
method, a cut-off score of below 82.5 per cent for the two recognition trials as a 
measure of consistency, suggests exaggeration (Green et al., 1996). The WMT has 
been criticised for lacking information on reliability of the measure (Wynkoop & 
Denny, 2001).
1.8.4 An evaluation of stand-alone cognitive tests of exaggeration
The different study designs used to validate stand-alone cognitive measures need 
to be considered when assessing the usefulness of the measures discussed. The 
PORT and the TOMM have both been studied using a 'known groups' design 
(Greve & Bianchini, 2006; Greve et al., 2006). These studies used the Slick et al. 
(1999) criteria of MND to identify a group of individuals with TBI as malingerers 
and non-malingerers, and found the cut-offs established by the test authors were 
accurate, and potentially conservative in identifying malingering. In contrast, 
criticism has been given to the accuracy of the WMT in the detection of 
'diagnosed' malingering due to the lack of 'known group' comparisons (Greve et 
al., 2008). Studies validating the use of the WMT have only used simulation 
designs.
The comparability of stand-alone cognitive tests of exaggeration show that they 
may vary in their sensitivity, with failure rates of 32 per cent for the WMT, and 11 
per cent for the TOMM, using cut-offs as suggested by the authors of these tests 
(Gervais et al., 2004). It has been proposed that for tests such as the TOMM, 
higher cut-offs to identify exaggeration in mild TBI would provide more 
meaningful outcomes (Greve et al., 2006). Greve et al. (2008) highlight high 
specificity of the PORT and TOMM, yet a 50 per cent failure to detect malingerers. 
The WMT was found to be sensitive in identifying malingering, but a high 
proportion of people were incorrectly defined as malingerers. In tests used to 
detect exaggeration, cut-off scores with a specificity of 90 per cent or higher are 
favourable as they reduce the risk of people being wrongly identified as feigning 
to 10 per cent or less (Larrabee, 2005). Considering the mixed findings of 
sensitivity and specificity of these measures, and how they may potentially risk
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leading to incorrect identification of exaggeration, thought needs to be given to 
what measures should be used when assessing MND.
Caution needs to be given to the use of these validity measures within medico­
legal contexts. Some people may know what they entail beforehand, as findings 
show that lawyers tell clients about tests that detect exaggeration (Youngjohn, 
1995). Information is also available on the internet and easily accessible through 
simple searches conducted independently or after being coached (Bauer & 
McCaffery, 2006; Ruiz et al., 2002). Others may learn about tests from individuals 
going through a similar legal process (Youngjohn et al., 1999). These factors all 
impact on the accuracy of identifying malingering in TBI. Embedded tests of 
exaggeration from standard neuropsychological tests overcome some of these 
concerns, and are discussed next.
1.9 Embedded cognitive tests of exaggeration
Existing neuropsychological measures, and some subtests of existing measures, 
are useful in assessing exaggerated cognitive symptoms as they act as internal or 
embedded validity indicators. This has advantages over stand-alone tests of 
exaggeration for three reasons: (a) they enhance the sensitivity of the entire 
validity battery without increasing the time needed for assessment (Heinly et al., 
2005), (b) they provide information about the validity of performance on specific 
tests (Mathias et al., 2002), and (c) they are less likely to be coached than SVTs 
(Mathias et al., 2002).
1.9.1 Digit Span (DS; Wechsler, 1997a, 1997b)
An example of an embedded test of exaggeration is the DS; a well known subtest 
of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Ill and the Wechsler Memory Scale-Ill 
(WAIS-III; WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997a, 1997b). DS is useful in the detection of 
exaggeration as only 5 per cent of healthy and clinical samples score below the 5th 
percentile (Rogers, 2008). Performance on the subtest is also relatively insensitive 
to brain injury, including amnesia (Greiffenstein etal., 1994; Iverson &Tulsky, 
2003). DS has been well researched and validated as a measure of exaggeration 
based on a FE method. A cut-off score of 7 on the DS has found high sensitivity 
(78-90 per cent) in identifying simulated malingerers and high specificity (90-100
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per cent) in identifying non-malingerers (Iverson & Frazen, 1994,1996). However, 
the applicability of these findings in detecting malingering should be considered 
with caution, as both studies used small samples and simulated designs.
1.9.2 The Reliable Digit Span (RDS; Greiffenstein et al., 1994)
The RDS calculated from the DS subtest, is another embedded measure of 
exaggeration (Greiffenstein etal., 1994). The calculation is based on the sum of 
the longest digit string of both the forward and backward digit strings in which 
both trials are completed without error. Research studies using the 
recommended cut-off have variable success in detecting exaggeration. Using a 
simulated design, RDS has shown to have poor sensitivity (27 per cent), and 
perfect specificity (100 per cent; Inman & Berry, 2002). However, it shows high 
sensitivity (86 per cent), and unsatisfactory specificity (57 per cent), using a 
'known groups' design, where probable malingerers were identified (Greiffenstein 
et al., 1995). In a recent study examining the usefulness of DS and RDS, DS has 
been found to be better in discriminating between probable malingerers and 
patients with mild TBI (75 per cent sensitivity and 69 per cent specificity; Axelrod 
et al., 2006).
1.9.3 Other embedded cognitive tests of exaggeration
Other neuropsychological measures that are useful as tests of exaggeration 
include the Recognition Memory Test (RMT; Warrington, 1984), which is based on 
a FCT format. Millis and Putnam (1994) found that the RMT differentiated 
between persons with moderate to severe TBI, and litigating mild head injury 
claimants, although the assumptions made about severity of injury and 
exaggeration status is debateable. Another advantage of using embedded 
measures versus stand-alone measures is that they look at other cognitive 
domains aside from memory (Boone & Lu, 2007). For example, a test of attention 
and concentration, known as the Conners' Continuous Performance Test-11 (CPT-II; 
Conners, 2000), has been helpful in identifying exaggeration of cognitive 
symptoms of TBI (Ord etal., 2010). Tests of executive functioning, such as the 
Stroop Colour Word Test (Strauss et al., 2006), have also been used to identify 
malingering (Lu etal., 2004).
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1.10 Over reliance on cognitive tests of exaggeration in identifying 
Malingered Neurocognitive Dysfunction
Both stand-alone and embedded tests are helpful in detecting exaggerated 
cognitive deficits of TBI. However, the choice of test and order of administration 
is a key consideration (Slick et al., 2004). It is important to understand the 
methods used to develop and validate the tests, in order to appreciate the 
limitations of applicability. In 'diagnosing' MND, neuropsychological measures 
play a crucial role, but they are not the only method of identifying malingering.
The potential of conditions, such as pain and depression, being exaggerated also 
needs to be considered when assessing malingering (Rogers, 2008).
The psychological sequelae strategy identified by Rogers et al. (1993) is proposed 
as a strategy of detecting malingered cognitive impairment, yet little research has 
been done in this area, and it has been deemed to be in its 'infancy and not ready 
for clinical application' (Aron off eta/., 2007, p.191). The psychological sequelae 
strategy implies that individuals know the association between 
neuropsychological and psychological deficits of TBI, and could avoid detection of 
fabricated cognitive symptoms by exaggerating psychological symptoms. This 
strategy provides a rigorous approach, as it expands looking at exaggeration of 
cognitive deficits to include exaggeration of psychological symptoms. Developing 
this strategy could address the limitations of the diagnostic MND criteria (Slick et 
al., 1999), where it has been suggested that there is an over reliance on 
neuropsychological tests when considering MND. Measures of psychopathology, 
potentially useful in detecting exaggerated psychological symptoms, are discussed 
with applicability to the TBI population.
1.11 Psychological measures of exaggeration
The exaggeration of psychological symptoms has been evaluated in psychiatric 
and forensic populations (e.g. Baity et al., 2007; Kucharski et al., 2007; Nelson et 
al., 2006), and some research has been conducted specifically with TBI 
populations (e.g. Greiffenstein etal., 2002; Ross et al., 2004). Exaggeration has 
been evaluated through the use of internal validity indicators. Two measures that 
detect exaggerated psychological symptoms, and are potentially useful in the 
'diagnosis' of MND, are the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
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(MMPI-2; Butcher et al., 2001) and the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; 
Morey, 1991, 2007).
1.11.1 The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher et 
al., 2001)
The MMPI-2 (Butcher et al., 2001) is a measure of psychopathology that is widely 
used in neuropsychological assessment (Archer, 2006). It consists of 567 items 
which are made up of 10 Clinical scales, and incorporate a range of Validity scales. 
The Validity scales have been found to be effective in the indication of 
exaggeration (Lees-Haley et al., 2002). A summary of the Validity scales most 
relevant to the topic of exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI is presented in 
Table 2.
Table2_______ MMPI-2 Validity Scales_________________________________
Name Description Area of assessment
F Infrequency
Over reporting or
Fb Back F
exaggeration of severity of
Fp Infrequency - Psychopathology
psychological symptoms
FBS Fake Bad Scale
L Lie Under-reporting or
K Defensiveness minimisation of psychological 
symptoms
RBS Response Bias Scale Response bias in forensic and 
neuropsychological and 
neurodisability assessment 
settings
The Validity scales, L, F, Fb, K were part of the original measure (MMPI; Hathaway 
& McKinley, 1983). The Fp, FBS, and RBS were later developed (Arbisi & Ben- 
Porath, 1995; Lees-Haley et al., 1991; Gervais et al., 2007). The FBS was 
specifically developed for use within medico-legal settings, and has been found to 
be more effective than other Validity scales in identifying over-reporting and
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exaggerated psychological symptoms (Nelson etal., 2006). The relationship 
between results of both Clinical and Validity scales and cognitive validity tests has 
been researched, and FBS in particular, has been correlated with cognitive tests of 
exaggeration (Slick et al., 1996). Furthermore, in general personal injury 
claimants who failed cognitive tests, FBS was more sensitive to exaggeration than 
F, Fb, and Fp scales (Larrabee, 2003b).
In a study specific to a TBI population, Greiffenstein et al. (2002) examined 
responses on the FBS. The scale was found to be highly sensitive in differentiating 
between an atypical minor head injury group, and moderate to severe head injury 
group who were both seeking compensation, and a moderate to severe injury 
group where no compensation was sought. Furthermore, in assessing the 
usefulness of the Validity scales, FBS was more sensitive than the F scale in 
differentiating groups, and elevations on the FBS were associated with elevations 
on Somatic scales. Fewer elevations were evident on scales measuring psychotic 
symptoms. This would suggest that in the context of exaggerated psychological 
symptoms of TBI, higher levels of hysteria and hypochondrias are expressed 
compared with paranoia and schizophrenia.
Ross etal. (2004) identified exaggerated cognitive deficits in a mild TBI group 
seeking compensation, and compared them to a group of 'genuine' TBI 
participants, on outcomes of the MMPI-2. Findings indicated high sensitivity and 
specificity of the FBS. This study favours the use of the FBS in conjunction with 
cognitive validity tests, in assessing exaggerated symptoms of TBI. However, 
using the FBS as a measure of exaggeration in detecting MND has been criticised. 
Butcher et al. (2003) proposed the FBS more likely captures somatic complaints 
than exaggeration, and argued that it should not be used in clinical and disability 
examinations.
The Response Bias Scale (RBS) is one of the more recently developed scales, and 
was specifically developed to detect cognitive bias (Gervais et al., 2007). Elevated 
scores on the RBS have been associated with the over-reporting of memory 
problems (Gervais et a i, 2008). However, the effectiveness of the scale in the TBI
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population has yet to be established. Despite its usefulness in the identification of 
exaggerated symptoms, the MMPI-2 is a lengthy assessment measure.
1.11.2 Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991,2007).
The PAI (Morey, 1991, 2007) is a self-report multi-scale personality and 
psychopathology measure, designed for the clinical assessment of adults aged 18 
years and older. It consists of 344 items, and is made up of twenty two non­
overlapping scales. These include four Validity scales, eleven Clinical scales, five 
Treatment scales, and two Interpersonal scales. The PAI offers additional scales, 
two of which are specifically designed to detect over-reporting and exaggeration 
of psychological symptoms. Table 3 provides a summary of the scales most 
relevant to this study, which include the Validity scales, Clinical scales and the two 
additional scales useful in detecting exaggeration.
Table 3 Description of PAI scales (extracted from Morey, 2007)
Scale Description
Validity Scales
Inconsistency (ICN) Indicates if client is answering consistently
Infrequency (INF) Indicates if client is responding carelessly, 
randomly or idiosyncratically
Negative Impression (NIM) Suggests an exaggerated, unfavourable impression 
or malingering
Positive Impression (PIM) Suggests the presentation of a very favourable 
impression or reluctance to admit minor flaws
Clinical Scales
Somatic Complaints (SOM) Preoccupation with health matters and somatic
complaints typically associated with somatisation 
or conversion disorders 
Anxiety (ANX) Phenomenology and observable signs of anxiety
with an emphasis on assessment across different 
response modalities
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Anxiety Related Disorders (ARD)
Depression (DEP)
Mania (MAN)
Paranoia (PAR)
Schizophrenia (SCZ)
Borderline Features (BOR)
Antisocial Features (ANT)
Alcohol Problems (ALC)
Drug Problems (DRG)
Symptoms and behaviours related to specific 
anxiety disorders, particularly phobias, traumatic 
stress, and obsessive compulsive symptoms 
Symptoms and phenomenology of depressive 
disorders
Affective, cognitive, and behavioural symptoms of
mania and hypomania
Symptoms of paranoid disorders and more
enduring characteristics of paranoid personality
Symptoms relevant to the broad spectrum of
schizophrenic disorders
Attributes indicative of borderline level of
personality functioning, including unstable and
fluctuating interpersonal relations, impulsivity,
affective liability and instability, and uncontrolled
anger
History of illegal acts and authority problems, 
egocentrism, lack of empathy and loyalty, 
instability, and excitement seeking 
Problematic consequences of alcohol use and 
features of alcohol dependence 
Problematic consequences of drug use and 
features of drug dependence
Supplementary Scales
Malingering Index (MAL)
Rogers Discriminant Function 
(RDF)
Eight configurai features observed with relatively 
high frequency in malingering samples. High 
scores indicate a negative response set and 
malingering
Empirical function found to discriminate patients 
from naïve and coached malingerers. High scores 
indicate malingering
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The PAI has been frequently used in clinical practice (Piotrowski, 2000) and 
medical health contexts, for example, to assist in treatment planning of 
candidates undergoing bariatric surgery (Corsica et al., 2010). It is effective within 
correctional contexts (Boccaccini et al., 2010; Patry et al., 2011), and acceptable 
to assess forensic issues such as malingering (Lally, 2003).
In comparison to the MMPI-2, the PAI is shorter (Rogers, 2008), allows 
identification of clinical participants, and differentiates clinical syndromes (Morey, 
1991). The clinical disorders incorporated in the measure were selected on their 
'importance within the nosology of mental disorder', and the 'significance in 
contemporary diagnostic practice' (Morey, 2007, p.3). Multiple items for each 
disorder were incorporated in the PAI, so that no single item was measuring a 
single disorder, allowing assessment of mild and severe forms. The PAI shows 
advantage over the MMPI-2 because items are comparatively easier to read, 
which may show promise when using with a TBI population (Till et al., 2009).
The Negative Impression Management (NIM) Validity scale of the PAI was 
constructed and validated using a simulation design method where students were 
asked to role play situations that required them to fake 'bad' (Morey, 1991). Later 
development of the PAI produced two additional indices: the Malingering Index 
(MAL) and Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) that added 'malingering detection 
power' (Morey, 1996; Rogers etal., 1996). Using simulation approaches, Morey 
and Lanier (1998) demonstrated the ability of the Validity indices to differentiate 
between authentic and feigned psychopathology.
NIM, MAL and RDF are indicators of negative distortion and exaggeration in the 
PAI. They are of particular relevance to this study, and are collectively referred to 
as the Validity indices. Studies evaluating these indices of over-reporting have 
shown varied results. Some show that all three of the indices are valid in 
differentiating malingerers from non-malingerers. For example, psychiatric 
patients who completed the PAI, and later retested after instructions to fake 
'bad', scored higher on all three indices, and those asked to fake 'good' scored 
lower on NIM alone (Baity et al., 2007). In another simulation study using 
students as feigners in a forensic and psychiatric context, Blanchard etal. (2003)
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found that NIM and RDF were valid in the detection of malingering (sensitivity 54 
per cent and 60 per cent respectively), and the MAL index showed less than 
desirable sensitivity (48 per cent).
In contrast, Bagby et al. (2002) found that the NIM and MAL indices failed to 
differentiate between psychiatric patients and participants asked to feign severe 
disorders, irrespective of being coached or not. However, the RDF index proved 
to be an effective measure of exaggeration. A 'known group' design study that 
defined criminal defendants as malingerers and non-malingerers, found that NIM 
accurately identified malingerers (Kucharski et al., 2007). However, neither RDF 
nor MAL were useful in the detection of malingering. The differences in outcomes 
could be explained by the different methods adopted in the studies. Hopwood et 
al. (2007) suggest 'base rates of pathology-free individuals may be lower than in 
simulation studies' (p. 44). Further, they suggest looking at specific distortions 
within PAI profiles for the interpretation of deliberately feigned disorders, for 
example, examining elevations in Clinical scales and indices that are found in 
different clinical groups. This moves away from solely relying on the Validity 
indices as measures of exaggeration.
Sullivan etal. (2010) evaluated the usefulness of the Clinical and Validity indices in 
a simulation study. Their findings indicate clinically significant elevations on all 
but two Clinical scales (Mania and Antisocial Features), and significant elevations 
on the Validity indices (NIM, MAL and RDF). However they failed to look at 
specifics of profile distortions as suggested by Hopwood et al. (2007). In looking 
at the relationship between cognitive effort and the Clinical scales of the PAI, 
Whiteside et al. (2010) found a consistent relationship between the Somatisation 
scale and Trial 2 of theTOMM.
The PAI Validity indices have shown variable utility in detecting exaggerated 
psychological symptoms. This implies potential use of the PAI as a measure of 
psychopathology that can be used to assess exaggerated psychological symptoms 
to aid in the 'diagnosis' of MND. No study to date has examined the effectiveness 
of the Validity indices in the context of exaggerated psychological symptoms of 
TBI. The PAI has been used in a few studies specific to TBI. Breshears et al. (2010)
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evaluated the use of the PAI in predicting suicidal behaviour in veterans with a 
TBI. Other studies have been found to examine the profile of psychological 
symptoms shown by individuals with TBI. Findings suggest elevations on Somatic 
Complaints, Depression, Borderline Features, Paranoia and Schizophrenia 
(Demakis et al., 2007). Mild TBI patients showed more elevated scores on 
Somatisation and Depression, and moderate to severe TBI patients showed 
elevations on the Antisocial and Alcohol Problem scales (Kurtz et al., 2007). Till et 
al. (2009) examined the overlap that may occur when using the PAI to assess 
psychological symptoms only, in TBI. They suggest some items are trans­
diagnostic, and can be attributed to cognitive and physical sequelae of the injury. 
Items identified as trans-diagnostic were based within the Clinical scales of 
Depression, Somatic Complaints, and Schizophrenia.
1.12 Summary and rationale for research study 
Neuropsychologists have taken on roles of evaluating and supporting, or 
defending compensation claims where MND maybe questioned (Cato et al.,
2002). Consequently, it has been important to identify objective methods to aid 
in the assessment process. To date, research examining exaggeration of 
symptoms in the TBI population has primarily focused on developing and 
validating neuropsychological tests such as the TOMM, PORT, and WMT (Binder, 
1993; Green et al., 1996,1999; Tombaugh, 1996,1997), and some existing 
neuropsychological tests, such as the DS and RDS (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; 
Iverson & Tulsky, 2003). However, cognitive tests of effort should not be the only 
means of assessment in the process of evaluating MND. Slick et al. (1999) suggest 
four criteria, of which neuropsychological testing is only one; other criteria include 
self-report of psychological symptoms. Rogers (2008) also states that other issues 
post-injury, such as pain and depression, and the potential for these conditions to 
be exaggerated, needs to be given more thought in the assessment of 
malingering. The psychological sequelae strategy identified by Rogers et al. (1993) 
highlights a need for assessing exaggerated psychological symptoms. The strategy 
suggests that neuropsychological deficits are associated with psychological 
symptoms, and individuals may know this and attempt to avoid being detected by 
exaggerating psychological symptoms. Consequently, within medico-legal 
settings, as well as exaggerating cognitive impairments, individuals may also have
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the motivation to exaggerate psychological symptoms for external gain (e.g. to 
avoid legal proceedings, or gain financial benefit through compensation claims). 
Given that exaggeration of psychological symptoms is important in the 
consideration of 'diagnosing' MND, it is important to identify measures that 
determine exaggerated psychological symptoms.
The PAI shows potential as a measure of detecting exaggerated psychological 
symptoms. In comparison to the MMPI-2, a well known measure of 
psychopathology that has shown some use in the evaluation of MND, the PAI 
shows advantage in use. It is shorter in length, items are comparatively easier to 
read showing promise when used with a TBI population (Till et al., 2009), and the 
measure offers the three Validity indices - NIM,MAL and RDF - that are specifically 
designed to assess the accuracy of responding. Given these advantages, this 
study aimed to evaluate the PAI in detecting exaggerated psychological symptoms 
of TBI.
1.13 Research objectives
The main research objectives of the study were:
• To compare the PAI Clinical scale scores between three participant 
groups, to identify which scales distinguish exaggerators (simulator group) 
from non-exaggerators (control group and TBI group).
• To compare the PAI Validity indices NIM, MAL, and RDF between three 
participant groups to identify which indices distinguish exaggerators 
(simulator group) from non-exaggerators (control group and TBI group).
• To examine the sensitivity and specificity of the Validity indices NIM, MAL, 
and RDF in detecting exaggerators and non-exaggerators.
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1.14 Main hypotheses
It was predicted that:
• Participants in the simulator group (exaggerators) would score 
significantly higher on Clinical scales than participants in the TBI and 
control groups (non-exaggerators).
• Participants in the simulator group would score significantly higher on 
Validity indices than participants in the TBI and control groups.
• The Validity indices NIM, MAL, and RDF would have high sensitivity in 
detecting the simulator group (exaggerators), and high specificity in 
detecting the TBI and control group (non-exaggerators).
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2 METHOD
2.1 Design
A three-group simulation quasi-experimental design was used to compare a TBI 
group, a control group, and a simulator group.
A simulation design is a commonly applied method in the research of malingering 
(Rogers, 2008). Simulators are provided with some disorder relevant information, 
and told to avoid being detected, prior to completing the assessment measures. 
This method was selected as it was convenient given the restricted timeframe of 
the research, and allowed maximum experimental control. The design holds good 
internal validity, but may have limited external validity, and therefore the ability 
to generalise from this method is a limitation (Rogers & Bender, 2003).
2.2 Sample size
The number of participants to be recruited for the study was based on the 
precision of the sensitivity and specificity estimates. Estimates of precision (95% 
confidence interval) were calculated for 30 or 45 participants per group (see Table 
4). While 45 participants would be preferable, the precision obtained for 30 
participants was judged to be adequate.
Table 4 Estimates of precision for different numbers and different
sensitivity and specificity estimates___________________
Sensitivity/ Confidence Interval
Specificity n = 30 n = 45
70% (50.6%-85.3%) (55.6% 83.6%)
80% (61.4%-92.3%) (65.4% 90.4%)
90% (73.5%-97.9%). (78.8% 97.5%)
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2.3 Recruitment of participants
Inclusion criterion adapted from a previous study of a similar nature (Regan, 
2008), was identified for the recruitment of all three participant groups, as shown 
in Table 5.
Table 5_______ Participant inclusion criteria
Simulator and control group TBI group
English as a first language English as a first language
No history of a TBI Documented mild, moderate or severe 
head injury
No learning disability No learning disability
No history of dyslexia or other reading No history of dyslexia or other reading
difficulty difficulty
No history of neurological disease No history of neurological disease
No neurodegenerative condition No neurodegenerative condition
No visual impairment not corrected by No visual impairment not corrected by
glasses/contact lenses glasses/contact lenses
Able to provide consent Able to give consent for themselves
>18 years >18 years
Assessed as fit and able to complete the 
assessment measure
2.3.1 Recruitment of the traumatic brain injury group
Participants were recruited via a neurorehabilitation service based in South-West 
London. This service administers the assessment measure used in this research as 
a routine part of their assessment process. Potential participants were recruited 
retrospectively, having already completed the assessment measure, and 
prospectively, before completing the assessment measure. The recruitment 
process is described in turn.
Retrospective recruitment process
Service users from the neurorehabilitation service who had already completed the 
assessment measure, and met the inclusion criteria defined for this research, 
were identified by the Clinical Neuropsychologist responsible for their care.
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Telephone contact was made to discuss individuals' participation in this research. 
Potential participants, who gave verbal consent, were posted a participant 
information sheet, a consent form, a demographic information sheet, and a 
stamped addressed envelope to return the completed forms to the researcher.
A contact number was provided for further queries. Upon written consent being 
received, the completed assessment measures were obtained from the service 
users' Clinical Neuropsychologist.
Prospective recruitment process
Clinical Neuropsychologists from the neurorehabilitation service identified service 
users who were potential participants, but had not completed the assessment 
measure. The researcher established contact with the potential participants via 
the responsible healthcare professional. The nature of the research was 
explained to potential participants, and they were provided with a participant 
information sheet for further consideration. Participants who expressed an 
interest to take part were asked to sign a consent form and complete a 
demographic information sheet. A suitable time and venue to complete the 
assessment measure was arranged between the participant and researcher.
The recruitment process for the TBI group was different to the recruitment of the 
simulator and control group. Recruitment for the TBI group was initiated prior to 
the recruitment of the simulator and control group, to allow for matching of 
participants at a demographic level.
2.3.2 Recruitment of the simulator and control groups
Participants were recruited using convenience sampling. The researcher 
contacted friends, acquaintances, relatives and colleagues regarding participation 
in the study, who in turn suggested other people to contact. Participants were 
recruited from within the community to overcome limitations of previous studies, 
where only university students had been recruited. Potential participants were 
informed of the nature of the research, and presented with a participant 
information sheet to read and consider. Opportunities were given to ask 
additional questions. Potential participants were not informed of the topic of 
research as this may have influenced response styles. A signature of consent was
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obtained from individuals who agreed to participate and met the inclusion 
criteria, and suitable arrangements made for participation in the research.
2.4 Materials
2.4.1 Demographic information sheet
An information sheet was used to collate details of participants' basic 
demographics and other details that enabled the researcher to monitor the 
inclusion criteria (see appendix A). Additional information, relevant only to the 
TBI group, was also collected.
2.4.2 Personality Assessment Inventory (Morey, 1991,2007)
The PAI (Morey, 1991, 2007) is a multi-scale self report measure that consists of 
344 items, each rated on a four-point ordinal scale (see appendix B), ranging from 
false - not at all true (F) to very true (VT). The PAI contains four Validity scales, 
eleven Clinical scales, five Treatment scales, and two Interpersonal scales, and 
offers additional indices of which two are specifically designed to detect over 
reporting and exaggeration of psychological symptoms.
Completion of the PAI takes approximately 30 to 45 minutes. Raw scores on the 
PAI are standardised based on non-clinical populations. The scores are 
transformed to linear 7-scores that have a mean score of 50 and a standard 
deviation of 10. Approximately 84 per cent of non-clinical populations have 
scores below 607and 98 per cent have scores below 707. Therefore, 7-scores 
above 70 are uncharacteristic of a non-clinical sample (Morey, 2007).
For the purpose of this study the researcher was primarily interested in the three 
Validity indices, NIM, MAL and RDF, in detecting exaggerated psychological 
symptoms.
Negative Impression Scale (NIM; Morey, 2007)
NIM detects exaggerated, unfavourable and distorted presentations of the self, 
and also detects reports of bizarre and unlikely symptoms. NIM is derived from 
nine items that show low endorsement in both normal and clinical samples (see 
appendix C). A low NIM score, less than 737, indicates little or no distortion;
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moderate elevations of 737to 837 suggest an element of exaggeration; and a 
score equal to or more than 927 indicates the PAI has been completed in an 
extremely negative manner. Therefore, a NIM cut-off score equal to or more than 
737and 927are used to define exaggerated psychological symptoms (Morey, 
2007).
Malingering Index (MAL; Morey, 1996)
MAL detects over-and under-endorsed items that are inconsistent with clinical 
samples, and highlight profiles of individuals simulating mental disorder. MAL is 
taken from eight configurai features of the PAI profile (see appendix D). A raw 
score of 1 is given if a feature is present, and so the raw score for MAL ranges 
from 0 to 8. The raw score corresponds to a 7 score. A raw score equal to or 
more than 3, equivalent to 847, raises a question of 'malingering'. Scores equal to 
or more than 5, corresponding to 1117, is unusually high in clinical samples, and 
according to Morey (1996) occur only when symptoms are being exaggerated. 
Therefore, scores equal to, or more than 847 and 1117 on MAL are used as cut­
offs to define feigning.
Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF; Rogers etal., 1996)
RDF was designed to differentiate between patients with mental health 
difficulties, and those asked to simulate a mental disorder. The scale was 
developed on the theory that simulators would have difficulty replicating the 
overall profile of patients with mental health difficulties. The RDF score is based 
on a constant value and on a weighted combination of twenty PAI scale scores; 
eight negatively weighted, suggesting that scores on these scales are higher in 
patients with mental health difficulties, and twelve positively weighted, 
suggesting those simulating score higher on these scales (see appendix E).
A RDF raw score of more than 0, equivalent to 597, suggests exaggeration and a 
score less than, or equal to 0 suggests no effort was made to negatively distort 
the results. Morey (2003) found that mean scores on RDF, derived from PAI 
measures completed in the community, and those completed by patients, are 
similar. Therefore, scores equal to or more than 597on the RDF index indicates 
exaggerated psychological symptoms.
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Participants were excluded from the research if their profile scores were screened 
as being invalid, not allowing any clinical interpretation to be made. The 
exclusions were based on elevated scores on two of the Validity scales, 
Inconsistency (ICN), and Infrequency (INF).
Inconsistency Scale (ICN ; Morey, 2007)
ICN reflects the consistency of responses on items of a similar content. The scale 
is based on pairs of items that should be answered either similarly or differently 
as the pairs are psychologically opposite. For example, the following items would 
be expected to be answered differently, 'I never use illegal drugs', and 
'Sometimes I use drugs to make me feel better'. Scores equal to or above 737on 
the ICN scale suggest completely random responding, and therefore the results 
are assumed to be invalid.
Infrequency Scale (INF; Morey, 2007)
INF indicates when individuals have completed the PAI in an atypical way because 
of random responding, carelessness, difficulties in reading, or confusion. The 
items that make up the scale are strange sounding, and those that would be 
expected to be answered similarly by individuals in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations. Examples of these items include, 'My favourite poet is Raymond 
Kertezc', 'Sometimes I get ads in the mail that I really don't want', and 'Most 
people would rather win than lose'. Scores equal to or above 757on the INF 
scale suggests that the individual did not respond appropriately to the item, and 
therefore the results on the measure are assumed to be invalid.
2.4.3 Accident scenario
A modified version of an accident scenario taken from the Neuropsychological 
Assessment Battery manual (NAB; White & Stern, 2003), was used with the 
simulator group (see appendix F). The scenario describes an incident in which the 
participant has been involved in a motor vehicle accident and, as a result, is 
seeking compensation for the damage to the vehicle, as well as the pain, 
suffering, and inconvenience caused by the accident.
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2.4.4 Post-experimental questionnaire
The simulator group completed a post-experimental questionnaire (see appendix 
G) that asked participants to rate how much they exaggerated when completing 
the PAI, and what strategies they used to fake psychological symptoms. This 
questionnaire was adapted from a previous study of a similar design (Sullivan & 
King, 2010).
2.5 Procedure
All participants read an information sheet (see appendix H), signed a consent form 
(see appendix I), and completed a demographic information sheet. None of the 
participant groups were informed that this research was on malingering as this 
may have influenced their response styles.
Participants in the simulator group were asked to read the accident scenario prior 
to completing the PAI. Following completion of the measure, they were asked to 
complete a post-experimental questionnaire to report any strategies used to 
exaggerate. Participants in the control group were given standardised 
instructions and asked to complete the PAI, as were the participants in the 
prospective TBI group. All participants were given an opportunity to ask 
questions about the research study prior to giving consent to participate, and 
were debriefed about the study after participation.
2.6 Participants
2.6.1 Traumatic brain injury group
In total, 30 participants were recruited to the TBI group. Out of these, 26 
participants had provided consent to participate retrospectively, and 4 
participants provided consent prospectively.
2.6.2 Control group
In total, 30 participants were recruited to the control group. One volunteer was 
excluded for having had a head injury that required hospital treatment. Another 
was excluded due to an elevated score on the ICN scale (797), indicating 
inconsistent responding. A third was excluded due to an elevated score on the 
INF scale (797) indicating carelessness or random responding.
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2.6.3 Simulator group
In total, 30 participants were recruited to the simulator group. Two volunteers 
were excluded as they had a previous head injury that required hospital 
treatment, and a third volunteer was excluded due to an elevated score on the 
ICN scale (767), indicating inconsistent responding.
The control and simulator groups were recruited so that demographic profiles in 
the three groups were similar, however not individually matched.
2.7 Safety and ethical implications
This study was approved by the North West London Research Ethics Committee 
(National Research Ethics Committee Number: 10/H0722/56), and from the 
University of Surrey Research Ethics Committee. Research and Development 
(R&D) approval was also granted from St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust (approval 
documents can be seen in appendix J). To increase the number of potential 
participants for the TBI group, the inclusion criteria was extended during the 
research to include participants with a severe TBI. Consequently, further ethical 
approval and R&D approval was sought (see appendix K for revised approval 
documentation).
The TBI group were not required to go into detail regarding how they sustained 
their head injury, thus ensuring that distress related to recalling information 
about their injury was minimal. All participants completed the PAI in a safe and 
comfortable environment, and were given time after completion to discuss any 
issues or concerns they had in relation to the PAI items.
The NHS Code of Confidentiality was followed throughout this study to ensure 
confidentiality of personal data. Further all data was pseudonymised and only 
available to the researcher and the supervisors of the research.
2.8 Data analysis
Participant's raw scores on the PAI were converted to 7-scores using computer 
software that was available from the PAI test publisher; PAI-Software Portfolio 
(PAI-SP; Morey & PAR staff, 2005). Following this, all participants' demographic
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data, valid profile 7-scores from the PAI, and all of the simulator group responses 
on the post-experimental questionnaire were entered into the statistical software 
package, SPSS, version 16. Data analysis was conducted as follows.
2.8.1 Characteristics of the three groups
Descriptive statistics on information regarding participants mean age, age range, 
gender, ethnicity, highest level of qualification, and employment status, were 
calculated for each of the three groups.
2.8.2 Characteristics specific to the traumatic brain injury group
Descriptive statistics based on the cause of TBI, severity of injury, the number of 
years within which the injury was sustained, and medico-legal compensation 
status, were calculated.
2.8.3 Characteristics specific to the simulator group
Participant's level of exaggeration, and strategy used to feign psychological 
symptoms were summarised.
2.8.4 Group comparisons of the PAI Clinical scales
The data was screened and found to violate the assumptions of parametric tests, 
and therefore group differences were examined using Kruskal-Wallis analyses. 
Mann-Whitney U tests were used to determine the groups that differed and 
effect sizes calculated. To reduce the probability of Type I errors a Bonferroni 
correction method was used, and as suggested by Field (2009), the standard 
critical value of 0.05 was adjusted by dividing the critical value by the number of 
comparisons to be made (.05/3 = .017).
2.8.5 Group comparisons of the PAI Validity indices NIM, MAL, and RDF
Parametric tests could not be used due to violation of assumptions. Group 
differences were examined using Kruskal-Wallis, with Mann-Whitney U tests used 
to follow up significant differences. Effect sizes were calculated, and Bonferonni 
corrections were applied to avoid Type I errors.
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2.8.6 Effectiveness of the PAI Validity indices NIM, MAL, and RDF
The cut-off characteristics associated with the Validity indices from the PAI were 
examined by calculating:
Sensitivity =  true positives
true positive + false negatives
Specificity =  true negatives
true negatives + false positives
Positive
true positives
predictive = ------
true positives + false positives 
power
Negative
true negative
predictive =__________________________________
true negatives + false negatives
power
In calculating the sensitivity, this would be someone who was exaggerating, and 
the PAI Validity indices detects it as exaggerating using the suggested cut-offs 
(true positive). Similarly, in calculating the specificity, this would be someone who 
was not exaggerating, and the PAI validity indices at the suggested cut-offs 
identified as not exaggerating (true negative).
Sensitivity was calculated using the simulator group (exaggerators) and two 
specificities were calculated; one using the TBI group and one using the control 
group (non-exaggerators). A 95% confidence interval was calculated using Strata 
V9 (Stata Corps, Texas).
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2.8.7 Traumatic brain injury group analysis
Due to the presence of a real external incentive that may have influenced 
outcome, participants from the TBI group that were seeking compensation claims 
were removed, and a further analysis conducted. The proportion of the TBI 
group, excluding those seeking compensation, that were correctly detected by the 
Validity indices at the suggested cut-offs as non-exaggerators (true negative), and 
the proportion of non-exaggerators incorrectly identified as exaggerators (false 
positive) were examined.
2.8.8 Simulator group analysis
On the basis that some participants in the simulator group did not adopt a 
strategy to exaggerate, participants were divided into two groups; those that used 
a strategy to exaggerate and those who used no strategy. The proportion of 
simulators correctly detected as exaggerators (true positive) by the Validity 
indices at the suggested cut-offs for these two groups was examined.
Participants in the simulator group also varied in their level of exaggeration, and 
so the proportion of simulators correctly detected as exaggerators by the Validity 
indices for the different levels was examined.
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3 RESULTS
3.1 Demographic characteristics of the three groups
The first part of the results focused on how comparable the three groups were in 
terms of socio-demographic characteristics. This is to examine how successful 
matching had been. Table 6 presents information on participants' ages across the 
three participant groups.
Table 6_______ Ages by group
Participant Group Range Median Mean SD
TBI group 19-73 40 40.37 14.74
Control group 19-73 39 39.57 14.64
Simulator group 18-63 36.50 38.53 12.8
Note: SD = standard deviation for participant group
The TBI and control group were similar in age range, and in comparison the 
simulator group had a narrower age range. The mean ages across the three 
groups were similar, and there was no statistically significant difference between 
them. A description of age ranges across the three groups is presented in Figure 
1.
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Figure 1 Age range of participants across the three groups
The number of participants in the age ranges from 18 to l9 , 20 to 29, and 60 to 69, 
matched across the participant groups. The number of participants in the age 
range of 30 to 39 in the TBI and simulator groups matched, with slightly more 
participants being recruited for the control group. In comparison to the control 
group, the TBI and simulator group recruited an equal number of participants in 
the 40 to 49 age range. The simulator group recruited slightly more in the age 
range of 50 to 59 in comparison to the other groups, who recruited equally in this 
age range. No participants were recruited in the age range of 70 to 79 in the 
simulator group, but an equal number were recruited in the TBI and control 
group.
Participants' characteristics of gender and ethnicity across the three groups were 
similar (see Table 7).
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A description of the highest level of qualification for each of the participant 
groups is presented in Table 8.
Tables_______ Participants highest level of qualification across the groups
Highest level of TBI group Control group Simulatorgroup
education n=30 n=30 n=30
n % n % n %
No qualification 4 13.3 3 10 3 10
GCSE/O Level 10 33.3 7 23.3 12 40
A Level 9 30 9 30 7 23.3
Graduate 5 16.7 6 20 7 23.3
Postgraduate 2 6.7 5 16.7 1 3.3
Note: n = number of participants in group; % = percentage of participants
Participants with no qualifications were approximately matched across the three 
groups. In comparison to the TBI group, a higher number of participants with 
GCSE qualifications were recruited to the simulator group. However, both these 
groups recruited a higher number of participants with GCSE's compared to the 
control group. The TBI and control group recruited an equal number of 
participants with A Level qualifications. The simulatorgroup recruited more 
people with graduate qualification compared to the other two groups, and the 
control group recruited more people with postgraduate qualifications.
Figure 2 shows participants' employment status across the three groups varied.
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E m plo ym en t status
Figure 2 Participant employment status
Participants in the simulator group were mainly employed or self-employed, as 
were the participants in the control group. More than a quarter of participants in 
the TBI group were receiving disability allowances, less than one quarter were 
unemployed, and altogether a third were employed or self employed.
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3.2 Characteristics specific to the traumatic brain injury group
The most common cause of a TBI for this participant group was being involved in a 
road traffic accident (RTA; see Figure 3).
16
Assualt
Cause o f in ju ry
Figure 3 Cause of TBI
Information regarding the severity of TBI, which was indicated by participants 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) at the time of hospital admission, was missing for one 
third of the group. Details that were available showed that a moderate injury was 
least present in this participant group (GCS 9-12), with most having either a 
severe (GCS 3-11) or mild injury (GCS 13-15; see Figure 4).
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Mild Moderate Severe Missing
In ju ry  severity
Figure 4 Severity of TBI
The length of time since sustaining injury varied across the participant group from 
within one year, to within thirty years. The majority of participants had sustained 
their TBI within a four year period, with fewer sustaining their injuries within a 
greater time period (see Figure 5).
CL
Years w ith in
Figure 5 Number of years within sustaining TBI
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One quarter of the TBI group were involved in medico-legal compensation 
regarding their head injury (see Figure 6).
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0
Compensation No compensation
M ed ico -lega l claim
Figure 6 Number of participants seeking medico-legal compensation
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3.3 Characteristics specific to the simulator group
Participants in the simulator group were presented a list of options from which 
they indicated strategies they used to exaggerate psychological symptoms. Table 
9 displays results from this.
Table 9_______ Strategies used to exaggerate psychological symptoms
Strategy used to exaggerate
Frequency
(n=30)
n %
Did not report extreme symptoms 2 6.7
Felt confident could outsmart system 5 16.7
Relied on given or personal knowledge 5 16.7
Did not report extreme symptoms and relied on given or 
personal knowledge
2 6.7
Other 3 10
No strategy used 13 43.4
Note: n = number of participants in group; % = percentage of participants
More than two-fifths of participants in the simulator group reported using no 
strategies. Less than a fifth of the participant group relied on given or personal 
knowledge, and similarly the same number reported they felt they could outsmart 
the system. Fewer participants indicated they did not report extreme symptoms, 
and the same number indicated a combination of not reporting symptoms and 
relying on given or personal knowledge. A few participants reported using other 
strategies. These were, 'using own imagination', 'creating a perception of 
someone who has been in a motor vehicle accident' and, 'accentuate existing 
personality'.
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Participants in the simulator group were also asked to indicate the level at which 
they exaggerated on a 5 point likert scale. As shown in Figure 7, more than half of 
the participants sometimes exaggerated, and less than a quarter infrequently 
exaggerated. In comparison, fewer participants never or frequently exaggerated, 
and no one reported that they always exaggerated when completing the PAI.
CD
S3
E3
C
croQ.
cl-
IN ever Infrequently Sometimes Frequently Always 
Level o f exaggeration
Figure 7 Simulator participants level of exaggerated psychological
symptoms
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3.4 Group comparisons of the PAI Clinical scales
The TBI, control, and simulator group scores on the eleven Clinical scales of the 
PAI were examined using the Kruskal-Wallis test. The outcome from this test and 
summary statistics from group 7-scores on the Clinical scales of the PAI are 
presented in Table 10.
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As Table 10 illustrates, there was no evidence of difference between groups on 
the PAI scales of Mania, Paranoia, Antisocial features, Alcohol Problems, and Drug 
Problems. Where the Kruskal-Wallis test evidenced significant differences on 
Clinical scales between the three groups, Mann-Whitney U tests were used to 
examine which groups differed (Bonferroni corrections were used with an 
adjusted p value of 0.017). The following group comparisons were made, results 
of which can be found in Table 11:
• TBI group vs. control group
• TBI group vs. simulator group
• Control group vs. simulator group
Table 11 Between group comparisons for the PAI Clinical scales
Clinical scale
TBI group vs. 
Control group
TBI group vs. 
Simulator group
Control group vs. 
Simulator group
P{r ) P( r ) P{r )
Somatic Complaints <.001 (.63) .290 (-.15) <.001 (-.61)
Anxiety <.001 (.49) .416 (-.11) <.001 (-.52)
Anxiety-Related
Disorders
<.001 (.45) 1.00 (0) .001 (-.44)
Depression <.001 (.50) .107 (-.20) <.001 (-.62)
Schizophrenia .002 (.39) .923 (-.04) .007 (-.36)
Borderline Features .009 (.33) .375 (-.08) .021 (-.26)
Note: p  = level of significant difference between group comparisons - Mann-W hitney U test; r  = 
effect size of difference between groups comparisons
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As demonstrated in Table 11, there was no evidence that the TBI group and 
simulator group differed on any of the Clinical scales. However, there was 
evidence of a difference between the TBI and control group, with the TBI group 
scoring higher on the Clinical scales. Similarly, the simulator group scored higher 
on the Clinical scales compared to the control group, although for Borderline the 
difference could have been due to chance.
Page 162 of 245
3.5 Group comparisons of the Validity indices NIM, MAL, and RDF
Group differences on the validity indices were examined using the Kruskal-Wallis 
test. The outcomes and summary statistics are presented in Table 12.
Table 12 Mean T-scores, standard deviations and Kruskal-Wallis contrasts
for the PAI Validity indices by group
Validity indices
TBI group Control group Simulator group
P
M SD M SD M SD
NIM 60.57 13.09 48.23 6.04 65.37 21.54 <.001
MAL 55.03 12.21 49.67 7.49 60.07 19.47 .072
RDF 46.90 12.13 54.13 8.83 53.93 6.29 .022
Note: M = mean 7 score of index for participant group; SD = standard deviation of index for 
participant group; p = level of significant difference between groups - Kruskal-Wallis test
As shown in Table 12, there was some suggestion of a difference on the MAL 
index of the PAI; however, this was not statistically significant. Significant 
differences were identified for the NIM and RDF indices. The simulator group 
showed greatest variability of scores on NIM and MAL, compared to the TBI group 
and the control group who closely matched the standard deviation of 107on the 
PAI. The simulator group showed least variability of scores on the RDF index 
compared to the control group and the TBI group.
Where significant differences were found for NIM and RDF, these were followed 
up using Mann-Whitney U tests to identify which groups specifically differed 
(Bonferroni corrections were used with an adjusted p value of 0.017). The same 
three group comparisons were made, as with the analysis of Clinical scales; results 
of which are illustrated in Table 13.
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Table 13 Between group comparisons for the PAI Validity indices
Validity
TBI group vs. 
Control group
TBI group vs. 
Simulator group
Control group vs. 
Simulator group
indices P(r) P(r) P(r)
NIM <.001 (.52) .687 (-.013) <.001 (-.48)
RDF .021 (-.32) .014 (-.34) .859 (.02)
Note: p = level of significant difference between group comparisons - Mann Whitney U tests; r  = 
effect size of difference between groups comparisons
As Table 13 shows, the TBI group scored significantly higher on NIM compared to 
the control group, as did the simulator group. No significant difference was found 
on NIM scores for the TBI and simulator groups, but a difference was found on 
RDF, with the simulator group scoring significantly higher. No significant 
differences were found on RDF scores between the TBI and control group, or the 
control and simulator group.
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3.6 Effectiveness of the Validity indices NIM, MAL, and RDF in detecting 
exaggeration of psychological symptoms
Further analyses were conducted on the Validity indices to explore:
• Sensitivity: the proportion of actual exaggerators (simulator group) 
correctly identified by the measure (PAI) as exaggerating
• Specificity: the proportion of non-exaggerators (TBI and control group) 
correctly identified by the measure as not exaggerating
• Positive predictive power: the likelihood that an elevated Validity indices 
accurately indicates exaggeration
• Negative predictive power: the likelihood that a non-elevated Validity 
indices accurately reflects non- exaggeration
Table 14 presents the sensitivity and specificity outcomes for the cut-off Tscores 
for each Validity indices, used to define exaggerated and valid psychological 
symptoms as suggested by Morey (1996, 2007) and Rogers etal. (1996).
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Table 14 shows a small proportion of the simulator group (exaggerators) were 
correctly detected as exaggerators by the PAI Validity indices with the various cut­
offs, and therefore the cut-offs showed poor sensitivity. In comparison, a high 
proportion of the TBI group (non-exaggerators) were correctly detected as non- 
exaggerators, and therefore the cut-offs showed high specificity. All participants 
in the control group (non-exaggerators) were correctly detected as non- 
exaggerators on all indices showing perfect specificity, apart from RDF, where 
two-thirds of the control group (non-exaggerators) were correctly detected as 
non-exaggerators, showing poor specificity.
The positive predictive power (PPP) and negative predictive power (NPP) of the 
PAI Validity indices at the suggested cut-offs were also calculated and can be seen 
in Table 15.
Table 15 Positive and negative predictive power of the PAI Validity indices
PPP* PPP* NPP** NPP**
Cut-off scores (Simulator (Simulator (Simulator (Simulator,
for non-valid group vs. group vs. TBI group vs. group vs.TBI
presentation Control group) group) Control group) group)
% % % %
NIM > 73 Ï55 64Ü 5Ü8 543
NIM > 92 100 80 53.6 52.7
MAL >84 100 60 52.6 51
MAL >111 100 100 52 52
RDF >59 37.5 54.5 45.5 51
Note: *  the likelihood that the index accurately indicates exaggerating; ** th e  likelihood that the 
index accurately reflects non-exaggerating; % = percentage of participants
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As shown in Table 15, the simulator and control group comparison indicated that 
the likelihood of elevated Validity indices, equal to or above the suggested index 
cut-offs to accurately detect exaggerating (simulator group), were exact, aside 
from the RDF index, which showed less than satisfactory likelihood.
When the simulator group were compared with the TBI group, the cut-off for MAL 
equal to or more than 111 showed exact likelihood that elevations at this cut-off 
accurately detect exaggerating. A high likelihood of an elevated score equal to or 
more than 92 on NIM, in detecting exaggerating, was also found; an acceptable 
likelihood was found for a score equal to or more than 73 on NIM, and equal to or 
more than 84 on MAL, and a poor likelihood was found on RDF at a cut off of 
equal to or more than 59.
In contrast, the likelihood that a non-elevated Validity index score, below the 
suggested index cut-offs accurately reflected non-exaggerating, when group 
comparisons were made between simulators and controls, and simulators and the 
TBI group, was found to be poor overall.
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3.7 Traumatic brain injury group analysis
Due to the presence of a real external incentive that may have influenced 
outcome, participants in the TBI group (non-exaggerators) seeking compensation 
were removed, and a further analysis to calculate specificity was conducted.
As presented in Table 16, when participants who were seeking compensation 
were removed from the analysis, the proportion of the TBI group correctly 
identified as non-exaggerators on NIM, at the cut-off equal to or more than 73, 
and RDF, at the cut off equal to or more than 59, increased; the proportion of 
those incorrectly identified as exaggerators (false positives) on these indices 
reduced.
In contrast, no change in the number of non-exaggerators correctly identified as 
non-exaggerators was found on the Validity indices at cut-offs of NIM, equal to or 
more than 92 ,and MAL, equal to or more than 84. Specificity of the cut off, equal 
to or more than 111 on MAL remained to be perfect for both groups.
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3.8 Simulator group analysis
Some participants in the simulator group adopted a strategy to exaggerate, while 
others reported no strategy was used. The proportion of simulators correctly 
detected as exaggerators (true positive) by the Validity indices suggested cut-offs 
for these two sub-groups were examined. The results are presented in Table 17.
Table 17 Sensitivity of the Validity indices for the simulator sub-groups
Cut-off scores 
for non-valid 
presentation
Sensitivity 
(Strategy used) 
n=17
Sensitivity 
(No strategy used) 
n=13
n % 95%CI n % 95%CI
NIM >73 7 41.2 18.4-67.1 2 15.4 1.9-
45.4
NIM >92 3 17.6 3.8- 43.4 1 7.7 0.2-
36.0
MAL >84 2 11.8 1.5- 36.4 1 7.7 0.2-
36.0
MAL >111 1 5.9 0.1- 28.7 1 7.7 0.2-
36.0
RDF >59 5 29.4 10.3-56.0 1 7.7 0.2-
36.0
Note: n = number of participants; % = percentage of participants; Cl = confidence interval
As shown in Table 17, the maximum proportion of simulators that used a strategy 
and were correctly detected as exaggerators was 41.2 per cent for the cut-off, 
equal to or more than 73 on NIM, and therefore showed poor sensitivity. The 
remaining Validity indices at the suggested cut-offs showed even worse 
sensitivity in correctly detecting exaggerators. In comparison, the proportion of 
simulators that used no strategy, and were correctly identified by the Validity 
indexes as exaggerators, was extremely poor.
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Participants in the simulator group also varied in their levels of exaggerated 
psychological symptoms. The proportion of simulators correctly detected as 
exaggerators by the Validity indices for the different levels was examined. The 
findings are presented in Table 18.
Table 18 Sensitivity of the Validity indices for the different levels of 
_____________ exaggeration used by the simulator group_________________ ___
Cut-off scores Never/Infrequently Sometimes/Frequently
for non-valid n=10 n=20
presentation N % 95%CI n % 95%CI
NIM >73 ï  ÏÔ 0.25-44.50 8 40 19.12-63.95
NIM >92 1 10 0.25-44.50 3 15 3.21-37.89
MAL >84 0 0 0-30.85 3 15 3.21-37.89
MAL >111 0 0 0-30.85 2 10 1.23-31.70
RDF >59 2 20 2.52-55.61 4 20 5.73-43.66
Note: n = number of participants; % = percentage of participants; Cl = confidence interval
As seen in Table 18 the proportion of the simulator group that 'never/ 
infrequently exaggerated', and were correctly detected as exaggerators by MAL, 
was zero. The NIM index, at both of the suggested cut-offs, correctly detected 10 
per cent, and the RDF index correctly detected 20 per cent of the exaggerators. 
Overall, the Validity indices showed very poor sensitivity in accurately detecting 
those that never/ infrequently exaggerated.
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From the participants in the simulator group that 'sometimes/ frequently' 
exaggerated, 40 per cent were correctly detected on NIM at the lower cut off of 
equal to or more than 73. However, the proportion of simulators correctly 
identified as exaggerators reduced when a higher cut off of equal to or more than 
92 was used, reducing the proportion identified to 15 per cent. A lower cut-off 
score on MAL (>84) correctly detected 15 per cent as exaggerators, and this also 
reduced with the higher cut-off used for this index (MAL>111) to 10 per cent. RDF 
accurately detected 20 per cent of the simulators. Overall, the ability of the 
Validity indices to accurately detect simulators who 'sometimes/ frequently 
exaggerate was unsatisfactory.
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4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Review of aims and objectives
The aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the PAI Validity indices 
NIM, MAL, and RDF in detecting exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI. The 
main objectives of the study were to compare the PAI Clinical scales and Validity 
indices between three participant groups: a TBI group; a control group and; a 
simulator group, and to examine the sensitivity and specificity of the PAI Validity 
indices in detecting exaggerators and non-exaggerators. In this section, the 
hypotheses of the study are revisited, and the findings discussed. The clinical 
implications of the findings are then reviewed, and finally a critical evaluation of 
the study is presented, with areas for further research highlighted.
4.2 Group comparisons of the PAI Clinical scales
It was predicted that participants in the simulator group would score significantly 
higher on Clinical scales than participants in the TBI and control groups. However, 
this hypothesis was not confirmed. Overall, in comparing the mean outcomes on 
the Clinical scales for all three participant groups, no evidence of difference was 
found across groups on five of the PAI Clinical scales: Mania, Paranoia, Antisocial 
Features, Alcohol Problems, and Drug Problems. On these scales, all three 
participant groups scored below 607 which is characteristic of 84 per cent of a 
non-clinical population (Morey, 2007), signifying that none of the participant 
groups indicated having difficulties in these areas. Similarly, Demakis et al. (2007) 
found few elevations on these PAI Clinical scales in individuals with a TBI, aside 
from Paranoia. These findings suggest that for individuals in the TBI group, these 
difficulties were not dissimilar to those within a non-clinical population. Similarly, 
the simulator group did not exaggerate these difficulties, showing success in their 
ability to replicate the performance of those with a TBI.
In a further examination of group comparisons, no evidence of a significant 
difference was found between the simulator group and the TBI group on the six 
Clinical scales: Somatic Complaints; Anxiety; Anxiety-Related Disorders; 
Depression; Schizophrenia and Borderline Features. However, when individually 
compared to the control group, both these groups showed significant differences
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on all but Borderline Features. Only the TBI group showed a difference on this 
scale, in comparison to the control group. These findings suggest that generally 
the TBI and simulator group expressed more difficulties in these areas than the 
controls.
In comparison to the control group (who scored between 467-517and close to 
the mean score of 507on the PAI), both the simulator and TBI groups scored 
within two standard deviations of the mean on these Clinical scales, with scores 
ranging between 577-697. Scores of the TBI and simulator group are 
characteristic of 98 per cent of a non-clinical population (Morey, 2007).
Therefore, these scores are relatively low for a clinical population. However, they 
are still elevated in comparison to the control group, which indicate an expression 
of some difficulty in these psychological domains. These findings further 
demonstrate the ability of the simulator group to successfully imitate 
presentations of individuals with a TBI. Interestingly, both the TBI and simulator 
groups showed most elevated mean 7 scores on Depression (63.20 and 69.40 
respectively), Somatic Complaints (63.57 and 67.87 respectively) and Anxiety 
(59.87 and 62.87 respectively). Also, when individually compared to the control 
group, a high level of significance was found for both groups on these three 
scales, and Anxiety-Related Disorders, all with large effect sizes (-.44 to .63).
These findings support the view that difficulties in these areas are known to be 
common psychological symptoms of TBI (McAllister & Arciniegas, 2002). Overall, 
these findings suggest that the simulator group were able to accurately replicate 
psychological symptoms that are experienced by individuals with a TBI.
4.3 Group comparisons of the PAI Validity indices
It was predicted that participants in the simulator group would score significantly 
higher on the Validity indices, than participants in the TBI and control groups. 
Overall, this hypothesis was not supported. The group comparisons for each of 
the Validity indices NIM, MAL and RDF are discussed.
On NIM a significant difference was found between the control and TBI group, 
and the control and simulator group, with large effect sizes (.52 and -.48 
respectively). No evidence of difference was found between the TBI and the
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simulator group. This finding was against what would be expected under the 
hypothesis. NIM detects exaggerated, unfavourable and distorted presentations 
of the self, and also detects reports of bizarre and unlikely symptoms (Morey, 
2007). A closer look at the mean 7 scores on NIM suggests that in comparison to 
the control group, both the TBI and simulator group produced more exaggerated 
and distorted presentations (control group=48.23, TBI group=60.57, and simulator 
group=65.37). Interestingly, the level of distortion by the TBI and simulator 
groups was similar. This suggests that for NIM, the simulators closely replicated 
performance of the TBI group, and therefore this index, is of little value in 
distinguishing between valid respondents (TBI group), and those who exaggerate 
(simulators).
Group comparisons of MAL scores provide no support for the hypothesis. MAL 
detects over-and under-endorsed items on the PAI that highlight profiles of 
individuals simulating mental disorder (Morey, 1996). Elevated scores above 847 
raise a question of malingering (Morey, 1996). A closer look at the mean 7 scores 
of the three groups on MAL suggests that all three participant groups endorsed 
items consistent with valid profiles (control group=49.67; TBI group=55.03; and 
simulator group=60.7). The fact that the simulator group did not present an 
invalid profile of exaggeration on the MAL index is perhaps unsurprising, as MAL 
was specifically designed to detect malingering of psychopathology rather than 
the psychological effects of TBI. As such, the eight configurai features of the PAI 
upon which MAL is based are suggested to be inadequate to detect the 
exaggeration in the simulator group in this study.
In contrast, comparisons on the RDF index showed evidence of a difference 
between the simulator and the TBI group with a medium effect size (-.34). 
However, a difference between the TBI and the control group was close to 
reaching significance also with a medium effect size (-.32). RDF serves a 
discriminant function, designed to differentiate when someone is simulating 
mental disorder (Rogers et al., 1996), and it has been suggested there would be 
difficulty replicating the overall profile of patients with psychological difficulties 
(Morey, 2007). These findings suggest that the simulator group were 
differentiated from the TBI group, scoring significantly higher on RDF (mean 7
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scores: 53.93 and 46.90 respectively), which partially supports the hypothesis. 
However, although the simulator group scored significantly higher than the TBI 
group, the mean 7 score for the simulator group was still within the valid range, 
and did not indicate feigning of psychological symptoms (scores of >597on RDF 
would have indicated feigning). Overall, these findings suggest that RDF is 
influenced by exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI, but not to a degree 
that exceeds the conventional cut-off level. Again, it is suggested that 
exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI may be distinct to exaggeration of 
psychopathology for a mental disorder. If this is the case, RDF may also be 
inadequate to detect the exaggeration of psychological symptoms of TBI.
These findings go against the findings of Baity et al. (2007) and Sullivan et al. 
(2010), who found significantly higher scores on all three Validity indices in 
participants asked to simulate mental disorder. In this study, a significant 
difference was only found between the simulator and the TBI group, on the RDF 
index. The difference in findings may be explained by some of the functions of 
the indices. For example, as discussed earlier, psychological symptoms of TBI may 
be quite distinct to psychopathology of mental disorder, thus the indices not 
relevant to detect exaggeration. Baity et al. (2007) and Sullivan et al. (2010) 
focused on the latter. The difference in findings may also be because different 
participant groups were recruited as 'simulators'. The study by Baity et al. (2007) 
recruited psychiatric participants, Sullivan et al. (2010) recruited first year 
psychology students who received course credit for participation, whereas 
participants in this study where from a TBI and healthy population, and no 
incentive was given. The different instructions, and methods by which the 
instructions were given to simulators prior to completing the PAI, also may have 
contributed to the outcome of this study. Baity et al. (2007) gave explicit 
instructions to patients to 'fake bad' to prolong their psychiatric hospital stay; 
Sullivan et al. (2010) asked participants to fake believable psychological 
impairment and gave a list of psychological symptoms to study before testing. In 
this study, simulators were given less direct instructions, and warned 'if you make 
your exaggeration obvious you risk being caught and receiving no financial 
reward'. Consequently, the similar performance on MAL across participant 
groups in this study, and the similar performance on NIM between the simulator
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and TBI group, may have been influenced by the participant recruitment and 
instructions given prior to testing. The method used in this study and the 
potential limitation are reviewed in detail later.
4.4 Effectiveness of the Validity indices in detecting exaggeration
It was predicted that the Validity indices NIM, MAL, and RDF would have high 
sensitivity in detecting the simulator group (exaggerators), and high specificity in 
detecting the TBI and control group (non-exaggerators). This hypothesis was 
partially supported.
On a whole, all three of the Validity indices at the suggested cut-offs (NIM>73; 
NIM>92; MAL>84; MAL>111; and RDF>59) showed little ability in accurately 
detecting the simulator group (6.7 per cent - 30 per cent), showing poor 
sensitivity. This finding did not support the hypotheses. The Validity indices at 
the suggested cut-offs showed high to perfect ability in accurately detecting non­
exaggerating in the TBI group (83.3 per cent -100 per cent), thus showing 
excellent specificity, and supporting the hypothesis. The Validity indices at the 
suggested cut-offs showed perfect ability in accurately detecting non­
exaggerating in the control group on all but RDF, which showed poor ability as a 
measure of detecting exaggeration (66.7 per cent). This outcome partially 
supports the hypothesis. Overall, given the poor level of sensitivity of the Validity 
indices in detecting the simulator group, these findings suggest that the PAI would 
be ineffective as a measure of detecting exaggerated psychological symptoms of 
TBI.
The unsatisfactory sensitivity of this measure in detecting exaggerated 
psychological symptoms of TBI may be because the degree of exaggeration varied 
across the simulator participant group. Some of the simulators 'never' or 
'infrequently' exaggerated as indicated on the post-experimental questionnaires 
that were completed. This is also reflected in the varied standard deviations from 
the mean on the indices. A greater variation in responses was noted on NIM and 
MAL (SD=21.54 and 19.47 respectively), suggesting that some simulators may 
have endorsed items that would reflect more exaggerated, unfavourable, and 
distorted presentations than others. The lack of sensitivity maybe also be
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because, as already discussed, the relevance of the Validity indices in 
differentiating psychological symptoms of TBI from psychopathology of mental 
disorder are dissimilar, and therefore insensitive in the detection of simulators in 
this study.
The sensitivity findings from this study partly replicate findings of Blanchard et al. 
(2003) who also found less than desirable sensitivity of MAL in detecting feigned 
psychopathology. However, Blanchard etal. (2003) found NIM and RDF to be 
valid in the detecting feigned psychopathology. This difference may be due to the 
different method used in the studies. Blanchard et al. (2003) used a student 
population to simulate psychopathology in a psychiatric and forensic population, 
and informed simulators that the PAI contained Validity indices, but did not give 
any further specific information.
For this study, a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis was 
considered. This was to examine different cut-off scores for each of the Validity 
indices, in order to propose new cut-offs at which a more satisfactory sensitivity 
level would be achieved, and exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI 
detected. However, this would have compromised the specificity outcomes. 
Maintaining a high specificity level is important for the purpose of this study, as 
this measure was being evaluated as a test of exaggerated psychological 
symptoms that would be useful in the diagnosis of MND (Slick et al., 1999). In 
such tests, higher levels of specificity (90 per cent or higher) are preferable. By 
reducing the level of specificity, it is also potentially raising ethical concerns of 
incorrectly identifying an individual as feigning psychological symptoms of TBI 
when they may indeed be showing authentic symptoms.
The sensitivity findings from this study indicate that exaggerated psychological 
symptoms of TBI is unlikely to be detected on the PAI Validity indices. However, 
compared with a control group, the probability that high outcomes on NIM and 
MAL (>73 and >84 respectively) accurately indicate exaggeration is perfect 
(100%), but the probability that high outcomes on RDF accurately indicate 
exaggeration is poor (37.5%). Aside from RDF, these findings are promising, 
suggesting high positive predictive power of NIM and MAL. This means where
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there is detection of exaggeration on these indices, the identification of 
exaggeration is likely to be true. Comparisons between the simulator group and 
TBI group show similar outcomes of positive predictive power, yet show varied 
predictive power dependent on the cut-off that is used for the indices. The 
probability that a high outcome on MAL, equal to or more than 111, accurately 
indicates exaggeration is perfect (100%), and is less so for MAL, equal to or more 
than 84 (60%); and the probability that a high outcome on NIM, equal to or more 
than 92, to accurately reflect exaggeration is highly impressive (80%), yet less so 
for NIM, equal to or more than 73 (64.2%). The probability that a high outcome 
on the RDF index indicates exaggeration is better than when simulators are 
compared to a control group (54.5% and 37.5% respectively), yet still 
unsatisfactory. This means where there is detection of exaggeration on MAL and 
NIM, the identification is highly likely to be true when the higher suggested cut­
offs are used, and though the lower suggested cut-offs are likely to be true for 
exaggeration of psychological symptoms of TBI, these are not as robust.
As discussed, the findings suggest that as predicted, the Validity indices NIM,
MAL, and RDF achieved acceptable to perfect specificity in accurately detecting 
both the TBI and control group (non-exaggerators). However, independent 
comparisons of both these groups with the simulator group showed that the 
probability that a low score on the Validity indices accurately reflects non­
exaggeration is poor, with a negative predictive power ranging from 45.5 per cent 
to 58.8 per cent. This suggests that where no detection of exaggeration is 
indicated on the Validity indices, this does not necessarily imply no exaggerating, 
suggesting that someone potentially exaggerating psychological symptoms of TBI 
may go undetected.
Overall, the results from looking at the positive and negative predictive power of 
the Validity indices suggests that elevated scores on the Validity indices at the 
suggested cut-offs probably indicate exaggerating but normal scores on the 
Validity indices do not rule out exaggerating .
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4.5 Additional findings
Previous studies with similar objectives as this study have utilised a "differential 
prevalence" method where compensation status has been used to define TBI 
participant groups. Findings from these studies have found those seeking 
compensation exaggerate cognitive deficits (e.g. Rees etal., 1998). Some 
individuals in the TBI group in this study were seeking financial compensation, 
thus the presence of a real external incentive that may have influenced outcomes 
was considered, and a further analysis conducted. Participants in the TBI group 
seeking compensation were removed, and any change in the false detection of 
the group as exaggerators was examined.
A slight reduction in false detection was found for the Validity indices NIM, at the 
suggested cut-off equal to or more than 73, and RDF equal to or more than 59. 
This suggests that when the TBI group consisted of participants seeking 
compensation, the proportion identified as false positives could have been 
'artificially' inflated, and included correct detection of participants in the TBI 
group who were seeking compensation and were exaggerating. However, no 
change in the proportion of false positives was found on NIM at a cut-off equal to 
or more than 92, and MAL equal to or more than 84, and no difference was found 
on MAL equal to or more than 111. Therefore, a conclusion of those seeking 
financial compensation influencing outcomes for the TBI group can only be 
speculative, and further research using a group of individuals with a TBI seeking 
compensation versus not seeking compensation would illuminate these issues 
further.
Other 'differential prevalence' studies have used severity of injury to define 
participant groups where those with milder injuries are viewed as more likely to 
be exaggerating (e.g. Green et al., 1999; Greiffensetin et al., 2002). In this study 
the TBI group consisted of individuals with a range of injury severity, thus the 
potential influence of injury severity on the proportion of false positives (those 
incorrectly identified as malingerers) was also considered. However, due to 
missing information regarding severity of injury for one third of the group, this did 
not appear to be feasible.
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Sullivan and King (2010) used a post-experimental questionnaire in their study to 
'assess understanding and compliance with experimental instructions' (p.76). A 
similar method was used in this study to understand the strategy and level of 
exaggeration adopted by the simulator group. Findings suggested that more than 
half of the participants (n=17) used a strategy, and less than half (n=13) used no 
strategy. An analysis to examine the proportion of simulators accurately detected 
as exaggerators for the two sub-groups was carried out. Overall, for the group 
that adopted a strategy, a less than satisfactory proportion of simulators were 
accurately detected by the Validity indices at the various cut-offs showing poor 
sensitivity (from 5.9%-41.2%). The outcome was even worse for the group that 
used no strategy, with an even fewer proportion of simulators being accurately 
identified (7.7%-15.4%). Even though both sub-groups were poorly detected by 
the Validity indices at the various cut-offs, it was interesting to note that a higher 
proportion of individuals that used a strategy were, on the whole, more likely to 
be detected than those that used no strategy. This suggests a counter-intuitive 
conclusion that using a strategy to exaggerate psychological symptoms of TBI may 
be maladaptive. Again this is only speculative, and more research would need to 
be done to explore this issue.
On the post-experimental questionnaire, information obtained from a five-point 
likert scale showed that most simulators either 'infrequently' exaggerated (less 
than a quarter) or 'sometimes' exaggerated (less than a half). No one claimed to 
have 'always' exaggerated; fewer indicated that they 'never' or 'frequently' 
exaggerated. The influence of the varied levels of exaggeration on the sensitivity 
of the Validity indices at the suggested cut-offs were examined. Due to the small 
number of participants in each sub-group, the levels of 'never' and 'infrequently' 
were combined (n=10), as were the number of participants in the level of 
'sometimes' and 'frequently' (n=20). Overall, findings suggest that when 
simulators 'never/ infrequently' exaggerated, the proportion correctly identified 
as exaggerators on the Validity indices NIM and MAL was lower than when 
simulators 'sometimes/frequently' exaggerated. The proportion of simulators 
correctly identified on RDF was similar across the different levels of exaggeration. 
This finding highlights the sensitivity of the Validity indices in detecting 
exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI, although still at an unsatisfactory
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level. The varied performance of the simulators suggests that exaggeration of 
psychological symptoms of TBI is multi-faceted, and far from static.
4.6 Clinical implications
Overall, this study found that as a measure of detecting exaggerated psychological 
symptoms of TBI, the PAI has limitations. The Validity indices at the suggested 
cut-offs were generally unsatisfactory in detecting the simulator group. However, 
many factors need to be considered before declaring them ineffective for use in 
clinical or medico-legal contexts. First, the issue that feigned psychological 
symptoms of TBI and feigned psychopathology of mental disorders may be 
distinct, needs to be given further thought. Given that the PAI Validity indices are 
more closely related to the latter, their use may be limited with neurological 
populations, but satisfactory with other participant groups. Second, the strategy 
adopted by simulators, and the presentation of exaggeration varied across the 
group. More promise of the PAI as a measure of detecting exaggerating was 
shown when simulators adopted strategies, and when simulators were highly 
exaggerating. This suggests that exaggeration is not stable and static, and looking 
at individual presentations in detail would create a more holistic picture. Third, 
this study was based on a simulation design and did not involve an external 
incentive to exaggerate, as may be the case for people seeking compensation in 
reality, thus the findings are not exact and have limited applicability. Therefore, 
to totally discount the use of the PAI Validity indices in being useful in clinical and 
medico-legal contexts, at this stage, would be premature.
In spite of showing limited utility in detecting exaggeration, the findings from the 
group comparisons analyses were useful and insightful. The control group scored 
closest to the mean of 507on the PAI Clinical scales, the TBI group also scored 
close to the mean of 507, yet comparatively higher than the control group on 
some of the Clinical scales. Where evidence of comparative differences was 
found, this provides clinically useful information about the common psychological 
difficulties experienced by those with a TBI. So, as a self-report measure of 
psychological symptoms, the PAI can be used as a method of obtaining 
information that is important in rehabilitation after a TBI.
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4.7 Critical evaluation
Most research on exaggeration of TBI symptoms has focused on the development 
and validation of neuropsychological measures (e.g. TOMM, PORT, WMT). Little 
research has been done to investigate exaggerated or feigned neuropsychological 
deficits associated with excessive self-reports of psychological symptoms fRogers 
et al., 1993). The aim of this study was to explore this issue by evaluating the 
effectiveness of the PAI Validity indices in detecting exaggerated psychological 
symptoms of TBI. Therefore, this study is unique in its own right.
A simulation design was used in this study. This is a commonly used method in 
malingering research, and has excellent internal validity (Rogers & Bender, 2003). 
However, the external validity, which implies the ability to generalise from 
findings using this method, may be limited because simulated exaggerators may 
not present in the same way as exaggerators in reality (Rogers et al., 1993). The 
'simulation-malingering paradox' highlights that in simulation design, simulators 
are being requested to comply with instructions to feign, so that researchers can 
study those who are feigning when asked to comply (Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983). 
This paradox further highlights the limited ability to generalise from findings 
based on a simulation study.
An advantage of using the simulation method was that a researcher can control 
for factors that may influence outcomes. Participants in the simulator group were 
all given the same instructions, and participants in the control and TBI group were 
given the same standardised instructions. A particular strength of this study was 
that both the control and simulation group were matched proportionally in their 
basic demographics to the TBI group, thus controlling confounding variables. 
Other studies of malingering that use simulation designs have commonly 
recruited students as simulators, and have not controlled for these variables (e.g. 
Inman & Berry, 2002; Rees et al., 1998). Therefore, despite the limitations of a 
simulation design, the researcher took additional steps to enhance the internal 
validity to allow for some generalisation.
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Previous studies evaluating the ability of stand-alone and embedded 
neuropsychological measures to detect exaggerated cognitive symptoms of TBI, 
and tests of psychopathology used to assess exaggerated psychological symptoms 
of TBI, have used varied approaches in defining participant groups. As previously 
mentioned, some of these studies have used a 'simulation' approach whereby 
participants identified as malingerers are recruited from non-clinical populations 
(e.g. university students), and have been given instructions to feign 
neuropsychological or psychological symptoms (e.g. Inman & Berry, 2002; Rees et 
al., 1998). Other studies have used a 'differential prevalence' approach, and 
defined participant groups in terms of injury severity (i.e. mild, moderate, and 
severe), and examined differences in performance of groups, where those with 
milder injuries have been perceived as likely to be exaggerating 
neuropsychological deficits (e.g. Green etal., 1999; Greiffensetin etal., 2002). 
Using the same approach, some studies have defined participant groups in terms 
of compensation status, with an assumption that those seeking compensation are 
more likely to be malingering (e.g. Binder, 1993; Millis & Putnam, 1994; Rees et 
al., 1998; Ross et al., 2004). Lastly, studies have differentiated participant groups 
based on a set of malingering criteria, defining a 'known group' of malingerers 
(e.g. Greve et al., 2006; Greve & Bianchini, 2006). In this study, three participant 
groups were recruited of which one group were a TBI group. The severity of 
injury and compensation status in this group varied. Although not directly 
impacting on the sensitivity findings of this study, it would have been ideal to 
have recruited a homogenous TBI group that consisted of individuals with either a 
mild, moderate or severe TBI. Kurtz et al. (2007) found variability in the PAI 
outcomes of individuals with mild, moderate and severe injuries. Individuals with 
mild TBI showed more elevations on the PAI Somatic Complaints and Depression 
scales, with those with moderate-to-severe injuries showing elevations on 
Antisocial Features and Alcohol Problems scales. In the context of this study, it 
potentially means that a different profile of clinical scores for the TBI group may 
depend on the make-up of the TBI group. At the same time this could also mean 
those from the TBI group correctly identified as non-exaggerators are dependent 
on the make-up of the group. Therefore, although not a limitation in its entirety, 
a homogenous TBI group would have strengthened the design of this study.
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As the simulator group had no external incentive to feign, like individuals seeking 
compensation in reality, this can be considered a limitation of the study. The lack 
of external incentive may have influenced outcomes of the sensitivity findings.
Reflecting on the approach taken in instructing simulators to feign symptoms, a 
further limitation of this study is highlighted. Participants in this study were given 
an accident scenario to read. A closer examination of this scenario highlights 
ambiguity of the severity of TBI that simulators were replicating. Participants in 
the simulator group may potentially have interpreted the instructions very 
differently, some exaggerating mild injuries, and others potentially exaggerating 
moderate or severe injuries. Furthermore, the instructions presented both 
cognitive and psychological deficits as consequences of TBI that simulators may 
have experienced. This may have been inadvertently misleading in terms of what 
the study was attempting to measure. In retrospect, it may have been more 
beneficial to give more detailed instructions, focusing solely on the psychological 
aspects.
4.8 Future research
This study has been the first to examine the use of the PAI Validity indices in 
detecting exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI. Evidently there is much 
room for further research, some of which is developing on the limitations of this 
study. As part of this development, it is proposed that different and more distinct 
approaches in defining participant groups are used. One approach would be to 
make further distinctions within the simulator participant group by potentially 
recruiting more than one simulator group, and giving each group different 
instructions regarding levels of exaggeration. The same approach could also be 
used by giving and not giving explicit strategies to simulate. For example, similar 
to the study conducted by Sullivan et al. (2010), participants could be given 
explicit instructions to study before being tested, such as a list of psychological 
symptoms typically experienced after a TBI. Taking these approaches would 
further inform how influential these variable issues are in the ability of the PAI 
Validity indices, to accurately detect exaggeration of psychological symptoms of 
TBI. This may potentially help in the development of new cut-off T scores of the 
existing Validity indices that may be helpful in distinguishing between different
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levels and strategies of exaggeration. This may be similar to the different levels - 
definite, probable, and possible - in the MND criteria established by Slick et al. 
(1999).
A repeat of this study, making more distinctions within the TBI group, is 
suggested. As highlighted, one of the limitations was having a mixed TBI group 
that made up a 'non-exaggerating' group. In building on this study, it would be 
useful to recruit individuals with a similar injury severity to non-exaggerators, thus 
limiting confounding variables within the TBI group. A final approach in 
developing this study would be to use a 'known groups' design versus a 
'simulation' design. This would mean using the criteria established by Slick et al. 
(1999) to define a group of individuals with a TBI as known exaggerators, and 
compare against a group of individuals with a TBI not meeting these criteria. This 
would build on the limitations of this study, where no external incentive to 
exaggerate was present. Again, it is advised that to limit confounding variables 
the severity of injury should be assessed and only participants with a similar injury 
severity recruited across both groups. Overall, this approach would strengthen 
the external validity of the study, enabling more ability to generalise from the 
findings.
In evaluating the effectiveness of the PAI as a measure of detecting feigned 
psychological symptoms of TBI, an entire new approach could be taken, which 
would involve the development of a new discriminant function of the measure.
As discussed, the presentation of psychological symptoms of TBI may be distinct 
from mental disorders, and thus exaggeration is not detected by the existing 
Validity indices. The RDF scale was developed as a discriminant function designed 
to differentiate between patients with mental health difficulties and those asked 
to simulate a mental disorder. It is proposed that a similar function could be 
developed in the context of feigning psychological symptoms of TBI. This has 
previously been done on the MMPI-2 (Butcher et al., 2001), where the FBS was 
specifically developed for use within the medico-legal settings, with the TBI 
population. Further analysis of the existing findings could develop this function.
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4.9 Dissemination
The results of this study will be presented to a neuropsychology department 
based within a neurorehabilitation service in South-West London. This study will 
also be submitted for publication within a neuropsychology journal.
4.10 Conclusion
The psychological sequelae strategy identified by Rogers et al. (1993) suggests 
that feigned neuropsychological deficits are associated with exaggerated 
psychological deficits. Further, Slick et al. (1999) state that evidence of 
exaggerated or fabricated psychological dysfunction contributes to identification 
of MND. The aim of this study was to explore these ideas by evaluating the PAI as 
a measure of detecting exaggerated psychological symptoms of TBI; however, as 
evidenced, this measure has shown little use. This is the first study exploring the 
use of the PAI in this context, and is not without its flaws. Taking into 
consideration some of the limitations and areas for further research highlighted, it 
is suggested that the study be developed, and the utility of the PAI as a measure 
of detection be further examined.
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6 APPENDICES
6.1 Appendix A Demographic information sheet
Demographic Information Sheet
Please can you tick the relevant boxes and complete the information requested to 
help identify key information about participants taking part in this research study. 
If you have any questions regarding the completion of this form please ask the 
researcher. Thank-you!
1) Age _______ (years)
2) Gender
□ Male
□ Female
3) Ethnicity
a) White
□ British
□ Irish
□ European
□ Other
b) Black or Black British
□ Black Caribbean
□ Black African
□ Other
c) Asian or Asian British
□ Indian
□ Pakistani
□ Bangladeshi
□ Other
d) Chinese
□ Chinese
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□ Chinese British
e) Mixed
□ White and Black Caribbean
□ White and Black African
□ White and Asian
□ Other
f) Other (please specify)_______________________________
4) Please state your highest level of educational qualification (e.g. 
postgraduate)
□ No qualification
□ GCSE/O Level
□ A Level
□ Graduate
□ Postgraduate
5) Are you currently
□ Employed
□ Unemployed
□ Student
□ Self-Employed
□ Disability
(Please tick the main category that applies e.g. i f  you are a student who is 
working please identify which out the two categories would most apply)
6) Is English your first language?
□ Yes
□ No
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7) Have you been diagnosed with a Learning Disability e.g. Dyslexia
□ Yes
□ No
8) Has your doctor ever told you that you had one of the following 
neurological problems (Dementia, Alzheimer’s)
□ Yes
□ No
9) Do you have a visual impairment not corrected by glasses?
□ Yes
□ No
10) Have you ever had a head injury that required hospital treatment?
□ Yes
□ No
(If no, end here, i f  yes please continue)
11) How long has it been since your head injury?
_______years________ months
12) What led to your head injury? (e.g. road traffic accident)
13) What was your Glasgow Coma Scale Score (if available)
14) Are you currently involved in medico-legal proceedings?
□ Yes
□ No
Thank you for your time in providing this information 
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6.3 Appendix C Nine items of the Negative Impression Scale (NIM)
PAI Item 
Number
Statement
9 Sometimes 1 cannot remember who 1 am
49 1 have visions in which 1 see myself forced to commit crimes
89 Since the day 1 was born, 1 was destined to be unhappy
129 1 think 1 have three or four completely different personalities 
inside of me
169 People don't understand how much 1 suffer
209 Every once in a while 1 totally lose my memory
249 Sometimes my vision is only black and white
289 1 don't have any good memories from my childhood
329 1 have severe psychological problems that began very suddenly
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6.4 Appendix D Calculating the Malingering index (MAL)
Table extracted from Morey (2007)
Feature Weight
Infrequency minus Inconsistency >15T 1
Negative Impression >110T 1
Negative Impression minus Infrequency >20T 1
Depression >85T and RXR >45T 1
Mania-lrritability minus Mania-Grandiosity >15T 1
Paranoia-Persecution minus Paranoia-Hypervigilance >15T 1
Paranoia-Persecution minus Paranoia-Resentment >15T
Antisocial Features-Egocentricity minus Antisocial Features- 
Antisocial Behaviours
1
1
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6.5 Appendix E Calculating the Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF)
Table extracted from Morey (2007)
Score Weight
Inconsistency (ICN) .01718613
Infrequency (INF) .01976398
Stress (STR) -.01917862
Treatment Rejection (RXR) .02103711
Somatic Complaints-Conversion (SOM-C) -.03403340
Somatic Complaints-Health Concerns (SOM-H) .02824221
Anxiety-Affective (ANX-A) -.04109886
Anxiety-Physiological (ANX-P) .05324155
Anxiety Related Disorders-Obsessive-Compulsive (ARD-O) -.01773748
Anxiety Related Disorders-Phobias (ARD-P) .02758030
Anxiety Related Disorders-Traumatic Stress (ARD-T) -.01741280
Depression-Cognitive (DEP-C) .04121700
Paranoia-Hypervigilance (PAR-H) .01603311
Paranoia-Resentment (PAR-R) .01554190
Schizophrenia-Psychotic Experiences (SCZ-P) .01775538
Schizophrenia-Thought Disorder (SCZ-T) -.02750892
Borderline Features-ldentity Problems (BOR-I) -.02909405
Borderline Features-Negative Relationships (BOR-N) .03675012
Borderline Features-Self Harm (BOR-S) -.01793721
Antisocial Features-Egocentricity (ANT-E) .02152554
Constant -6.60458400
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6.6 Appendix F Accident scenario
Imagine that within the last year you were involved in a motor vehicle accident in 
which another driver hit your car. You suffered injuries to the head and were 
knocked unconscious. You were transported to an Accident and Emergency 
Department, and were admitted to hospital. After regaining consciousness you 
were dazed, not taking things in properly, and you were also in considerable pain. 
After a period of recovery in hospital, you were discharged and told about typical 
things you may experience after a head injury. This included frequent headaches, 
ringing in you ears, double vision, dizziness, nausea, increased fatigue, decreased 
motivation, and problems with thinking (like attention problems, slowed thinking, 
problem solving difficulties, and/or memoiy problems), as well as increased 
irritability, mood swings, anxiety and/or depression.
When you returned home you continued to feel unwell for several weeks, and 
consequently were not able to return to work. You have decided to make a claim 
for the injuries you have suffered and now have a solicitor who is dealing with the 
case to ensure that you receive appropriate compensation for the damages to your 
car plus the pain, suffering, and inconvenience this accident has caused. For the 
most part your symptoms are gradually improving.
You have now been told by your solicitor that you will undergo a psychological 
assessment as part of your claim. As part of this you have been asked to complete 
a questionnaire to reflect the severity of the problems you have experienced. The 
results of this assessment play a large part in the amount of settlement that you will 
receive. You know that the more affected you appear to be, the more financial 
compensation you are likely to receive. Your ability to convey this information 
without making your exaggeration obvious also has direct bearing on the amount of 
your financial settlement. Therefore, you want to answer the questionnaire the 
way you think you would have immediately following the accident in order to 
convince the court that you deserve a large financial settlement. However, if you 
make your exaggeration obvious you risk being caught and receiving no financial 
reward.
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6.7 Appendix G Post experimental questionnaire
Post experimental questionnaire
The following questions will allow us to understand how much you exaggerated 
when completing the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) and what strategies 
you used to fake psychological symptoms. Please can you tick the relevant boxes 
and complete the information as requested. If you have any questions regarding 
the completion of this form please ask the researcher. Thank-you!
1) On a scale of 1-5 how much did you exaggerate when completing the 
questionnaire?
1-----------------2-----------------3----------------- 4----------------- 5
Never Infrequently Sometimes Frequently Always
2) If you did exaggerate symptoms, what strategies did you use to fake? 
{please tick the strategy that most applies)
Ü Did not report extreme symptoms
□ Felt confident could outsmart system
□ Relied on given or personal knowledge
□ No strategy used
□ Other__________________________________
Thank you for taking your time in providing this information.
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6.8 Appendix H Participant Information Sheets
Participant Information Sheet 
(Head Injury Group)
Title of study:
The Personality Assessment Inventory: Assessment of psychological symptoms 
reported in head injury
Name of Researcher: Gursharan Virdee
You have been invited to participate in my research study. To help you decide if 
you would like to take part I have provided the following information to 
understand why this research is being done.
Purpose of the study
This study is part of my doctoral training as a clinical psychologist. It is looking at 
how specific and sensitive the use of a self report personality measure is when 
detecting psychological symptoms experienced by individuals who have sustained 
a head injury and those who do not.
Why have I been asked to participate?
In total three groups of individuals are being asked to participate. One of these 
groups consists of individuals who have sustained a head injury.
Do I have to take part?
Taking part in this study is entirely your choice. You will be asked to sign a 
consent form to show that you have agreed to take part. If you change your mind 
about participation in this study you are free to withdraw at anytime. If  you 
withdraw all your identifiable information and data collected from you will be 
destroyed and not used in the study.
W hat would be involved if I take part?
If you agree to take part in this research, demographic information about yourself 
will be collected. This will also include basic information about how your 
sustained your head injury. If you have already completed a self report personality 
measure as part of your assessment process, this will be used as data for this 
research. If you have not completed a self report personality measure, you will be 
asked to complete one, where the data will be used for the purpose of this research. 
If you are pursuing a legal claim, the research will not have any impact on that 
claim.
When collecting the demographic information, you can either provide this 
information yourself, or with your consent I can collect this information from the 
healthcare professional who approached you about this research.
Is this study confidential?
Yes. All information about you will be handled in complete confidence following 
ethical and legal practice. You will be allocated a participant number to ensure 
anonymity and confidentiality upon consenting to the research.
W hat happens when the research completes?
Once all information has been collated the data generated will be analysed. This 
will then be written up as part of my doctoral training as a clinical psychologist. It
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6.9 Appendix I Consent Forms
Consent Form
(Head Injury Group)
Title of study:
The Personality Assessment Inventory: Assessment of psychological symptoms 
reported in head injury
Name of Researcher: Gursharan Virdee
□ I have read and understood the participant information sheet, dated
_____________ and have had the opportunity to ask questions and consider
what my participation in this research will involve.
□ I understand that I am not obliged to take part in this research. Should I 
wish to withdraw from this study at any time I can do so without having to 
justify my decision and this will not affect any current treatment that I 
receive.
□ I understand that the self report personality measure that I had/have 
completed during my assessment process is going to be used as part of the 
data for this research.
□ I agree that it is okay for the chief investigator (Gursharan Virdee) to gain 
information and clarify details regarding my demographics and details 
regarding my head injury from the healthcare professional that has 
approached me regarding my participation in this research.
□ I agree to take part in this study.
Signature of participant___________________  Date_________
Name
□ I confirm that I have explained the nature of this research and that 
this has been fully understood by the participant.
Signature of researcher___________________  Date____________
Name
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Consent Form
(Healthy Control Group)
Title of study:
The Personality Assessment Inventory: Assessment of psychological symptoms
reported in head injury
Name of Researcher: Gursharan Virdee
□ I have read and understood the participant information sheet, dated
_____________ and have had the opportunity to ask questions and consider
what my participation in this research will involve.
□ I understand that I am not obliged to take part in this research. Should I 
wish to withdraw from this study at any time I can do so without having to 
justify my decision.
□ I agree to take part in this study.
Signature of participant___________________  Date
Name ____________________________________
□ I confirm that I have explained the nature of this research and that 
this has been fully understood by the participant.
Signature of researcher___________________  D ate____________
Name ___________________________________
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Consent Form
(Experimental Group Simulating a Head Injury)
Title of study:
The Personality Assessment Inventory: Assessment of psychological symptoms 
reported in head injury
Name of Researcher: Gursharan Virdee
□ I have read and understood the participant information sheet, dated
_____________and have had the opportunity to ask questions and consider
what my participation in this research will involve.
□ I understand that I am not obliged to take part in this research. Should I 
wish to withdraw from this study at any time I can do so without having to 
justify my decision.
□ I agree to take part in this study.
Signature of participant___________________  Date
Name
□ I confirm that I have explained the nature of this research and that 
this has been fully understood by the participant.
Signature of researcher___________________  Date____________
Name
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6.10 Appendix J Study approval documents
NHS Research Ethics Committee, Surrey Research Ethics Committee, and St
Georges Research and Development Team letters
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UNIVERSITY OF
Dr Adrian Coyle
Chair: Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Faculty ofAm and Human SciencesCommittee 
University of Surrey Faculty O ffice 
AD BuPding
G u ild fo rd , Surrey GU2 ?XH UK
1: t44 (0)1483 6BS445 
F: *4 4(0)1483 685559
Miss Gursharan Virdee
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey
8* October 2010
Dear Gursharan
Reference: 497-PSY-10 (NHS Approved)
Title of Project: Do self report measures of personality detect those who malinger 
psychological symptoms after sustaining a mild to moderate head injury
Thank you for your submission of the above proposal
The Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee has given a favourable ethical 
opinion.
If there are any significant changes to this proposal you may need to consider requesting 
scrutiny by the Faculty Ethics Committee.
Y n n r e  t i n r . p r e l v
Dr Adrian Coyle
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Chair’s Action
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences 
Ethics Committee
Ref:
Name of Student: 
Title of Project:
Supervisor:
Date of submission:
497-PSY-10 
GURSHARAN VIRDEE
Do self report measures of personality detect 
those who malinger psychological symptoms 
after sustaining a mild to moderate head injury
LINDA MORISON
07 OCTOBER 2010
The above Project has received NHS approval and expeditious ethical approval has 
been granted.
Signed: iXtL ia cu- 
DiyAdrian. 
Chair
Dated: 7 ^  O c c 2 .o io
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St George's Healthcare ftVr
\C  St George's NH5Trust
University of London
St George’s Research Office
Ground Floor, Hunter Wing, St George's University of London, 
Cranmer Terrace, Tooting, London SW17 ORE
All research carried out within St George's Healthcare NHS Trust and St George's, University of 
London, must be in accordance with the principles set out in the Research Governance Framework 
for Health and Social Care (2005, second edition, Department of Health).
Failure to comply with the above conditions and regulations will result in the suspension of the 
research project.
Please contact the Research Office if you require any further guidance or information on any 
matter mentioned above. We wish you every success in your research.
Yours sincerely _
uLsubhiféedi
Clinical Research Governance Officer 
St George’s Joint Research Office
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6.11 Appendix K Study amendment approval documents
NHS Research Ethics Committee, Surrey Research Ethics Committee, and St
Georges Research and Development Team letters
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Participant Consent Form: (Healthy Control Group) 2 24 January 2011
Participant Consent Form: (Head Injury Group) 2 124 January 2011
Participant Information Sheet: (Experimental Group 
Stimulating a Head Injury)
2 !24 January 2011
i
Participant Information Sheet: (Healthy Control Group) 2 24 January 2011
Participant Information Sheet: (Head Injury Group) 3 24 January 2011
Notice of Substantial Amendment (non-CTIMPs) 1st Amendment 24 January 2011
Covering Letter Letter to Ms Braley 
from Miss Virdee
24 January 2011
Accident Scenario 2 24 January 2011
Membership o f the Committee
The members of the Committee who took partin the review are listed on the attached sheet.
R&D approval
All investigators and research collaborators in the NHS should notify the R&D office for the relevant 
NHS care organisation of this amendment and check whether it affects R&D approval of the 
research.
Statement o f compliance
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics 
Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK.
10/HQ722f56:  Please quote this number on all correspondence
Yours sincerely
Ms Louise Braley 
Committee Co-ordinator
E-mail: louise.braley@nhs.net
Enclosures: List of names and professions of members who took part in the review
Copy to: Dr Martin Van Den Broek
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SURREY
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F
Dr Adrian Coyle
Chair: Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics
Fatuity of
Arts and Human Sciences
Committee 
University of Surrey G u ild fo rd . Su rrey G U 27 X H  U K
T: +14 (0)1463 659445 
F:+44 (0)1483 689550
Gursharan Virdee
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey
7th March 2011
Dear Gursharan
Reference: 497-PSY-19 Amendments (NHS Approved)
Title of Project: Personality Assessment Inventory and the Detection of Malingering
Thank you for your submission of amendments to the above proposal.
The Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Hthies Committee has given a favourable ethical 
opinion.
If there are any significant changes to this proposal you may need to consider requesting 
scrutiny by the Faculty Ethics Commillcc.
Yours sincerely
Dr Adrian Coyle 
Chair
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Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences 
Ethics Committee
Chair’s Action for amendments to Project
Ref:
Name of Student:
Title of Project:
Supervisor:
Date of submission of 
amendments:
497-PSY-10
GURSHARAN VIRDEE
Personality Assessment Inventory and the 
Detection of Malingering
LINDA MORISON (for original project)
22nd February 2011
The amendments to the above Project have received NHS approval and expeditious 
ethical approval has been granted.
Signed: _u
Dfkdrian Coyle 
Chair
Dated: 7 fch Hc.r 2 0 n
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